Messages In This Digest (16
Messages)
Messages
- 1a.
-
Tue Jan 26, 2010 3:20 am (PST)
Stuart,
you seem to be all over the map with regard to the taxonomy of BS
(belief systems) relevant to the body/consciousness issue.
you've proposed a classification scheme that distinguishes between what
is traditionally called substance dualism and what is traditionally
called property dualism and what is traditionally called reductive
materialism or physicalism.
thus, you *appear* to have a three-category taxonomy (once we eliminate
mysterianism as irrelevant); but, when it comes to actually evaluating
the philosophies under discussion, you revert to a more primitive
dichotomous taxonomy: dualism vs non-dualism.
it's good to see that you finally recognize that there is a distinct
difference between property dualism (Chalmers' style of dualism) and
substance dualism (Descartes' style of dualism); and, that one form does
not necessarily lead (as a matter of logical inevitability) to the
other.
however, it is still important to be able to distinguish between
Chalmers' style of dualism and the reductive physicalism (your type 3)
that Dennett is trying to advocate (but, IMO, ultimately failing to
defend); otherwise, aren't you admitting that there is no significant
difference between Dennett's style of monism and Chalmers' style of
dualism?
Joe
--
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- 1b.
-
Tue Jan 26, 2010 7:59 am (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@.. .> wrote:
> Stuart,
>
> you seem to be all over the map with regard to the taxonomy of BS
> (belief systems) relevant to the body/consciousness issue.
>
Your map, I suppose, but not necessarily mine. You seem bent on certain rigid categorizations and insistent on shoe-horning every claim into one or the other of them. I agree that generalization into categories can be helpful but perhaps trying to adhere to certain rigid classification systems isn't the best way? Perhaps we need to be a little more flexible and open to the underlying relations which, of course, is what I've been aiming to do here.
> you've proposed a classification scheme that distinguishes between what
> is traditionally called substance dualism and what is traditionally
> called property dualism and what is traditionally called reductive
> materialism or physicalism.
>
I haven't proposed anything like a formal classification scheme at all. I have noted differences and similarities leading to some general categorizations which may or may not be hard and fast. What I have sought to avoid is trying to fit everything into some pre-existing "official" categories. That is, my aim is to think the issues through anew rather than adhere to certain already codified, and excessively rigid, academic categories. Where there is alignment, I try to recognize it, of course. Where there isn't, I try to highlight the nuances of difference.
As to distingushing between "substance dualism" and "property dualism", I have said that dualism is dualism if it implies reduction of whatever exists in the universe to two ontological basics rather than one, e.g., if to have a mind in the universe we have to assume there is both a physical underlayment and a mental underlayment of existence where the two are not the same at their most basic level. I am uninterested in using a term like "substance" both because it isn't really relevant to today's understanding of physics in the universe (and is thus misleading) and because it isn't essential to the idea of dualism, i.e., we can speak of two underlying realities in the universe without any notion of a substance per se.
Moreover, I would argue (and have argued) that the use of the term "substance" is misleading for yet another reason, i.e., it is a misapplication of a perfectly ordinary and useful term. That is, in ordinary language, when we speak of a "substance" we mean some bit of matter that is indeterminate in its nature (either in fact or for discussion purposes). Once we determine what it is, we typically replace the term with something more precise. For example I might describe some material I had inadvertently stepped on in the street as a "rather gooey and foul smelling substance" and someone, looking down at my shoe may say, "oh right, you stepped in some dog crap."
So for all these reasons I think little is gained by insisting on calling genuine dualism "substance dualism" and differentiating it from "property dualism" in this way. As I have also noted, even claims of "property dualism" can be about ontological basics (even if it is supposed that such a basic is only brought into the world by some capacity of certain bits of matter or physical events in brains). But in that case, it runs into a kind of incoherence I think because it is caught betwixt and between dualism in the sense of being about ontological basics and mere dualism of appearance which, finally, isn't a serious kind of dualism at all.
Moreover, one has the problem of explaining HOW brains do the trick of bringing something wholly new into the world or, if one cannot, of avoiding reversion to a kind of mysterianism (as Walter did on Analytic when he declined to answer definitively whether or not the "property of intentionality" that he was asserting some brains just have was nothing more than a complex of non-intentional physical processes [he did answer it at one point and seemed to be agreeing to reducibility but then backed away and refused to amplify] -- if you recall, he eventually stated that on this he was a "mysterian" on the matter, and that's my point here: this view forces one into mysterianism if one insists on the irreducibility of the "property" under consideration) .
> thus, you *appear* to have a three-category taxonomy (once we eliminate
> mysterianism as irrelevant);
It may be irrelevant in comparing our views but I think the kind of "property dualism" asserted by Walter on Analytic leads either to outright dualism (no different than what you like to insist on calling "substance dualism") precisely as Searle says, or it leads to a conclusion that is non-dualistic (in the only sense that matters, the causal sense) OR it forces one to assert mysterianism (which, in Bruce's lexicon, is expressed as unintelligibility) . And that kind of "property dualism" (the inadequately explicated kind), of course, is what I have been addressing when considering it in these discussions. So I'm not sure it's entirely irrelevant in the larger sense of this discussion.
> but, when it comes to actually evaluating
> the philosophies under discussion, you revert to a more primitive
> dichotomous taxonomy: dualism vs non-dualism.
>
As noted, my view is that there is only dualism and non-dualism. Claims of "property dualism" ultimately boil down to the same thing as claims of "substance dualism" IF they are, in fact, dualism. Insofar as they don't boil down in this way though, then "property dualism" is only that in terms of the nomenclature, i.e., it isn't about two ontological basics co-existing in the universe. But "property dualism" tends to be somewhat fuzzy around the edges as we have seen because it is open to conflicting interpretations. (Searle claims it is ultimately no different than "substance dualism" whereas Walter thinks Searle misstates what property dualists really believe.) On balance I think Searle does us a service by cutting away the verbal camouflage to reveal what lies at the heart of these concepts.
> it's good to see that you finally recognize that there is a distinct
> difference between property dualism (Chalmers' style of dualism) and
> substance dualism (Descartes' style of dualism);
If you go back to Analytic you will see that I said the same thing about this issue there. But if you want to think I have had a revelation now, under your tutelage, you may do so. Perhaps it will make these discussions less rancorous?
By the way, Chalmers, insofar as he is arguing for an extra principle in the universe, a principle of consciousness, or better, an underlying irreducible force qua phenomenon (along with the other posited "known" forces of gravity, magnetism, strong nuclear attraction and weak nuclear attraction), is not talking about properties but about basics. However it is arguable that it is not merely dualism he has in mind since his claim seems to be that consciousness is a natural part of the ontological basics that make up what we otherwise know as the physical universe at a very deep level. But note that, on this view, it isn't one of two but one of several. Severalism then?
Galen Strawson may be more of a "property dualist" since he argues that at the very deepest level there is only one basic but that, since something cannot come from nothing and consciousness (mind) is something, it must have some precursors very deep down at the atomic and even sub-atomic level itself, thus there must be a set of parallel properties extending down into the monist ontological substrate, whatever that is. (I suspect it is this kind of musing that so irritates Neil when he castigates philosophy, by the way.)
> and, that one form does
> not necessarily lead (as a matter of logical inevitability) to the
> other.
>
I recognize differences, as already noted, if that's what you mean.
> however, it is still important to be able to distinguish between
> Chalmers' style of dualism and the reductive physicalism (your type 3)
See above for a little more of my take on Chalmers.
> that Dennett is trying to advocate (but, IMO, ultimately failing to
> defend);
Which you have yet to demonstrate. But then you are, perhaps, looking for some kind of logical argument for the truth of his model and, as noted, he is not making that kind of case. He is only arguing that his way of thinking about mind accounts for everything that needs to be accounted for while the alternatives either add more than is necessary or provide a less adequate account.
> otherwise, aren't you admitting that there is no significant
> difference between Dennett's style of monism and Chalmers' style of
> dualism?
>
> Joe
>
Huh?
SWM
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- 1c.
-
Tue Jan 26, 2010 5:20 pm (PST)
jrstern wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>in my opinion, Searle should have said that consciousness has and
>>irreducibly first-person phenomenology. that would mean only that he
>>accepts what I call phenomenological dualism -- the irreducible
>>difference between measurable phenomena and experienceable
>>phenomena.
>>the point is that claiming that there is an irreducible
>>phenomenological dualism is to stand on dualist ground; but, it is
>>not to stand where Descartes stands.
>Of course it is. Unless it's worse. Rorty covers this in that
>introduction I mentioned yesterday.
I've reread the introduction; but, there is nothing there to suggest
that noticing the difference between watching a sunset and measuring the
wavelengths of the light the sun gives off is equivalent to adopting
dualism of the Cartesian stripe.
care to elaborate?
Joe
--
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- 2a.
-
Tue Jan 26, 2010 4:14 am (PST)
SWM wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>just having a taxonomy of belief systems is not enough. one must
>>also apply it consistently and coherently; but, you are not. you,
>>Dennett and Searle are all trying to be in category 3; but, neither
>>you nor Dennett can avoid the same latent property dualism of which
>>you've accused Searle.
>I'll let you demonstrate that with an argument then since I think that
>is just wrong.
the argument was already included, as follows:
>>physical objects have physical properties that cause measurable
>>phenomena. some objects also have physical properties that cause
>>experienceable phenomena.
>All measureable phenomena are experienceable since you cannot measure
>what cannot be encountered in experience, either directly or
>indirectly. This distinction is not a distinction at all.
it is a valid distinction that can only be obscured by sloppy and
unscientific verbiage.
simply put, I experience qualia. I measure quantities.
a quale is a qualitative aspect of experience (an experienceable
phenomenon). I can experience the quale of, say, redness. scientists can
measure the wavelength of light reflecting or radiating from a ripe
tomato and find that the light has a wavelength in the 650 nm range.
however, I do not actually experience '650 nm' when I look at a tomato.
what I experience is the quale of redness generated when an
electrochemical signal from the retina reaches some group of neurons in
the visual cortex. I don't actually experience electromagnetic radiation
at all. that just gets measured.
>>Searle, in trying to explain why he is not a property dualist, claims
>>that consciousness has an irreducibly first-person ontology; but, he
>>is not admitting to Cartesian style substance dualism.
>While we can agree that first person and third person claims represent
>irreducibly different accounts applied to our actual experience
>>in my opinion, Searle should have said that consciousness has and
>>irreducibly first-person phenomenology. that would mean only that he
>>accepts what I call phenomenological dualism -- the irreducible
>>difference between measurable phenomena and experienceable phenomena.
>So you would recommend he use your vocabulary?
as long as he includes the claim of irreducibility it doesn't matter
whether he uses my vocabulary (the irreducible difference between
experienceable phenomena and measurable phenomena) or yours (the
irreducible difference between first-person phenomena and third-person
phenomena). experienceable phenomena maps to first-person phenomena and
measurable phenomena maps to third-person phenomena.
>>claiming that there is an irreducible phenomenological dualism is to
>>stand on dualist ground; but, it is not to stand where Descartes
>>stands.
>this has NOTHING to do with the causal question ...
that there is an irreducible phenomenological dualism is the so-called
'brute fact' of philosophy of consciousness. there is subjective
(first-person) experience in an otherwise insensate universe of
measurable objects. just noticing this fact makes no causal claims; but,
it invites the question of what causes this phenomenological dualism
>even Searle agrees that consciousness is caused by brains.
this is one basis of my claim that Searle, Dennett and even you are all
latent property dualists.
if the brain causes consciousness; then, the brain has a property that
consciousness doesn't have; and, hence, by the operation of the Law of
Indiscernibility of Identicals, the consciousness can not be identical
to the brain.
Joe
--
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- 2b.
-
Tue Jan 26, 2010 8:54 am (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@.. .> wrote:
>
<snip>
> > >you,
> >>Dennett and Searle are all trying to be in category 3; but, neither
> >>you nor Dennett can avoid the same latent property dualism of which
> >>you've accused Searle.
>
> >I'll let you demonstrate that with an argument then since I think that
> >is just wrong.
>
> the argument was already included, as follows:
>
> >>physical objects have physical properties that cause measurable
> >>phenomena. some objects also have physical properties that cause
> >>experienceable phenomena.
>
> >All measureable phenomena are experienceable since you cannot measure
> >what cannot be encountered in experience, either directly or
> >indirectly. This distinction is not a distinction at all.
>
> it is a valid distinction that can only be obscured by sloppy and
> unscientific verbiage.
>
> simply put, I experience qualia. I measure quantities.
>
You can measure the duration of a quale by reference to other events (in terms of other qualia), etc. What you seem to be doing here is confusing categories, supposing that the qualia we count as part of our objective experience (observables) is measureable but that the qualia of the experience of measuring is not. But that is an artificial distinction.
> a quale is a qualitative aspect of experience (an experienceable
> phenomenon). I can experience the quale of, say, redness. scientists can
> measure the wavelength of light reflecting or radiating from a ripe
> tomato and find that the light has a wavelength in the 650 nm range.
>
> however, I do not actually experience '650 nm' when I look at a tomato.
Different things are being measured, that's all. How long were you seeing the redness of the tomato under conditions X? Don't know? Well we scientists have clocked it based on your responses, etc., etc. That you were not "seeing" the wavelengths in terms of the instrumentation tracking them is irrelevant.
None of this supports your claim that Dennett's model implies "property dualism".
By the way, I do not accuse Searle of "property dualism" as you state above. I accuse him of being implicitly dualist (in the deep sense, the sense you insist on calling, somewhat archaically, "substance dualism"). But I am fully aware that he denies being dualist in that or any sense. That is why my claim is that he is "implicitly dualist."
> what I experience is the quale of redness generated when an
> electrochemical signal from the retina reaches some group of neurons in
> the visual cortex. I don't actually experience electromagnetic radiation
> at all. that just gets measured.
>
So? We can measure your experience of the redness in other ways. You are drawing an arbitrary and artificial distinction here, Joe.
<snip
> >>in my opinion, Searle should have said that consciousness has and
> >>irreducibly first-person phenomenology. that would mean only that he
> >>accepts what I call phenomenological dualism -- the irreducible
> >>difference between measurable phenomena and experienceable phenomena.
>
> >So you would recommend he use your vocabulary?
>
> as long as he includes the claim of irreducibility it doesn't matter
> whether he uses my vocabulary (the irreducible difference between
> experienceable phenomena and measurable phenomena) or yours (the
> irreducible difference between first-person phenomena and third-person
> phenomena). experienceable phenomena maps to first-person phenomena and
> measurable phenomena maps to third-person phenomena.
>
He confuses irreducibility in terms of the things we can say or experience with causal irreducibility (he affirms the first, denies the second, i.e., he argues FOR causal reducibility to brains, though not to computers but that is a different argument for now).
Given that your vocabulary seems to be so confused (i.e., the way you misleadingly focus on "measureability" as though this were a distinguishing criterion) I suspect your terminology would not make things clearer and would probably obfuscate things further.
I will reiterate: Qualia are measureable just as observed phenomena are. However, subjectness is a different level of phenomena and is necessarily treated as such. However that doesn't imply anything beyond particular methodogical concerns with regard to an effort to determine how brains work to cause subjectness in the world.
> >>claiming that there is an irreducible phenomenological dualism is to
> >>stand on dualist ground; but, it is not to stand where Descartes
> >>stands.
>
> >this has NOTHING to do with the causal question ...
>
> that there is an irreducible phenomenological dualism is the so-called
> 'brute fact' of philosophy of consciousness.
What does it mean to be a "brute fact" in this case? That we cannot deny that there is subjectness and objectness in the world? Okay. But that doesn't imply anything for what is needed to explain this double aspect of existence. The fact that we have minds and bodies doesn't mean that one is not explainable in terms of the other. Indeed, whether one is or is not explainable in terms of the other is the question we are looking to answer. The fact of this duality in the world does not imply a basic duality in the world.
> there is subjective
> (first-person) experience in an otherwise insensate universe of
> measurable objects. just noticing this fact makes no causal claims; but,
> it invites the question of what causes this phenomenological dualism
>
Right and what is at issue is whether we need to posit two co-existing basics in the universe to explain the occurrence of subjectness and objectness in our experience. To posit two such basics is dualism so the issue is whether we need dualism to explain the presence of consciousness.
Dennett's thesis offers a way of understanding consciousness without assuming either explicit or implicit dualism.
> >even Searle agrees that consciousness is caused by brains.
>
> this is one basis of my claim that Searle, Dennett and even you are all
> latent property dualists.
>
See my comments above and elsewhere on the confusions of "property dualism".
> if the brain causes consciousness; then, the brain has a property that
> consciousness doesn't have; and, hence, by the operation of the Law of
> Indiscernibility of Identicals, the consciousness can not be identical
> to the brain.
>
> Joe
This is the kind of misuse of logic that, I suspect, drives people like Neil to say that philosophy is hogwash (or some equivalent). Let's look at this argument of yours more closely:
Causing anything is a property of the causal agent.
Whatever causes something has at least one property which the thing it causes lacks (i.e., the property of causing it).
The brain causes consciousness therefore it has a property consciousness lacks.
You then assume that Dennett's thesis asserts that consciousness is identical to the brain. And note that, since brains cause consciousness, consciousness cannot be identical to the brain because it has at least one property consciousness lacks, the property of causing consciousness!
Consider first what it means to describe "causing" as a "property". While we can and do use "property" in this way, there is a significant amibguity here. Is "property" just some contingent fact or feature of something, or is it to be construed as part of the description of what the thing is?
A globe has the "property" of being round (spherical) and, indeed, cannot be otherwise and still be a globe. But a ball can be round or oblong (think of footballs) and a brain can cause consciousness (be conscious) or not! Indeed, there are many brains which aren't conscious, even among human beings which are manifestly creatures whose brains have the capacity to be conscious! So there is no claim that a brain and consciousness are the same thing. Are wheels the same as their spin when they are turning? Aren't you really just confusing your categories here?
Now consider "identity". You have interpreted the claim I have made for Dennett as a claim that the brain and the mind are the same and therefore you invoke the issue of "indiscernibility" even though you must know very well that I have constantly denied THIS kind of "identity" claim. You proceed to argue that "consciousness can not be identical to the brain" based on your invocation of the logical "Law of Indiscernibility of Identicals".
But no one is saying that consciousness and brains are identical in that sense of "identity". The claim is that consciousness is nothing more than brains doing certain things under certain conditions, that is consciousness IS the doing of these things, in the same way that the wetness of water is the behavior of water's atomic level constituents under certain ambient conditions.
If consciousness is just a feature or set of features of certain process-based systems running on brains then it's no more surprising that a brain could cause consciousness than that H2O molecules under certain conditions cause water's wetness or that computers produce answers to calculation questions, run machines, make decisions, or play chess. Is the computer the game of chess that it is playing?
In the end it all boils down to whether or not it makes sense to think of consciousness as a system property or set of system properties (a la Minsky's usage) or whether we are obliged to think of it in some dualistic way as you suppose.
SWM
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- 3a.
-
Tue Jan 26, 2010 5:08 am (PST)
BruceD wrote:
> Sorry, when you wrote "explanation of the [behavior of the] physical
> organism" did you mean to hold that distinct from the person's mental
> life? If so, then, of course, physical events cause physical events,
> whether they be of the heart or brain.
>
> But explanations of "behavior", as I understand it, can't be fully
> understood in terms of physical factors. Two people see a sunset,
> two people may have radically different accounts.
>
> It's that transition from the physical to the mental, what SWM
> recently called animating the physical is problematic.
>
> All that aside, I would agree if you asked your question like this:
> Why isn't any explanation of behavior in terms of influences
> (genetic, historical, etc.) be sufficient?
I don't regard mental processes and physical processes to be
/substantially/ distinct, though our use of language often misleads us
into conceiving of them that way. When two people see a sunset,
those two people may have radically different accounts because
of physical factors like their respective histories (e.g. classical
and operant conditioning) and like the unpredictability that is
inherent in systems that are sensitive to initial conditions (chaos).
In what manner is an explanation of behavior in terms of physical
influences insufficient?
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- 4.1.
-
Tue Jan 26, 2010 7:10 am (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@ ...> wrote:
>
> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> >> How could philosophy hope to settle that "philosophical one" when
> >> it hasn't a clue as to how science actually works?
>
> > That's a bit of an overstatement, Neil.
>
> I didn't expect you to agree.
>
Then we're at least on the same page!
> > After all, there are plenty of philosophers whose specialty is
> > science and how it works.
>
> It does not follow that they actually understand how science works.
>
True. But it's unlikely they're all just a bunch of fools so we can presume that some have a fairly decent idea! If you want to say that philosophers, by definition, can't understand how science works that would be a different claim and, of course, another source of disagreement between us. But I am guessing you are offering an opinion that is empirically based, i.e., that all the philosophers with whom you are familiar just don't understand how science works, presumably including thinkers like Carnap, Popper, Quine, et al. This is possible of course. I count myself as expert in none of them. Still it seems to me that they have a fairly decent (if sometimes differing) notion of how science works.
What do you think is missing in any of their accounts or in the accounts of other philosophers I haven't named?
>
> > Moreover there are philosophers who are basically science-oriented
> > (see Dennett).
>
> If Dennett had properly understood science, he would not have got into
> that public debate with Stephen Gould over evolution.
>
I'm unfamiliar with the debate or the issues you are addressing concerning it so I can't comment.
>
> > Scientists study facts in the world, collect data about it, formulate
> > theories and test predictions based on those theories against the
> > data collected.
>
> So do historians, accountants, journalists. The description omits what
> is distinctive about science.
>
Yes, science is like any empirical inquiry in that sense. How is it different? At least in my view it involves the systematic collection and testing of data about real world occurrences against formulated hypotheses. Historians are more or less systematic but their field generally precludes systematic collection in the way science does it. That is, being "systematic" doesn't always mean the same thing. An historian may follow a very systematic, as in personally regimented and comprehensive approach, but in the end the data collected cannot be exhaustive because it isn't accessible enough. We can't go back in time or capture every nuance of every fact, etc. So history, as a discipline, is more judgemental, more personal, more about educated guesswork and insights. Historians don't generally attempt to predict future events with precision based on information gathered about the past.
I think the same can be said for fields like accounting and journalism, etc. Of course, as human beings we are always interested in guessing what's to come, predicting the future. We do it everyday in our ordinary lives. But that's part of what it means to be empirical. On the other hand science aims, if it can't always succeed, at being systematic in an exhaustive sort of way, with the idea of being able to generate real predictions that can be relied on.
Anyway, that's my own feeble view of what science is. Perhaps yours is different though?
>
> > Philosophers consider the conceptual issues used by science and other
> > disciplines, either through the application of logical analysis and
> > argumentation or by exploring our linguistic usages (how we speak,
> > and therefore think, about things).
>
> That emphasis on logical analysis and argumentation is perhaps why they
> miss out. Science is very prolific in coming up with new concepts, and
> philosophy does not seem to study why or how. Perhaps it doesn't even
> notice.
>
>
I don't think that's true as a hard and fast rule though I'm sure it occurs in many cases. In the end, decent philosophy, to be any good, can't isolate itself in a tower of limited ideas, it has to take into account all the ideas, all the knowledge, currently available. But, of course, philosophy is dependent on the philosophers practicing it, perhaps to a greater extent than science per se because science is much more a group endeavor while philosophy tends to be the work of individuals.
> > Since they are different games there's no reason why the two sets
> > of disciplines (and there are different schools of philosophy just
> > as there are different field of scientific inquiry) need to be seen
> > as poaching on one another's preserves.
>
> The underlying problem for science is that of understanding the world
> around us.
Yes, we agree there I think.
> The underlying problem for the brain is that of
> understanding the world around us. If philosophers really understood
> how science works, then they should have little difficulty extending
> that into an understanding of how the brain works.
>
> Regards,
> Neil
>
> ============ ========= ========= ========= ==
Well I guess I don't understand that! It seems to me that science itself is still a long way off from a full understanding of the brain and how it operates. Since all of us are always engaged in trying to understand the world around us, this, too, is no different from the aims of journalism, accounting, etc. That is, they, too, are after understanding particular aspects of the world. Journalism wants to understand why particular things happened in particular places. Accounting, how the money comes and goes in an enterprise.
It seems to me that the difference vis a vis science lies in the kind of understanding it is seeking vs. what, say, philosophy is seeking, i.e., science is after understanding causes and effects while philosophy is interested in understanding things like what it means to understand, including what it means to speak of causes and effects.
But I don't see how understanding science automatically leads to an understanding of how brains do what they do, or vice versa! There is still the matter of the research (the theorizing, data collection and testing) to be accomplished.
SWM
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- 4.2.
-
Tue Jan 26, 2010 9:48 pm (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@.. .> wrote:
> What do you think is missing in any of their accounts or in the
> accounts of other philosophers I haven't named?
As I said in my previous post, "Science is very prolific in coming up
with new concepts, and philosophy does not seem to study why or how.
Perhaps it doesn't even notice."
>> If Dennett had properly understood science, he would not have got
into
>> that public debate with Stephen Gould over evolution.
> I'm unfamiliar with the debate or the issues you are addressing
> concerning it so I can't comment.
Google for "dennett gould" (without the quotes).
>> So do historians, accountants, journalists. The description omits
what
>> is distinctive about science.
> Yes, science is like any empirical inquiry in that sense. How is
> it different?
Science is far more creative.
> At least in my view it involves the systematic collection and testing
> of data about real world occurrences against formulated hypotheses.
Sure, but only because "involves" is a weak assertion. Kuhn thoroughly
debunked the view that science could be explained with that kind of
account.
Regards,
Neil
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- 4.3.
-
Tue Jan 26, 2010 10:29 pm (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@ ...> wrote:
>
> >> If Dennett had properly understood science, he would not have
> >> got into that public debate with Stephen Gould over evolution.
>
> > I'm unfamiliar with the debate or the issues you are addressing
> > concerning it so I can't comment.
>
> Google for "dennett gould" (without the quotes).
http://www.stephenjaygould.org/reviews/dennett_exchange.html
Yikes.
Are you saying, you side with Gould on this?
I'm entirely with Dennett.
Josh
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- 5a.
-
Tue Jan 26, 2010 12:38 pm (PST)
... One of the things that I had never paid attention to was how On Certainty was different in the way it was produced, compared to other Wittgenstein creations. Of critical note is that OC is not a typescript (or even a manuscript). It's fresh from the notebooks. One assumes that Wittgenstein would have gone through those remarks and added to, excised, crossed out, changed words, snipped and amended many of them. In the process of generating manuscripts or typescripts, there would have been more material added and plenty excised. (Not that it would be any more clear!). And so I wonder: should more caution be taken when reading OC compared to the reading of a typescript work?
There is another line of argument that I am quite hesitant to make, because it offends me, but I suppose should be raised. I wonder if the hormone therapy he was under would have in any way affected his faculties? (I think not for several reasons). Of course, it is true that Wittgenstein himself had noted differences in his mind as he became much older and remarked that his insights were dimming. Monk notes that OC seems to lack the powerful and brilliant similes (to the same extent) found in earlier work. But still, one cannot dispute the fact that the machinery is still functioning quite well in OC, down to the very last utterance. So I think the more important question is what value those remarks have in light of the fact that they did not go through the manuscript-typescri pt work process that they surely would have gone through, had Wittgenstein lived another 3 to 5 years of reasonable health.
Knowing this, I think the book should have been published with a bit of a warning: "these remarks have not yet gone through the Wittgenstein editing process." At least with the typescripts, you had something akin to a playoff team that survived one of the rounds. (With Wittgenstein, you'll never have a Superbowl champ. Playoff team is all you can ever have. But with OC, don't we have a team that hasn't even completed the regular season? )
Regards.
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html
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- 5b.
-
Tue Jan 26, 2010 4:30 pm (PST)
.. I guess the preface does warn you: "It is all first-draft material, which he did not live to excerpt and polish."
SW
----- Original Message ----
From: Sean Wilson < whoooo26505@yahoo.com>
To: wittrsamr@freelists.org
Sent: Tue, January 26, 2010 3:38:05 PM
Subject: [Wittrs] How to Regard On Certainty
Knowing this, I think the book should have been published with a bit of a warning: "these remarks have not yet gone through the Wittgenstein editing process."
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- 5c.
-
Tue Jan 26, 2010 4:34 pm (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@ ...> wrote:
>
> .. I guess the preface does warn you: "It is all first-draft material, which he did not live to excerpt and polish."
>
> SW
>
Nevertheless, there's something remarkably powerful and insightful in that very small volume. Perhaps in some ways we benefit from the lack of ex post facto self-editing, second guessing and continued efforts to say it better in this case. Sometimes, as my wife once quoted Allan Ginsberg with whom she studied poetry, as saying: it's really "first thought, best thought."
SWM
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- 5d.
-
Tue Jan 26, 2010 5:07 pm (PST)
... I was thinking about you Stuart, on this thread. Because a little voice in the back of my head was wondering whether I was contradicting myself in an earlier assertion with you regarding the value of everything he had written or said (letters, lectures, diaries, etc.). Being a student of philosophy- through-biograph y in general, and of Wittgenstein- through-biograph y in particular, I would be inclined to agree with you that there is some great value in seeing Wittgenstein "with his guard down." I see this all the time when leafing through student lecture notes, which I have to date found to be wonderful.
But here is what concerns me. On occasion, Wittgenstein would begin a train of thought, and then would abandon it or call it rubbish. If, as he progressed with his thoughts, the abandoned "rubbish" retained that verdict, knowing about it as such would nonetheless be helpful biographical information -- not only to see what he had in mind as a contrast for NOT RUBBISH, but to see when he began to change and so forth. HOWEVER, (big point coming), we may run into some problems where the TRAIN STOPS. That is, what would Wittgenstein had done with his OC notebook entries? Just polish them? Just make them more clear? Or would we have seen segments or lines of inquiry get the "rubbish" stamp, only to see new flowers grow from the scorched earth? One thing about Wittgenstein: the thunder of "rubbish" usually followed with the sowing of new seeds.
But anyway, I don't think there is anything in OC that represents a rogue or a weed, as it were. At least, not as a chain of thought (line of inquiry). I suppose the moral of the story is simply to be careful placing emphasis on any discreet quote or choice of language, as one does with his lectures. One could only read it properly "in context."
The only reason why I brought it up today is that, for years, I had never taken OC to be less of a prepared work than, say, Zettel or even PI. What I had not understood, I guess, was that OC was not a typescript. I guess for some reason I had always thought that it was. It was not until recently -- like in the last year -- that I even knew that the majority of OC (from pages 38-90) was written in his last month-and-a- half of his life. And I guess what fundamentally concerned me about this was that all of his other spontaneous works -- letters, lectures, diary entries -- have the status of being just that. OC, however -- at least on the shelves of bookstores -- pretends to be something other than diary-sort of writing. I think it would be good if people who indulged it at least had that fact front and center in their minds.
Again, none of this is to assert that OC is deficient; it is merely to assert that it is not a typescript (or even a manuscript).
Yours, on a bit of a tightrope ...
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html
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- 5e.
-
Tue Jan 26, 2010 7:53 pm (PST)
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@ ...> wrote:
> ... I was thinking about you Stuart, on this thread. Because a little voice in the back of my head was wondering whether I was contradicting myself in an earlier assertion with you regarding the value of everything he had written or said (letters, lectures, diaries, etc.).
<snip>
>
> The only reason why I brought it up today is that, for years, I had never taken OC to be less of a prepared work than, say, Zettel or even PI. What I had not understood, I guess, was that OC was not a typescript. I guess for some reason I had always thought that it was. It was not until recently -- like in the last year -- that I even knew that the majority of OC (from pages 38-90) was written in his last month-and-a- half of his life. And I guess what fundamentally concerned me about this was that all of his other spontaneous works -- letters, lectures, diary entries -- have the status of being just that. OC, however -- at least on the shelves of bookstores -- pretends to be something other than diary-sort of writing. I think it would be good if people who indulged it at least had that fact front and center in their minds.
>
> Again, none of this is to assert that OC is deficient; it is merely to assert that it is not a typescript (or even a manuscript).
>
As you know, I have problems with putting too much stock in something like Culture and Value or even the Lectures on Ethics, Aesthetics and Psychology for some of the reasons you cite (and, especially with C&V, because I think the material it contains wasn't meant for public consumption. But On Certainty is different. As you note, he wrote it while ill and completed it, literally on his deathbed. He knew he wouldn't have a chance to revise. He knew he was writing it for those he would be leaving behind. Aside from the fact that we can see it's rich with insight and so tight in form, we can be reasonably comfortable that he was doing his best work under the circumstances. Perhaps his medication undermined him to some degree. Perhaps his failing health did as well. Still, he took the trouble to scribble away while dying to get these thoughts down. I think the provenance of On Certainty is testimony to its value but, more, I think a careful reading of it surely demonstrates that as well.
And I came late to On Certainty because it wasn't available in my university years. My reading of him had mainly been the Blue and Brown Books, the Notebooks and, of course Philosophical Investigations (with some attention, but not much once I had read the PI, to the Tractatus). I was quite surprised when I returned to philosophy after some thirty years separation to discover On Certainty -- and impressed with its depth and perspicacity.
Avrum Stoll argues that On Certainty is a departure from the PI, a veritable third Wittgenstein. I must admit I don't see that but it is most assuredly a substantial contribution from the second Wittgenstein.
SWM
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- 5f.
-
Tue Jan 26, 2010 8:24 pm (PST)
Stuart:
Just a couple of quick remarks regarding the quote below my signature:
1. OC doesn't END. He doesn't "complete it." (I would argue that none of his post-Tractarian philosophy really has an "ending"). Had he not died, there surely would have been remarks numbered 677 and onward. And there surely would have been a typescript that threw out many of the remarks and added many new ones.
2. Also, I would be careful assuming that mere intention to work hard in the face of finality is something that exalts philosophic value. It sounds more suitable for things like dying declarations (confessions, changing the will, getting the record straight). In other words, had he written on his deathbed "the 10 things I want to clear up about how my work is perceived, " we might be inclined to give "work-plus-death" some capital. But as it stands, all that OC is, is an elder Wittgenstein at work on a different language game -- one started by Moore (and one that W wanted to leave significant remarks about).
3. I think, also, one should be careful about how the ability to philosophize existed in Wittgenstein. He could not simply sit down and do it. He had to be in the right mood, setting, etc. It is quite plausible to assume that had his health changed miraculously and had his mood and surroundings changed, that he would have found the forced daily labor of churning out his thoughts to have resulted in unfortunate or feigned remarks here and there. Maybe more of the powerful similes that we see in other works (that Monk notes are absent) might have re-appeared. One could even reasonably wonder whether the fact that such regular writing was occurring was evidence that the rare energies that came in bursts and thrusts were NOT the things producing the near-daily remarks -- and that a subdued Wittgenstein worked within lights more dim, but stable, throughout the month and a half.
Anyway, my point here is not in any way to diminish OC. All I am doing is making sure that people understand its historical context and are not under the illusion that: (a) the work is finished; or (b) that the conditions of his writing in March/April made his remarks more philosophically worthy than other thoughts he chased in his notebooks.
Regards and thanks.
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html
Stuart: "As you note, he wrote it while ill and completed it, literally on his deathbed. He knew he wouldn't have a chance to revise. He knew he was writing it for those he would be leaving behind. Aside from the fact that we can see it's rich with insight and so tight in form, we can be reasonably comfortable that he was doing his best work under the circumstances. Perhaps his medication undermined him to some degree. Perhaps his failing health did as well. Still, he took the trouble to scribble away while dying to get these thoughts down. I think the provenance of On Certainty is testimony to its value but, more, I think a careful reading of it surely demonstrates that as well."
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- 5g.
-
Tue Jan 26, 2010 9:00 pm (PST)
First, I want to thank Sean for raising an interesting topic. Second, I want to endorse Stuart's observation that Wittgenstein was well aware that he wasn't likely to bring these thoughts to completion. That too should be considered.
The most important reason to raise the issues surounding the writing of _On_Certainty_ is the simple virtue of getting the facts right. But as I've mentioned elsewhere, regarding the "cash value" of periodization schemes, what interests me about such distinctions is the use to which we're to put them. What is the relevance of these facts?
I would assume that, hagiography and religious metaphors aside, no one here treats Wittgenstein' s remarks as some sort of unquestionable authority in any case. So, distinctions between his most carefully considered thoughts and things have might have entertained but reconsidered (or would have reconsidered given the chance) aren't relevant in that sense. Whether what Wittgenstein has to say is true, insightful, or interesting is what matters, whether it is a remark recorded from casual conversation or a remark from his most finished work.
In a related topic, we might consider whether some ideas ought to be properly called "Wittgensteinian" . Here the dispute would be about classification not authority. I am unaware of any differences between professed Wittgensteinians that turn solely on the acceptance of ideas in OC, but it is at least remotely plausible that such a dispute might arise.
Similarly, I could at least imagine a polemic against Wittgenstein that focused on works like OC while giving little attention to PI. Aside from the fact that such a polemic would be rather bizarre, it might be deemed relevant to point out that one is judging a philosopher by work he was unable to complete.
So far these possibilities aren't very interesting but this is:
Suppose someone were to bring to our attention remarks in OC that clearly conflicted with remarks in PI. (If it is conflicting theses, then the reading would be suspect by my lights but perhaps the conflict is methodological, i.e. he says something in OC that conflicts with his account of philosophical practice in PI.) Now, what might we say?
1. OC is a demonstration of the method and if it seems to conflict with what PI says, then when need to reconsider our reading of the PI's recommendations in light of the practice demonstrated in OC.
2. He was reconsidering his previous ideas about the role of philosophy and this makes a case for a "third Wittgenstein" that is not only a set of additions to but also a departure from the Wittgenstein of the PI.
3. He wasn't at his best and he would have spotted the conflict and revised accordingly had he had the chance, bringing them into conformity with PI.
And it is for arguments like (3.) that the circumstances of writing OC would become significant.
This is of course completely hypothetical but it is not implausible that such a debate might arise, on a larger or smaller scale. But without a clear case before us, without further context, I can't say that any of those approaches (or others I might not have considered) might not be the most sensible.
JPDeMouy
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