Thanks to Phil E. for a very illuminating discussion of the social nature of decisionmaking. I share most of his views, including all of his views in the last 2 sentences of the post below. Phil's positions are very similar to the ones I have in critically responding to Marc D. Hauser, the author of *Moral minds: the nature of right and wrong* - a book I must read as penance for losing a bet on the outcome of Euro 2008. I commend it to you all for the sole reason that it demonstrates the physical possibility of a Harvard professor running with a category mistake for 444 pages. Bookjacket reads: "In his groundbreaking book, Marc Hauser puts forth a revolutionary new theory: that humans have evolved a universal moral instinct, unconsciously propelling us to deliver judgments of right and wrong independent of gender, education and religion. Combining his cutting-edge research with the latest findings in cognitive psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, economics and anthropology, Hauser explores the startling implications of his provoicative theory vis-a-vis contemporary bioethics, religion, the law and our everyday lives." The movie version should be out in a theatre near you before Christmas. Walter O MUN Quoting Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxx>: > John McCreery wrote: > > "Phil could say, of course, 'Those aren't decisions; they are only > habitual behaviors.' In making this statement he will appeal to the > prototype of rational decision making in which, ideally, the decider > is conscious throughout the process." > > I would, of course, say what John has me saying but I wouldn't make > any such appeal. We don't ordinarily point to blips on a machine as > evidence of decisions, making me wonder whether some form of > reductionism is going on in this argument. The reductionism would > suggest that _really_ a decision is this neural activity. On the > other hand, it seems to me that whatever else a decision is, it is a > social phenomenon. It is one manner by which we distinguish various > kinds of behaviour. > > For example, while we were living in Nigeria, we attended a tea party > that one imagines happened frequently in Africa during colonial times. > There were the Oxbridge types somehow connected with the British > foreign service, there were the businessmen from N. America and > various European countries, and then there were the missionaries. My > wife was sitting beside an elderly missionary lady who was unable to > reintegrate into British life and so had come back to Africa to die. > At some point, this lady started drinking my wife's tea and then > complained about how she kept getting tea that was too sweet. My > wife, not wanting to embarrass the lady, agreed that it was hard to > get a good cup of tea these days. > > The lady's body did all the things involved in taking hold of a cup of > tea and drinking it, and it would make sense to say that she may have > decided to drink a cup of tea, but it would be a mistake to say that > she made a decision to drink my wife's cup of tea. > > It seems to me that here we have three different kinds of activity. > There is the inadvertent drinking of the wrong cup of tea. There is > what appears to be an obvious mistake so that we would rule out the > possibility of a decision. My wife was not offended because it seemed > obvious that the woman did not decide to drink my wife's cup of tea. > > Then there is the behaviour of reaching out for a cup of tea. We > might say that one explanation for why the missionary took the wrong > cup of tea was that she wasn't paying attention to what she was doing. > If the missionary had been more aware/attentive/conscious of what she > was doing, she would probably have noticed which cup was hers. Most > likely she wanted a sip of tea, but the question of whether she made a > decision to drink tea seems to me to be an open question. If she > wasn't aware or attentive to what she was doing, did she make a > decision? Wouldn't a decision imply a greater degree of attention and > awareness? Here we would distinguish between the desire, which most > likely is evidenced by her reaching for the tea, and her making a > decision, the evidence for which seems to be lacking. My wife was a > bit annoyed that the missionary was not paying more attention and > drank the cup of tea my wife wanted to drink. > > Then there is the physiological account of what transpired, an account > that could include reference to events accessible only to specialized > medical machinery. There is no question that the missionary reached > out, grabbed the cup of tea, and drank it. There is no question that > the body went about its business of taking a drink. It would make no > sense at all for my wife to have been upset at the missionary woman's > body, nor would it make sense to blame her brain cells. Of course > those brain cells were involved in the woman's inattentiveness, but we > don't normally hold them responsible for decisions or lack of > attention. > > It seems to me that talk of decision-making necessarily requires > reference to social circumstances. To suggest, and John may not > necessarily be doing this, that decision-making can be sufficiently > explained with reference to neural activity strikes me as being both > reductionist and wrong. I don't want to claim that decisions are > necessarily rational and transparent to consciousness, but I don't > know what to make of a reference to a decision that is completely > opaque to consciousness. Decision-making has social qualities and I > am not sure how to get to these qualities from a reductionist account. > > > Sincerely, > > Phil Enns > Yogyakarta, Indonesia > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, > digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html > ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html