[Wittrs] On the Experience of Self-Awareness
- From: Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 03 Nov 2009 04:28:31 -0500
Cayuse wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>Cayuse wrote:
>>>If experience is sometimes reflexive and sometimes not, then
>>>experience cannot be reflexive by its very nature.
>>and, therefore ... what?
>Then we have to look to the alternative hypothesis that there is a
>separate and distinct experiencer of experience, and this too is found
>to be problematic (the homunculus problem).
the alternate hypothesis would be that there is an experiencer of its
experience.
I've deleted your qualifiers 'separate and distinct' because you've
never specified what they mean to you; and, because the idea that the
experiencer must be separate and distinct from its experience is just
another idea about experience.
so, where does that leave us?
it seems to me that we have a fact (that experience is sometimes
reflexive and sometimes not reflexive) and a theory that explains that
fact.
you're response to this situation is to allege that the theory has an
unpleasant consequence: it somehow generates an infinite regress of
experiencers. however, I've never noticed any of these beyond the one
that I designate by saying 'I' [I-2 in humanese english] or by some
phrase such as 'I, this experiencer'.
by itself, an unsupported allegation of unobservable consequences is no
reason to reject a theory that otherwise explains the fact.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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http://what-am-i.net
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