[Wittrs] Re: Dennett's paradigm shift.
- From: "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2010 23:37:44 -0000
Stuart,
I'll comment on your claim about whether Searle is arguing against Dennett (and
why I offered that on one interpretation he is not).
In the target article (BBS), Searle points out that the systems (or robot)
reply changes the subject from strong AI to nonS/H systems (or a combination of
S/H and nonS/H systems.
The point about Dennett is that he can't have it both ways.
The systems reply (as well as the robot reply) is motivated by strong AI or not.
If not, then Searle is not in disagreement--and so would not be in disagreement
with Dennett if he is waffling on strong AI.
If so, then Searle has caught those offering the systems or robot reply either
changing the subject (no disagreement if so) or being incoherent.
If someone manages to say that the program is purely formal and so the
semantics are somewhere else (or a combination of program and nonprogram), then
one has effectively removed the original motivation for strong AI as discussed
quite clearly in the target article.
I still also disagree with your proposal that Searle is wrongheaded in his
later critique of Strong AI being incoherent. His reason is crystal clear--no
one knows what it would mean to discover if something were intrinsically
computational. Computation names an abstract sort of thing.
If one bypasses this point by insisting that it is all about the combination of
computation along with the physical processes used to carry the formal program,
then one also has bypassed the original strong AI claim. And it still is
problematic to understand just what formal processes can add to brute ones.
So Searle manages to distinguish his position as biological naturalism and
insists that one (Dennett's among others) of the motivating factors of strong
AI is still the idea that we can learn things about mind by studying the laws
of computation without needing any information whatsoever about real brains.
But I do agree that brain science is tough. And I would disagree with your
idea that Searle has to be a dualist because brain science is both tough and he
is arguing against computational theories of mind.
For your argument to go through (Searle's dualism that he doesn't know is
implied by his CRA and biological naturalism), you would have to waffle on
strong AI. I believe you do along with all the systems and robot repliers.
But if you waffle, you're really accepting something with which Searle is in
agreement.
Cheers,
Budd
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