[lit-ideas] Re: "Promissory Materialism" [was: the first lines are the argument referred by]
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 11:47:05 +0000 (GMT)
A more point-by-point comment on John's last post below.
________________________________
From: John Wager <jwager@xxxxxxxxxx>
>Here's one way to test this: If scientists succeed in creating a
>non-phenomenal way to induce the theory of materialism into the brain that
>does not require a logical analysis of an argument, then the theory should
>hold true.>
This is dubious. A "non-phenomenal way to induce the theory...into the brain"
would be something like a chemical or other physical World 1entity (that could
be injected or attached or slotted into the brain); but even if doing this
caused the brain to 'believe' or 'accept' "the theory of materialism", this
would not show that theory was true - for presumably, a false theory could also
be 'induced' in this way. All it would show is that we can, by materialist
means, make it so the brain thinks "the theory of materialism" is true. For
this reason, even this achievement - which would be an incredible achievement
for materialists - would not show their "theory of materialism" to be true.
But even this side-steps the question of how a "theory of materialism" could be
compacted into a material entity, which of course is the fundamental
metaphysical problem but one which is simply assumed to be soluble in this
'thought-experiment'.
> "Theories" are phenomenal, after all,
not material.
As my last post outlined, a perhaps better way of putting it is that the
content of a theory 'belongs' to World 3 and is not reducible to its "material"
embodiment in World 1. This is a clearer and less problematic way of talking
than saying '"Theories" are phenomenal'. If 'phenomenal' = World 2, or some
aspect of World 2, then it is not adequate to identify the content of a theory
with World 2 in this way. To say a theory may be grasped or understood by World
2, or to say likewise that the understanding of a theory is 'phenomenal', is
not to say that the content of a theory itself is phenomenal. After all, the
perception of a rock may be 'phenomenal' (World 2) but this does not mean that
the content of a rock as an item in World 1 is 'phenomenal'. Even aside of the
highly troubled history of the term 'phenomena' and 'phenomenal' in philosophy,
the claim that "'Theories are phenomenal invites" confusions that are better
avoided by using World123
terminology in an appropriate way.
> So "in theory" if materialism is true, its truth
should be independent of its phenomenal status;
While it may be true that its truth as a theory "should be independent of its
phenomenal status", it is not obviously crucial to the argument here.
>it should be
possible to "cause" truth by material changes in the structure of
the brain independent of the arguments proposed for that truth.
As per my last post, this is hitting on the important point that if "the theory
of materialism" is true it can only be accepted as true by virtue of "material
changes in the structure of the brain independent of the arguments proposed for
that truth." But we need to be careful here: for the "theory of materialism"
could be true even if it is never accepted by us as true because the necessary
"material changes" do not occur. And it could be true even if we only accept it
is true because of those "material changes" and not because it is true.
And a materialistmight try to say that "material changes" need not be
"independent of the arguments proposed for that truth", though it would appear
they will have insuperable difficulty in explaining how those "arguments" are
purely material or how their evaluation and affect as arguments is purely
material;- in other words, they will have insuperable difficulty in explaining
what Popper would say involves the interaction of World 1, 2 and 3 as a process
that can be explained entirely in World 1 terms. This is the force of the
argument contained within John's last sentence as Popper would see it.
Donal
World123
Also in England
Other related posts:
