[Wittrs] Re: some helpful guidelines for reading Wittgenstein's philo...
- From: "c.moeller1" <cmoel888@xxxxxxx>
- To: Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2009 21:14:47 -0000
Sorry, I erroneously titled George Boole's work, the original title of which
is: "An Investigation of the Laws of Thought."
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "c.moeller1" <cmoel888@...> wrote:
>
>
> Hi, Kirby,
>
> The story, of course, was Stuart's. I recast it adding my own
> comments and interpretations and conclusions.
>
> One of this Wittgenstinean group's stated charters is:
>
> "Above all, we want people to understand philosophic "problems" as only
> exercises created by manipulating grammar. And to see the philosopher's
> role,
> therefore, as one who watches over the grammar of others during the
> ritual of
> disputation or pronouncement."
>
> I have it that logic is a valid subject of inquiry, construction, and as
> a foundation for
> precision in philosophical discussion, otherwise how could systems of
> thought be properly and concisely expressed. But the existing logic
> systems are lacking a rich vocabulary of operators?some
> grammar?especially certain verbs. They depend upon the sparse
> concepts of existence, non-existence and coincidence (in both time and
> space). These systems of static logic?descended from Aristotle
> through Boole [1], Frege, Pnueli, Prior, and all modern logicists and
> natural philosophers?are lacking in several respects. The models of
> correct thinking [2] are unable to be used to describe or to create any
> more than was given (sum of the parts); or directly express causation
> (which instead must be divined or extracted from the givens). They can't
> be used to express or treat dynamic or changing scenarios, thus they
> can't deal directly with ongoing time [3] or processes which evolve with
> time.*
>
> Those observable attributes, including synergy or emergent behavior,
> cause and effect, dynamic activities and ongoing time, are very evident
> in the real world and especially in life.
>
> My question is: "How can philosophy treat questions of dynamic living
> and being without a
> dynamic logic?" The answer is, of course, "Only with great
> difficulty."
>
> In response to my observation of the shortcomings of logic and
> philosophy, I created a dynamic system of logic, "Natural Logic"
> (NL) that includes all of that which went before and has, in addition,
> those dynamic operators with which one may easily describe ongoing
> process in real continuous time. In the system of NL, all the
> participants are really there and participate in the real domains of
> space and time.
>
> Best regards,
> Charlie
>
> *I believe LW recognized this when he wrote extensively on the
> philosophy of mathematics, saying at one point, "They are really
> there." (when describing the participating elements in pure logical
> and mathematical transformations). My interpretation is that when
> ordinary logic deals with worldly things, as opposed to abstract things,
> it is all done by referents, i.e., tokens, as I put it, that stand-in
> for the actual things being dealt with. In pure logical and mathematical
> transformations, all the participants are "really there" (they
> are not stand-ins but are the actual participants) in the same
> domain?which happens to be the static (timeless) space-domain for
> any operations via accepted logic systems, including any and all used in
> computation (or computers).
>
> References:
> 1. George Boole's The Fundamentals of Thought more properly should have
> been
> titled:The Fundamentals of Static Thought. The workings of the
> additional
> operators in my "Natural Logic" could be titled: The
> Fundamentals of Dynamic
> Thought.
>
> 2. About thirty "non-standard" logics (aside from predicate calculus and
> propositional logic) are listed in
> http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/logsys/nonstbib.htm
> <http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/logsys/nonstbib.htm>
>
> 3. A logic of "time flowing" rather than of "time flown," as philosopher
> Henri
> Bergson (1859-1941) put it in "Time and Free Will" (1888).
>
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, kirby urner <kirby.urner@> wrote:
> >
> > On Sat, Aug 15, 2009 at 9:45 AM, c.moeller1cmoel888@ wrote:
> >
> > << SNIP >>
> >
> > > Since the effectiveness of philosophy hinges on the effective use of
> logic,
> > > it too is impaired. Thus your discussion on, and efforts to capture,
> > > consciousness goes `round and `round without resolution.
> > >
> > > Best regards,
> > >
> > > Charlie
> > >
> >
> > Hi Charlie --
> >
> > Your story made plenty of sense to me.
> >
> > People just fall asleep reading books all the time too i.e. there's no
> > cause for alarm, but in the story you gave us, there was cause for
> > concern, maybe a visit to a medically trained person who sees lots of
> > cases.
> >
> > Anyway, regarding philosophy, I think Wittgenstein's in particular is
> > about equipping you to investigate our own way of thinking "as if from
> > outside" and his "climbing the ladder" in earlier years gave him a
> > "good eye" as we say. But you have to willingly become a stranger in
> > a strange land so to speak i.e. what an existentialist might call
> > "alienation" is embraced as a positive, e.g. spin it to mean "thinking
> > more like an ET".
> >
> > Not every philosopher thinks like Wittgenstein of course, but in the
> > humanities especially, and in philosophy in particular, it's OK to
> > "create a whole world" in which the key words or core concepts are
> > "internally defined", maybe not by listing definitions (like in a
> > dictionary) but by having the concepts "bounce off" one another. The
> > use cases teach the principles, the rules, just like in ordinary life
> > (we didn't always have dictionaries, a relatively recent invention).
> >
> > In the case of the TLP, the logically simple components point to each
> > other in such a way that you get an 'ecology of mind' where stuff
> > hyperlinks and folds up, creating like a shiny crystal ball (a
> > literary analogy obviously). The PI is not dissimilar in that its
> > core innovations create a "philosophical world" (like Uru by Cyan) --
> > the aphorisms all "talk to each other" (reflect one another -- add
> > meaning in this way).
> >
> > People come to the PI and want to find the place where it just "says
> > what it means" about matters of grave import -- that is the stereotype
> > about philosophy, some dude on a mountain top, pregnant with special
> > wisdom we might glean and repeat, hoping some of the glory rubs off
> > (we'd like to be wise as well, but maybe not at the price of living
> > like a hermit).
> >
> > What's frustrating to many readers of the PI and connected writings
> > (RFM, On Certainty, Blue & Brown books), is there don't seem to be
> > many "summary scrolls" where you get the pithy "philosophy" that by
> > all rights is supposed to be there ("how could this be a famous
> > philosopher, if he doesn't play superman?").
> >
> > However, a lot of secondary literature has developed over the years
> > where commentators impute lots of summary views to our guy and this
> > more fits that pattern people expect, so in the case of Wittgenstein's
> > philo in particular, there's often more reliance on the commentators
> > than on the original materials, which latter come across as
> > "insufficiently interpreted" or "too raw" ("uncooked" as it were), or
> > just plain "cryptic" (clear as a bell maybe, each aphorism taken in
> > isolation, but to what end do we study them?).
> >
> > I am likewise a commentator contributing to the secondary literature
> > and I inject quite a bit of "summary stuff" i.e. keep going back to
> > "judgment day" and linking this to "waxing and waning of the world" in
> > some eternal sense, in the sense that the facts of the world, its
> > empirical meaning, is not the important dimension with respect to
> > judgment -- he was making the aesthetic and ethical, (what some call
> > "the subjective") of core importance by showing how we must transcend
> > the limits of what might sensibly be said in order to get to this more
> > important realm (his "logical positivist" interpreters got their
> > positive and negative reversed in many cases as they were more wedded
> > to "scientism" i.e. "sounding like a scientist about everything under
> > the sun" (sounds more authoritative, a better way to bully (to BS))).
> >
> > By the time we get to Philosophical Investigations, he's not so
> > obsessed with showing what cannot be said but rather countering the
> > whole notion that there's something missing, something we cannot do.
> > On the other hand, he himself felt continually challenged to get his
> > meanings across, compared himself to a sketch book artist in a
> > landscape, hoping to communicate a "knowing one's way about"
> > sensibility (like a travel writer in Italy) by means of a strategic,
> > finite number of well chosen sketches.
> >
> > Getting that album put together requires throwing away more than one
> > keeps. So yes, philosophy is still difficult, but not because there's
> > some "realm" we are logically precluded from speaking about (that
> > image from the TLP is less in the foreground).
> >
> > What his philosophy actively discourages, is biased against, is
> > playing superman with so-called super-concepts, these supposed "global
> > variables" that'd get us all on the same page if we could only "get it
> > right" about how they fit together (language, logic, reality,
> > consciousness...).
> >
> > Rather, the best one might do is pioneer and develop a namespace, a
> > logical space of "local variables" (internally defined, operationally
> > consistent, yet piggy-backing on ordinary language for meaning -- no
> > way to avoid that, so if you can't beat 'em, join 'em, was the
> > "surrendering" of the PI). The TLP was more invested in
> > "extraordinary language" i.e. the cryptic notations in vogue at the
> > time among followers of Russell, Whitehead, Frege et al). Those
> > seeking to ascend the Tower of Babel (i.e. to play god) are in search
> > of a bully pulpit and find Logic (capital L) attractive for that
> > reason. The PI levels the playing field, is more democratic in that
> > way (although the TLP, properly understood, was likewise about
> > humility before eternity, not being sinfully vain).
> >
> > Rolling the tape forward, we find that not that many folks trying to
> > make a living in philosophy (in the sense of getting a pay check for
> > teaching the subject) can afford to "just do" the kind of work
> > Wittgenstein was doing (investigating grammatical confusions, clearing
> > up difficulties, even coming up with improved designs). The market is
> > more eager for these grand summary views, for "philosophy" in the
> > tradition of metaphysics and/or "highly speculative science" (how
> > metaphysics dresses up today -- a sort of drag queen, or HMS Mad Cow,
> > a kind of "faux science enterprise" decked out with all the
> > trimmings).
> >
> > On the other hand, I think people paid to do advertising, diplomacy,
> > curriculum writing, psychology, stand to benefit from incorporating
> > Wittgenstein's techniques into their work (I know I certainly have).
> > The kind of "distancing" he encourages, with respect to one's own
> > language (patterns of thought), is quite powerful and effective when
> > it comes to developing "new perspectives" (new ways of looking), and
> > that's often just what the doctor ordered in these workaday
> > disciplines. Gestalt switches are often differences that make a
> > difference (Bateson) even if their meaning (significance) takes time
> > to play out (no "aha!" is "the meaning" although we call those moments
> > of enlightenment "meaningful" (per PI Part 2)).
> >
> > Conclusion: a lot of Wittgenstein's legacy is being felt in
> > disciplines outside of "paid for" mostly university-based philosophy.
> > He has a following in the art world for example.
> >
> > Still awake? Or did you nod off there, too much rambling?
> >
> > Kirby
> >
>
Other related posts:
