[C] [Wittrs] Re: On When the New Wittgenstein Arrived (Again)
- From: "J" <ubersicht@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 06 Jan 2010 05:28:17 -0000
SW,
Please note: I refered to the completion of "The Big Typescript", from which
the material in _Philosophical_Grammar_ is taken, albeit with a great deal
abridged. The sections omitted have been a subject of some controversy and
include extended remarks on phenomenology, a topic generally associated with
the transitional work of _Philosophical_Remarks_. In fact, one of the
rationales (Kenny's as I recall) for their omission was that similar material
was already present in PR. I would consider the transition from phenomenology
to grammar to be an important part of the development of the later philosophy.
(Unfortunately, I don't have all of this material at hand so my recollection
should be taken with a grain of salt.)
As an examination of the recent "Scholar's Edition" of the BT material makes
vividly apparent, the work was undergoing extensive revision. In 1933, he had
set out to have work he'd written made into a typescript but during that time,
he suddenly found himself drastically reworking the material. This is part of
why the scholar's edition was such a challenge.
Yes, I am well aware that he was constantly revising and rearranging his work
throughout the later period. But the revisions here are often quite dramatic.
Also, there are key Tractarian ideas still under consideration, being reworked,
not rejected, such as the idea of elementary propositions, the idea that the
reference of a term is determined by its place in grammatical space, and the
relationship between a proposition and a picture.
1929/1930 saw the collapse of the Tractarian approach to objects. And with
that one could say that a picture no longer held him captive. But this was the
first domino (or we could say that realizing the import of the color-exclusion
problem was the first domino, one which led to the rejection of the overall
approach). I'm going to quote Hacker on this, because I don't have the
resources available right now to assemble such a case myself and because
Hacker's approach is largely consonant with my own (and influenced my own view
to no small degree). The following is from "The Whistling Had to Stop", which
is also a good summary of many of the particular Tractarian ideas that were
rejected and the interrelationships between those ideas):
"By the time he had written the Big Typescript, however, his philosophy had
become transformed
(although here and there one can still find residues of the earlier ideas
sticking to the new
thoughts, like pieces of the eggshell out of which he has broken (cf. CV 23))
"To trace in detail the story of the change in Wittgenstein's views between
1929 and
1932/3 is a task for a book-length study. It would have to trace simultaneous
developments
on many fronts, noting how some lagged behind when Wittgenstein initially
failed to realize
the implications of some of his advances. And it would have to examine his
extensive writings
on the philosophy of mathematics in this period, for that work played an
important role in the
general change of his ideas."
The domino analogy is a particularly apt one because it captures what I take to
be the core of our disagreement. Once the first domino falls, it is
"inevitable" that the others will fall as well. That's the picture we make.
But just as, when think of machines when we think of mathematical rules and
neglect the fact that machine parts can bend or break, we also forget that any
number of things can happen to prevent all of the dominoes from falling.
Unquestionably, Wittgenstein had important insights in 1929/1930 that would
make the later work possible. But working through those ideas and their
consequences would take time.
I don't have them handy nor do I recall the exact terms covered, but Moore kept
some notes from 1930-1933 and they are available in a few places, including
_Philosophical_Occasions_.
My best recollection of those is that in 1931 he was still ambivalent about the
principle of bipolarity and about whether various sentences should be called
propositions and in 1932, he was still having great difficulty articulating
what was wrong with the "meaning-body" conception, sometimes suggesting that
talk of meaning was itself "obsolete".
> > The phrase
> > "length of interval" has its
> > sense in virtue of the way we determine it,
> and differs
> > according to the method
> > of measurement
>
> I was thinking meaning is use, here.
Even strident verificationism could be described as approaching meaning by
attending to use. But verificationism is a thesis. And one with many
difficulties. The remarks on meaning and use in PI are not theses.
>
> > We cannot
> > say that two bangs two seconds apart differ only in
> degree
> > from those an hour
> > apart,
>
>
> I had understood this to say that one is a psychological
> estimate, the other isn't.
Either could be a psychological estimate and either could be measured with a
stopwatch. But when I say, "They're about two seconds apart" and "They're
about an hour apart", I can grasp the first interval as a whole, as when I
recall a musical phrase.
Compare this with seeing 4 objects and not needing to count and seeing 17
objects and needing to count. The difference is important but it is not a
difference of sense, as if when more objects are placed on a table, the numbers
I use don't mean the same or as if when variations on a melody get longer (as
in Brahms method of motivic variation), I'm guilty of equivocation in comparing
their durations.
This is the sense of interval.
> He's taking what are thought to be analytic ideas -- length,
> interval -- and showing that they have senses which are
> conveyed only "in action."
But he's saying that there are different senses, not that symptoms and criteria
we use in judging vary in different cases. Not that there is a family
resemblance between the different activities we call "judging the duration",
but that the sense "differs according to the method of measurement".
(Elsewhere, I've remarks on the disagreement between Bridgman and Einstein over
Einstein's abandonment of operationalism in General Relativity. There, the
dispute is over the "principle of equivalence" and the treatment of gravitic
mass and accelerational mass as equivalent despite their being measured
differently. These issues are actually closely related.)
JPDeMouy
=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
Other related posts:
