--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@...> wrote: > >... > But we still have no account of what it means to be "about" something. It's "the mark of the mental", Brentano said so, 100+ years ago. Searle is serving it up in vanilla and chocolate. But, I suppose you're right, nobody has quite said what it is. ... except maybe me, and what did I say? "I would make it that your traffic light controller (or something not much more complex) has all the intentionality that any object in the world ever has, and it's not a matter of how it got that way, but simply that it has certain relationships with physical objects and consequential state changes, and that's all the intentionality could possibly be, and nobody has ever said a word otherwise." So, an object (eg, text string) S is intentional about distal object D if it has certain (underspecified, eg "referential") relationships to D such that state changes in and around S relate to state changes in and around D. That's still pretty vague, and we probably need an agent A somewhere in the story. But the point (if we have one) is, don't we need *something* like this kind of description, if we're going to take the term seriously, or even to have any kind of talk about any kind of consciousness or mind? -- ObW: Does Wittgenstein accept, require, or forbid intentionality? Er, ... probably none of the above. Ouch. Josh ========================================= Manage Your AMR subscription: //www.freelists.org/list/wittrsamr For all your Wittrs needs: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/