[Wittrs] Re: Dennett's paradigm shift.
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 01:36:27 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "BruceD" <blroadies@...> wrote:
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> > Dennett argues that we can account for all the features we typically
> associate with consciousness in ourselves
> > by thinking of them in a different way, changing the paradigm.
>
> The paradigm shift is what? A materialistic, causal account of C is as
> old as the hills. The new neurology still doesn't tell us HOW brain
> makes C. But there is something new here, you suggest.
>
We stop looking for mind as entity (or pseudo entity) and think of it instead
as process. Once we give up the idea of consciousness as being a unified
entity-like phenomenon, it is more easily explainable as a complex set of brain
functionalities, accomplished by a process-based system running in brains.
> > You want to say I or he have left out the transformation of a physical
> phenomenon to a mental one. Fair enough.
>
> Thanks for the recognition. But then you go on to sayy...
>
> > But then you miss the point because we haven't left it out if one
> accepts the paradigm shift.
>
> Which is what?
See above.
>To deny that there we are conscious in the sense that we
> have always seen ourselves.
No, to do that is to miss the point of the paradigm shift. We are still just
what we are. We still have the experience of being selves, of having a mental
life, of being aware, etc. It's just that now we can see how this can be
accounted for in terms of physical processes going on in brains.
> Yes, if we do that there is no B/M problem,
> because there is no Mind. We've been kidding ourselves? Hmm...you
> comment about D's work may help.
>
Again you miss the point. To accept the Dennett paradigm adjustment we don't
have to say we have no minds, only that mind isn't what we are initially
prompted to take it as based on introspection alone.
> > Note that he says of his research at one point that "it turns out
> Dennett was right".
>
This was a reference to what Dehaene says about his work in relation to
Dennett's thesis.
> In other words, both D's think that they have dispensed with mind by
> describing everything we used to call "mental" in a material language.
> Right?
No, wrong. See above.
>We use to think of feeling pain but now we say my C-fiber is
> firing. We use to say "He is love" but now we say "his endorphins are
> secreting. This sounds like silly word games to me. So, I misunderstand.
>
Again, you miss the whole point of the paradigm shift which is NOT to deny mind
but to explain it in terms of what we can discover scientifically about brains.
> > His research is aimed at discovering what it is that brains do that
> yield/produce/constitute/cause consciousness.
>
> Hold on, didn't you say above that he doesn't show how brains actually
> do that. One doesn't show how a C-fiber yield/produce/constitute/cause
> pain by demonstrating the correlation. You've agreed time and again that
> a complete description of C-fiber activity yields nothing about the pain
> experience. So there is no possibility of discover.
Nope, I've never agreed there is no possibility to discover! I've agreed that
we don't look for or expect access to others' subjectivity but Dehaene does
appear to believe that such access is at least in principle possible. So does
Ramachandran.
> You know my
> position. We can't discover how a C-fiber causes pain because the
> relationship between the fiber and the experience is not causal in any
> sense, but conceptual in view of the researcher.
>
I think that's just playing with words.
> > I have described consciousness as being an agglomeration of certain
> features we recognize in ourselves,
> > specifically in our subjective experience.
>
> Surely there is no paradigm shift here, especially in the phrase
> "subjective experience."
>
The idea is not to deny "subjective experience" but to explain it in a way that
makes it conceivable as an outcome of physical processes.
> > By "we associate with" I meant (and have always meant) the things we
> think of when speaking of consciousness!
>
> Old fashion "mentalism". No? Perhaps you think me cranky, but if the
> paradigm shift is away from talking about mind and consciousness as
> something other than brains on fire, then you can't go back to
> describing your consciousness.
Again, you don't grasp the paradigm shift. You keep hanging onto this idea that
to accept the Dennettian model is to deny minds. But that isn't the point of it
at all. As to your reference to "old fashioned mentalism" -- no!
>
> > Think again of the wheel and its turning. If the wheel is an entity,
> must we think its turning is, too??????
>
> I can't see why this analogy has a hold on you. Yes, the turning is an
> entity
I assume you mean't "isn't"?
> but turning is what entities do, from point A to point B. We can
> "see" the turn in that we see the displacement of the wheel. But we
> can't see the brain do consciousness because we don't see consciousness.
Sure we do. We see it in our subjective experience and we see it in the way
others behave. It's just a different kind of turning!
> There is no analogy here beyond the fact that both C and turning aren't
> entities, although turning is what an entity can do.
>
See above.
> Another analogy,
>
> > Here's the coin picture again: The brain's processes, its operations,
> are the coin.
>
> which we can see.
>
> > The experiences occurring to the subject, the subjectness, are the
> other (side).
>
> It is intriguing to say that. What are we saying?
>
> > Two sides, one coin, but each side is also itself and not the other.
>
> Yes. And one side of a coin is a condition for there being another side
> but not a causal condition. Logical?
This has to do with how we express the idea. As Sean correctly says elsewhere
in another context, you can't fit this into a logical form because the meanings
must be attended to and the meanings alter in the syllogism. Is the head the
condition of my quarter's tail? Think about how that sounds. Is that what we
mean by a "condition"? It really works much more poorly than the notion of
causality in the sense of wetness and the water molecules. But identity is
fine, too, as long as you steer clear of the idea that now were invoking
logical identity -- which I expect you won't because you need a hook to hang
your objection on!
> Well, in the sense that what we
> mean by a coin is that it has two sides. We can also imply that,
> basically, the two are the "same thing", since head and tails are
> arbitrary.
>
> In some ways this works for the brain/mind correlation. What's called
> identity theory. I'm at home with that except for one nagging question.
> If we describe the brain side causally, how do we justify describing the
> mind side intentionally?
>
Different domains of reference.
> This returns us to the B/M problem as it always was. I see no paradigm
> shift in any of this.
>
> bruce
That's because you have missed the paradigm shift above and simply continue to
do so at this point in your response.
SWM
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