[C] [Wittrs] Re: Re: On When the New Wittgenstein Arrived (Again)
- From: Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 6 Jan 2010 23:57:40 -0800 (PST)
(J)
... I don't know what to say. On one hand, I'm inclined to agree with one point
that you make. Perhaps the problem with the way I have characterized this is
that too much is front-loaded. I've taken the breaking of the ice (or the fall
of the first domino) as though it were the equivalent of what necessarily
followed from those events. It is true that those events, however necessary I
would claim them, still have to happen. One want to say in late 30 he stuck a
new dinner in oven. It still has to be cooked.
But on the other hand, I have some objections with your views. The first is
whether we are really disagreeing about something or just talking about it
differently. (glass half full or empty). Let's do this. Let's agree that there
is a latter Wittgenstein (LW) of some sort which is different from Early
Wittgenstein (EW) of some sort. And let's agree the difference is only
relative, for even LW bears SOME important relationship EW (as many scholars
emphasize). The question becomes: what does LW consist of that EW doesn't, when
did it happen, and what might be said to be the transitional Wittgenstein (TW)?
I'm still going with what Monk says. The Wittgenstein of Philosophical Remarks
clearly has backed off of, yet retained enough of, EW. He sticks Kant and and
talk of phenomenology in the mix as a band-aid while endorsing verification. He
talks of words having space that cannot be invaded and of inner mental
connections. And almost right after presenting these views to receive his
college stipend, he begins to shed the only remaining links to EW, including
those temporary band-aids.
The shedding of the specific things begins in 1930, to wit:
1. rejection of elementary propositions and logical inference. (Telling Schlick
how his views had changed since the Tractatus, Wittgenstein wrote, "... at the
time, I had thought that all inference was based on tautological form. At that
time I had not seen that an inference can also have the form: This man is 2m
tall, therefore he is not 3, tall. .. What was wrong about my conception was
that I believed that the syntax of logical constants could be laid down without
paying much attention to their inner connection ... [which Wittgenstein's new
mission is to now discover] ." (284-285)
2. introduction of a central role for grammar. (The possibility of a circle
that is longer than it is wide is ruled out by what we mean by 'circle.'
Wittgenstein describes this idea as syntax and as grammar. 285)
3. Rejection of doctrines and theses as philosophical method; ("If one tried to
advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them,
because everyone would agree to them.') (297)
4. Seeing philosophical method as a craft or technique (rather than formulating
proofs). He told Drury that this realization provided him, " a real resting
place. ... I know that my method is right ... My father was a business man, and
I am a business man: I want my philosophy to be business like, to get something
done, to get something settled." Monk says, "the 'transitional phase' in
Wittgenstein's philosophy comes to an end with this." (297)
5. waffling on the verification principle soon after reinforcing it to Schlick
and Waisman in the same year. (Monk doesn't give a date, but the suggestion is
1930 [if this is wrong, it could be important if after 32:] Wittgenstein tells
the Moral Science Club, "I used at time to say that, in order to get clear
about how a sentence is used, it was a good idea to ask oneself the question,
'how would one try to verify such an assertion?' But that is just one way among
others of getting clear ... . For example, another question which it is very
often useful is to ask oneself is: 'How is this word learned?' 'How would one
set about teaching a child to use this word?' But some people have turned this
suggestion about asking for verification into a dogma -- as if I'd been
advancing a theory of meaning. (287-288)).
6. Announcing in the lectures of the Lent term of 1930 that philosophy's role
is to dispel puzzles of language, and that doing so involves spelling
out grammar ("grammar tells us what makes sense and what does
not"). Wittgenstein also rejects the causal view of meaning (e.g., I intend
with words to cause a foreseeable behavioral effect. Doesn't work for
confusion). (291)
7. Arriving for the Fall term, Wittgenstein had a clear conception of the right
method in philosophy. "The nimbus of philosophy has been lost." Philosophy is
like "tidying up a room." (298-299). He writes about the nature of his views,
"For me ... clarity, perspicuity are valuable in themselves. ... I am not
interested in constructing a building, so much as in having a perspicuous view
of the foundations of possible buildings." (300-301)
Also, please note that In the chapter "the Fog Clears," which takes place in
late 30, is so littered with modern Wittgensteinianisms that one cannot in good
faith call this Wittgenstein transitory to Tractarian thought. At this point in
time, the dinner in the oven is well on its way and is even recognizable in the
rough form it will be consumed. (Imagine a turkey on Thanksgiving getting
brown). I can't type all of that stuff. Could you look at it for me?
(Summary: strongly anti-theory, anti-formalistic, anti-analysis,
anti-logic talk. Importantly, internal phenomena cannot be examined or
justified -- we can only give examples of where rules are used correctly or
incorrectly, and say: 'look, don't you see the rule?" (shedding that Kantian
talk). Mathematics doesn't need a reason for it to be. Contradiction isn't
important. You can't prove proving.)
All of this turn-coat stuff is being put into Philosophical Grammar in 31 and
32. This is apparently where he begins his notebook-to-manuscript-to-typescript
(and back again!) process. In fact, this is what produces the first
"big typescript." Monk describes the work in 31 as Wittgenstein "beginning to
formulate some sort of satisfactory presentation of his new thought." (319).
The thought,by the way, that he has been telling his students over the last
year. Wittgenstein tells Schlick in 1931 that he can no longer go forward with
the updated Tractatus book, because his views are now too much opposed to the
Tractatus. "There are very, very many statements in the book which I now
disagree!" (emphasis on both verys). He tells Waisman that clarity and peace
are better than logic and truth. (320-321). He's telling his kids that grammar
is to replace theories and truth. (322).
Also, see Monk on 325 -- the chapter on philosophy that was in the Big T but
did not make it into PG. (Philosophy is confused by asking wrong questions
-- like "what is time.")
Here is where I think I fundamentally differ with you. He dictates the big T in
the summer of 32. But the thoughts were already there in 30/31. They just have
to be polished and worked out. I think I'm taking a biographical look at this
and you are looking at this legalistically (when documents are produced, etc.).
Monk does say that as soon as he completed the Big T, he began making extensive
revisions of it. And neither I nor you deny he still has work to do on the
dinner. You mentioned some things that he had to later clarify and formulate. I
don't disagree with that.
But my Wittgenstein came to the earth in late 30. Like Jesus, he came to his
students and friends first with "the word." The date of birth is when the new
ideas entered his head, not when he presents a formal document of them.
I don't know really how much we are disagreeing.
Regards.
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html
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