... here's a good one. Let's imagine Wittgenstein was a professor of linguistics doing work in linguistic theory. But let's suppose the work he did was the exact same as it was in history (same body of work). So he meets Russell and does the same exact stuff, but his degree and professorship is in linguistics. Question: would Wittgenstein be a "professional philosopher?" Because of the novel way he did philosophy, along with his formal credential, I'm sure there would be plenty of people who would say "no." My only point is this: such a position only says what it does and not a thing more. It doesn't stop another from saying "yes he is" -- so long as each knows the facts of the case (who Wittgenstein is and what he is doing). That's the key: any problem here is false. One merely needs to make sure that the person understands certain facts and not be concerned how they talk about them. And if anyone gets into a yes-no fight, the point of "philosophy" is only to show each that the matter concerns only the SENSE of "professional philosopher" that they prefer to use. In a lay sense, anyone who goes to work in a field of theory could be spoken of as a professional theorist or philosopher. But in a strict sense, one would have to be doing the work sanctioned inside the club, by one of its members. Let's say, after my book, Wright State makes my appointment in both departments (Philosophy and Politicology) and I teach 1 Wittgenstein course permanently. Would I be a "professional philosopher" even in Walter's sense of the idea? I imagine not. Walter would probably speak of these facts differently than others, because of his outlook about the club and its business. It's no different from the language game of asking whether X is a patriot of his country. --- In Phil-Sci-Mind@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "walto" <Philscimind@...> wrote: > > > I was actually focusing on "professional" but thanks anyhow. > > W