[C] [Wittrs] Re: Wittgenstein on Religious Belief
- From: "J D" <ubersicht@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2010 20:08:59 -0000
First, I think the essay whose link you provided isn't far from the right track
as far as Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion goes:
"It is important to distinguish varieties of religious non-realism based on an
error theory from another set of views sometimes labelled ` non-realist'. I
have in
mind here views inspired by some remarks on religion by the later Wittgenstein.
Proponents of this view tend to deny that religious discourse ? outside philos-
ophy and philosophically dominated theology ? has ever been in the business of
making the sort of metaphysical truth-claims realists are wont to defend. This
is
an important view, but one outside the scope of the present discussion. In con-
trast, proponents of the non-realist views discussed below should be understood
to concede the realist aspirations of traditional religious speech-acts ; but
having
concluded that these aspirations are not fulfilled, they offer a
reinterpretation of
the aim and function of religious discourse."
This strikes me as correct as far as it goes.
However, one might still observe that Wittgenstein has been (mis)interpreted as
having theories about what traditional religious talk involved. Using the
terminology of the essay, something like the "religious positivism" view has
been ascribed to Wittgenstein, though he explicitly rejects the idea that there
should be some translation that said just what the believer wished to say.
Likewise, he has been read as espousing "religious expressivism" (and not
without reason), but again the point about translation militates against this.
As does the rejection of theorizing and putting forth contentious theses, of
course. "Religious instrumentalism", though still objectionable a theory, is
much more plausible as something close to some of Wittgenstein's views.
Still, calling a religious text "fiction"... Is this an extended usage? If
so, that's fine but we mustn't be misled as to the differences between
religious texts and works we typically call "fiction". Is it a simile? A
simile can be revealing in various ways and it can be misleading: things are
like and unlike in various ways and similes apt and unapt. And what the
"fictionalist" is trying to do is to disagree with the realist, not to
reorganize the library shelves or the curricula of religious studies.
Where we go wrong most often in discussing Wittgenstein and religion is in
overlooking his general approach to debates about realism in various forms.
When he considers debates between Realists and Idealists or debates between
Platonists and Intuitionists or Formalists or between Cartesians and
Behaviorists, he is subverting the very terms of the debate. What the Realist
and Idealist want to do is say things that are undeniably true and at the same
time contentious. And this leads to nonsense, to queer and misleading
pictures, or to mere "battle cries". And similarly with the other disputes.
But one must examine each case carefully, each temptation to talk nonsense.
And the same applies to the metaphysical glosses we may wish to give to
religious utterances.
A last point. These approaches start from the idea that the believer and
non-believer have substantive disagreements then proceed to show how what the
believer has to say might be understood in a way that would be perfectly
reasonable by the non-believer's lights. That is one possibility, but
Wittgenstein also wants us to consider another: that sometimes the differences
between the believer and non-believer may run so deep that they can't even
really disagree. That too needs to be considered and such considerations of
different cases is one reason that attempts to derive a single systematic view
of religious belief from Wittgenstein's remarks is doomed to fail.
JPDeMouy
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