[lit-ideas] Re: "Promissory Materialism" [was: the first lines are the argument referred by]
- From: "Eric Yost" <mr.eric.yost@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 15:15:05 -0500
Isn’t it more precise to refer to the particular view of mind-brain identity as
“physicalism” rather than materialism? Materialism seems an awkward term,
especially given the electrical nature of neuronal activity, but also
considering that “matter” (ordinary matter and energy) is only a small portion
of the universe.
From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On
Behalf Of John Wager
Sent: Tuesday, November 08, 2011 9:15 AM
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: "Promissory Materialism" [was: the first lines are the
argument referred by]
Donal McEvoy wrote:
. . . . Papineau doesn’t suppose that current science has yet established any
such identity; and while he can “see no reason to think that such advances need
to take us beyond physical theories of the same general sort as we already
have”, he does admit that “it is possible that our access to such identities
will require significant advances in brain science.” In other words, we accept
this materialism on the promise that it will deliver the necessary advances,
however "significant". [It is also only a promise to claim that these advances
will not need to take us beyond physical theories of the same general sort as
we already have] While Popper makes it clear he does not assert that “it is
impossible that things may happen as the physicalist says here” [TSAIB p.98],
nevertheless “all the physicalist offers is, as it were, a cheque drawn against
his future prospects, and based on the hope that a theory will be developed one
day which solves his problems for him; the hope, in short, that something will
turn up.”
Here's one way to test this: If scientists succeed in creating a non-phenomenal
way to induce the theory of materialism into the brain that does not require a
logical analysis of an argument, then the theory should hold true. "Theories"
are phenomenal, after all, not material. So "in theory" if materialism is
true, its truth should be independent of its phenomenal status; it should be
possible to "cause" truth by material changes in the structure of the brain
independent of the arguments proposed for that truth.
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