Sean,

Two questions arise for me:

1. If translating from German into English the writings of someone who spoke German primarily, to what extent should their English speaking be a guide in your translation.

Obviously, there are good reasons for the person to have written in German. One reason very well could be a greater confidence and fluency in their native tongue. Shouldn't the translation reflect the fluency of the German text?

On this view, one would wish to preserve the eccentricities where the German is eccentric but not to impose eccentricities (reflecting their English speaking) where the German text is not eccentric.

Somewhat apropos of this and amusing in its own right is an exchange between Anscombe and Hanfling (whose first language was German but who spoke English so fluently that most people assumed him to be a native speaker). Apparently, Hanfling found it peculiar that Wittgenstein continued to write in German throughout his life. Anscombe replied (unaware of the irony) that only someone who was unable to read the original German could ask such a thing!

2. To what extent would "queer" even be eccentric at the time? I suspect it would be somewhat odd, but not nearly as odd as today. And this cuts two ways:

a. To the extent that it was odd even at the time, there is a case to be made for preserving it in order to reflect Wittgenstein's style. But again, are we interested in reflecting his German style or reflecting his English style even though we're working with his German? We're talking about preserving a precedent of translation not about preserving Wittgenstein's words.

b. To the extent that it was much less odd at the time, and to the extent that the German words have not undergone the same transition in usage, there is a case for changing it. We want to reflect how Wittgenstein would have wished to be understood by someone who read German. How he might have been understood by people who understood English when he spoke English is a secondary concern, at most suggestive.

Finally, I want to emphasize this: Anscombe used one word to translate two different words. Whether for variety or in order to draw some distinction, Wittgenstein used two different words in German.

And I would say (though I am no authority) that translating merkwurdig as "queer" reads as an understatement. Merwurdig is most literally rendered as "memorable" but with a suggestion that the reason it is memorable is its peculiarity. "Remarkable" is on the whole a better translation. "Extraordinary" is good too, though the context would be one's guide.

Translating seltsam as "queer" seems perfectly appropriate however.

JPDeMouy

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

Hi.

I just wanted to say that I've very much enjoyed reading a number of your recent posts on Wittrs. Both interesting and acute. Many thanks!

Sincerely,

Walter Horn

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

... thanks Walto! (You and I are buds).
 
SW

----- Original Message ----
From: walto <walterhorn@yahoo.com>
To: wittrsamr@freelists.org
Sent: Tue, January 5, 2010 4:44:02 PM
Subject: [Wittrs] Re: Wittgenstein, Translations & "Queer"

Hi.

I just wanted to say that I've very much enjoyed reading a number of your recent posts on Wittrs.  Both interesting and acute.  Many thanks!

Sincerely,

Walter Horn

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

Hi, Sean.

Hope you're well. I don't know how anything I've written ended up here. Certainly it was none of my doing. As you know I'm not a member of Wittrs and have not sought membership, though I often read it with enjoyment and am glad it's around. I was simply trying to write a note to JPDeMouy, who (IMHO) has written a bunch of really interesting posts here lately (not that yours or anybody else's haven't also been interesting: I certainly don't mean to suggest that--but it was Mr. DeMouy's on which I intended to (privately) comment.

Wishing you and yours a happy new year, your bud,

Walto

--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@...> wrote:
>
> ... thanks Walto! (You and I are buds).
>  

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

(walto)

... I knew that, Walter. I was just having some "fun." J's a splendid fellow around here.

As to why the posts were not "private," I imagine it has to do with Yahoo and the way our group is configured. If you are using that forum, make sure you pay attention to the email address that appears whenever you press reply. Even if you try to direct the reply privately to J, you will note that the email address is wittrsamr@freelists.org   There are numerous reasons specific to Yahoo's lack of functionality and communistic approach that requires this. As a general rule, any reply from Yahoo goes public, even if it is addressed to me (though I don't know why on that last one, because the email address seems "correct").

Bottom line: send private messages through your own mail client, and copy the addy yourself. Or, join the message board. It can send private messages. Once again, pay close attention to the addy that pops up whenever you reply in Yahoo.

One last thing. Please know that Wittrs does not really require "membership" to post. You can join in just by shooting off mail (as you can see). We don't recognize the prejudice of treating one who reads as "not being a member.' If you read it, you are a "member" in our eyes.

Regards.   

Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

WH,

Thanks so much for your kind words. They are much appreciated. Sean's as well. (Bloody Yahoo! You don't want me to get started on my problems with their service!)

JPDeMouy

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

(J)

... I think that was an excellent defense. I cannot dispute the the cogency of its appeal. But let me at least offer another perspective. It isn't necessarily one I believe, more than it is one I "feel" (as a passion). It goes like this:

1. Wittgenstein knew English well enough. And the test of when one comes to know a word, generally speaking, is when one can deploy it. And Wittgenstein had a pattern of using the _expression_ "queer" in English, which presumably conformed to a usage he picked up in the language culture. None of this is to deny that he could be using a strange sense of the word. But I think the general gist of "queer" is "weird." (peculiar?).

2. I do not deny that the translation should be focused on Wittgenstein's German text rather than his English. But what I might deny is that his German is free from the similar peculiarities that you see in his English. There are historical sources for this. Monk and others note that his German expressions could mean something ordinary and peculiar all at the same time. There are scores of accounts of him being frustrated with translations of his work. (From Waisman, to Rhees, to anyone). Wittgenstein had a serious historical problem with people understanding his philosophy, even in his own language. I want to suggest this is because of the way he philosophized and the intensity of his ideas (as well as his personality). His thoughts, in a way, sort of "breached" language. Monk writes, "Wittgenstein's language has the singularly rare quality of being both colloquial and painstakingly precise." (414). 

3. Note that weird/peculiar is similar to, and in some cases synonymous with, "odd, strange or curious" (the translations for seltsam), and only cousin to "remarkable" or "extraordinary" (some of the translations for merkwurdig). The question seems to boils down in the first instance (seltsam) to a code of style -- aristocrats don't say "queer" -- and in the second (merkwurdig) for a more specific sense, for clarity's sake. Or, the question boils down to this: Wittgenstein's English didn't know the Queen's word for weird, and he couldn't mind p's and q's when it came to some basic English expressions.

I must tell you I have trouble with the latter idea. I think Wittgenstein knowingly deployed "queer" because of its mystical aesthetic. Think of the intensity of the riddle that is suggested by such an _expression_. Think of the intensity of the mind. Odd or curious are words that say something more cold about the nonconformity. "Queer" in this sense has the connotation of "bizarre." So I fear that an aesthetic quality may be washed away.

The real questions, it seems, are twofold: (a) what is the German equivalent, if any, for "bizarre" or "weird" where the same is informal and suggestive of something mysterious (intensely felt as such); and (b) did Wittgenstein use such a word in his German? Let us call such a word X. If X exists and Wittgenstein used it on occasion, I'm inclined to say merkwurdig is interpreted correctly, and that seltsam MAY be (hard to say). But if W never or barely used X -- or if X doesn't exist -- I may be more inclined to say that an exceedingly difficult philosopher has a peculiar way of speaking at times that may affect seltsam and possibly merkwurdig (harder case here). [Note: I don't speak a word of German]. I wonder if there is a change from his original notebooks or typescripts to the final one? Be interesting if X were crossed out for one of the others. That would be a smoking gun.

4. Consider Plato and "the forms." If you were translating that -- from Greek, right? -- would you use "essences" as the meaning? And if you would not, is this similar or different to what is happening here? (It may be different. I'm not sure)

5. Don't you find the below statement a bit arrogant?

"In the changes we have introduced to the first 107 remarks of the Investigations, we have paid careful attention to Wittgenstein's responses to Rush Rhees's translation of 1938-9 (TS 226). Wittgenstein went over Rhees often imperfect draft carefully, together with Yorick Smythies, and he made numerous changes and corrections on the typescript by hand. To be sure, he was not a native English speaker, and not all of his corrections are improvements. But where he changed a translation that was subsequently used also by Anascombe, his proposal always merits close attention. ...[And where] he did NOT change some of Rhees's translation where it differs importantly in meaning from Anascombe's is always noteworthy."  (PI, 4th, xiii)

Compare with Monk. Monk says (414) that Wittgenstein shelved publishing the parts of PI that he had completed in 38 for two reasons: he came to doubt the second half of the book dealing with philosophy of mathematics (needed further work), and he did not like Rhees translation. He writes regarding Rhees translation, "Wittgenstein, who was never easily pleased with any attempt by others to represent his thoughts, was horrified at what he saw." (414).

Anyway, I am not really arguing for or against anything. This is all at the level of "wonder." I don't even have a specific translated _expression_ that I am disagreeing about. I am just talking out loud. My only "point" is to express a bad feeling I have that some of the judgments may be in the nature of style and copy editing. I don't know for sure.

Regards.      

Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

Sean, J,

when too much philosophizing can be just plain too much

I think the world of you two guys...but talk about making a "mountain out of a molehill". It's clear that the main issue on the part of the trendy new translation is nothing more than a patronizing disregard for their readers, with the translator's assuming that Wittgenstein must be predigested and spoon fed to the MTV generation of dysfunctional readers who don't know or don't care what "queer" actually meant before it's cooping by gender politics.

Indeed, even if it mattered in the least bit how we can pares the meaning of the word "queer", which in fact had no role in the decision to abandon Anscombe's translation, the word "queer" connotes not only "odd or strange" but actually conveys, as you can see from the Merriam-Webster below a sense of "counterfeit" and also as anyone over the age of 16 can probably dig down and attest, also conveys a "subjective feeling of sorts" as well, a feeling of lack of genuineness.....moreso than just a commentary on the 'oddness" of an object or external.

Lastly, you'll see that even Merriam-Webster points us to the angst of the frantically politically correct among us in their definition which is all that's really behind this needless meddling with Wittgenstein's words..

Honestly, guys ...too much philosophy can be just plain too much. When there is nothing but a desperate need to be trendy and politically correct and to patronize the reader by assuming the reader doesn't know that actual meaning of a word, let's just call things as we see them . Queer.

queer
4 entries found.
1queer (adjective)
2queer (transitive verb)
3queer (noun)
queer theory (noun)
Ads by Google
Definition
Looking for Definition? Find exactly what you want today.
Yahoo.com

Main Entry: 1queer
Pronunciation: \Ë?kwir\
Function: adjective
Etymology: origin unknown
Date: 1508
1 a : worthless, counterfeit <queer money> b : questionable, suspicious
2 a : differing in some odd way from what is usual or normal b (1) : eccentric,unconventional (2) : mildly insane : touched c : absorbed or interested to an extreme or unreasonable degree : obsessed d (1) often disparaging : homosexual(2) sometimes offensive : gay 4b
3 : not quite well
- queer·ish \-ish\ adjective
- queer·ly adverb
- queer·ness noun
usage Over the past two decades, an important change has occurred in the use ofqueer in sense 2d. The older, strongly pejorative use has certainly not vanished, but a use by some gay people and some academics as a neutral or even positive term has established itself. This development is most noticeable in the adjective but is reflected in the corresponding noun as well. The newer use is sometimes taken to be offensive, especially by older gay men who fostered the acceptance ofgay in these uses and still have a strong preference for it.
On Jan 5, 2010, at 11:25 PM, Sean Wilson wrote:

> (J)
>
> ... I think that was an excellent defense. I cannot dispute the the cogency of its appeal. But let me at least offer another perspective. It isn't necessarily one I believe, more than it is one I "feel" (as a passion). It goes like this:
>
> 1. Wittgenstein knew English well enough. And the test of when one comes to know a word, generally speaking, is when one can deploy it. And Wittgenstein had a pattern of using the _expression_ "queer" in English, which presumably conformed to a usage he picked up in the language culture. None of this is to deny that he could be using a strange sense of the word. But I think the general gist of "queer" is "weird." (peculiar?).
>
> 2. I do not deny that the translation should be focused on Wittgenstein's German text rather than his English. But what I might deny is that his German is free from the similar peculiarities that you see in his English. There are historical sources for this. Monk and others note that his German expressions could mean something ordinary and peculiar all at the same time. There are scores of accounts of him being frustrated with translations of his work. (From Waisman, to Rhees, to anyone). Wittgenstein had a serious historical problem with people understanding his philosophy, even in his own language. I want to suggest this is because of the way he philosophized and the intensity of his ideas (as well as his personality). His thoughts, in a way, sort of "breached" language. Monk writes, "Wittgenstein's language has the singularly rare quality of being both colloquial and painstakingly precise." (414).
>
> 3. Note that weird/peculiar is similar to, and in some cases synonymous with, "odd, strange or curious" (the translations for seltsam), and only cousin to "remarkable" or "extraordinary" (some of the translations for merkwurdig). The question seems to boils down in the first instance (seltsam) to a code of style -- aristocrats don't say "queer" -- and in the second (merkwurdig) for a more specific sense, for clarity's sake. Or, the question boils down to this: Wittgenstein's English didn't know the Queen's word for weird, and he couldn't mind p's and q's when it came to some basic English expressions.
>
> I must tell you I have trouble with the latter idea. I think Wittgenstein knowingly deployed "queer" because of its mystical aesthetic. Think of the intensity of the riddle that is suggested by such an _expression_. Think of the intensity of the mind. Odd or curious are words that say something more cold about the nonconformity. "Queer" in this sense has the connotation of "bizarre." So I fear that an aesthetic quality may be washed away.
>
> The real questions, it seems, are twofold: (a) what is the German equivalent, if any, for "bizarre" or "weird" where the same is informal and suggestive of something mysterious (intensely felt as such); and (b) did Wittgenstein use such a word in his German? Let us call such a word X. If X exists and Wittgenstein used it on occasion, I'm inclined to say merkwurdig is interpreted correctly, and that seltsam MAY be (hard to say). But if W never or barely used X -- or if X doesn't exist -- I may be more inclined to say that an exceedingly difficult philosopher has a peculiar way of speaking at times that may affect seltsam and possibly merkwurdig (harder case here). [Note: I don't speak a word of German]. I wonder if there is a change from his original notebooks or typescripts to the final one? Be interesting if X were crossed out for one of the others. That would be a smoking gun.
>
> 4. Consider Plato and "the forms." If you were translating that -- from Greek, right? -- would you use "essences" as the meaning? And if you would not, is this similar or different to what is happening here? (It may be different. I'm not sure)
>
> 5. Don't you find the below statement a bit arrogant?
>
> "In the changes we have introduced to the first 107 remarks of the Investigations, we have paid careful attention to Wittgenstein's responses to Rush Rhees's translation of 1938-9 (TS 226). Wittgenstein went over Rhees often imperfect draft carefully, together with Yorick Smythies, and he made numerous changes and corrections on the typescript by hand. To be sure, he was not a native English speaker, and not all of his corrections are improvements. But where he changed a translation that was subsequently used also by Anascombe, his proposal always merits close attention. ...[And where] he did NOT change some of Rhees's translation where it differs importantly in meaning from Anascombe's is always noteworthy." (PI, 4th, xiii)
>
> Compare with Monk. Monk says (414) that Wittgenstein shelved publishing the parts of PI that he had completed in 38 for two reasons: he came to doubt the second half of the book dealing with philosophy of mathematics (needed further work), and he did not like Rhees translation. He writes regarding Rhees translation, "Wittgenstein, who was never easily pleased with any attempt by others to represent his thoughts, was horrified at what he saw." (414).
>
> Anyway, I am not really arguing for or against anything. This is all at the level of "wonder." I don't even have a specific translated _expression_ that I am disagreeing about. I am just talking out loud. My only "point" is to express a bad feeling I have that some of the judgments may be in the nature of style and copy editing. I don't know for sure.
>
> Regards.
>
> Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
> Assistant Professor
> Wright State University
> Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
> SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
> Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html
>
>
>
> ==========================================
>
> Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
>
>

CJ,

"when too much philosophizing can be just plain too much"

A quibble: if we were disputing how to translate Goethe, we would not be so inclined to think of the dispute as "philosophizing". Exegesis and philosophy are different activities. (I've emphasized this point elsewhere in relation to the appropriateness of contentious theses in defending an interpretation as opposed to examining a philosophical puzzle.)

"I think the world of you two guys..."

Thanks! You too.

"but talk about making a 'mountain out of a molehill'."

I think Sean acknowledges as much. So do I.

"It's clear that the main issue on the part of the trendy new translation is nothing more than..."

I am really distrustful of such reductionistic "explanations". I don't want to be too hasty in ascribing motives here. But your suspicions do have some plausibility to me.

"a patronizing disregard for their readers, with the translator's assuming that Wittgenstein must be predigested and spoon fed to the MTV generation of dysfunctional readers..."

Hey! I resemble that remark!

Of course (putting on my cantankerous old man voice), back in my day, MTV actually played music videos.

"...who don't know or don't care what 'queer' actually meant before it's cooping by gender politics."

Note: the originators of "queer theory", campus speech codes, and the like, were "Baby Boomers", aka filthy hippies, taking inspiration from Marxists like Herbert Marcuse (who also gave hippies the slogan "Make Love, Not War". It took them awhile to understand the other parts of his work.)

Of course, if you point out that connection, you'll be accused of McCarthyism. And, more oddly anti-Semitism. Not that they oppose Jew-baiting themselves when it comes to criticizing US foreign policy.

(The game is called "Guilt by Association". Thanks for playing.)

The best thing to do, if your politics don't fit into a neat category, i.e. if you have a brain, is to keep your head low and your mouth shut. Else, you may find yourself a martyr and cause celebre of the right wing think tanks. Like those asshats give a damn about academic freedom outside of scoring points in the "culture wars": they'd turn every biology department in the country over to the Young Earth Creationists if they thought it was a winning political strategy!

Er, where was I? Oh, you can't blame MTV or even the "MTV generation" for this mess.

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

SW,

I'll just comment in a couple of points, since I don't have a particularly strong position on this either way so much as an interest in considering the issue from different sides. A lot of your points are also well taken.

But
> what I might deny is that his German is free from the
> similar peculiarities that you see in his English.

You "might deny" it? I would insist on denying it!

But one thing I'd hoped to convey before and I'll now emphasize, is this:

Where the German text would strike a German-speaking reader as eccentric, the translation into English should strike the English-speaking reader as eccentric. But where the German text would not strike a German-speaking reader as eccentric, the English translation shouldn't strike the English-speaking reader as eccentric either.

Whether his way of expressing a similar insight in English would have been eccentric, if the phrasing doesn't sound eccentric in German, then the translation that doesn't follow his own English usage is warranted.

On a related point, where the German text would not strike the German-speaking reader as archaic, the English translation should not strike the English-speaking reader as archaic either.

If the usage of the English word has undergone a dramatic change but the German word it translates has seen no such controversy, then the updated translation might wish not to give such an impression. And this need not be for reasons of "political correctness".

These are goals of translation that cannot always be realized. Some things just sound odd in translation. Some idioms don't readily come across. But these are still reasonable aims.

Or, the question boils
> down to this: Wittgenstein's English didn't know
> the Queen's word for weird, and he couldn't mind p's and
> q's when it came to some basic English expressions.

My suspicion, more in line with CJ's, is that this is less about the Queen's English and more about the contemporary political controversy surrounding "queer".

Why do I say this? You'll find "queer", among other places, in Russell, e.g. _The_Analysis_of_Matter_, in Moore, e.g. "Is Existence a Predicate?", in Ryle, e.g. _The_Concept_of_Mind_ , and most famously, Mackie (though he's from Oz, he still counts as a native speaker of English) in his _Inventing_Right_and_Wrong_.

Russell's example alone should suffice to make the point that this is not some point about aristocratic style.

> I must tell you I have trouble with the latter idea. I
> think Wittgenstein knowingly deployed "queer" because of
> its mystical aesthetic.

In light of the previous examples, I think that's a reach.

JPDeMouy

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

SW,

Please note: I refered to the completion of "The Big Typescript", from which the material in _Philosophical_Grammar_ is taken, albeit with a great deal abridged. The sections omitted have been a subject of some controversy and include extended remarks on phenomenology, a topic generally associated with the transitional work of _Philosophical_Remarks_. In fact, one of the rationales (Kenny's as I recall) for their omission was that similar material was already present in PR. I would consider the transition from phenomenology to grammar to be an important part of the development of the later philosophy. (Unfortunately, I don't have all of this material at hand so my recollection should be taken with a grain of salt.)

As an examination of the recent "Scholar's Edition" of the BT material makes vividly apparent, the work was undergoing extensive revision. In 1933, he had set out to have work he'd written made into a typescript but during that time, he suddenly found himself drastically reworking the material. This is part of why the scholar's edition was such a challenge.

Yes, I am well aware that he was constantly revising and rearranging his work throughout the later period. But the revisions here are often quite dramatic. Also, there are key Tractarian ideas still under consideration, being reworked, not rejected, such as the idea of elementary propositions, the idea that the reference of a term is determined by its place in grammatical space, and the relationship between a proposition and a picture.

1929/1930 saw the collapse of the Tractarian approach to objects. And with that one could say that a picture no longer held him captive. But this was the first domino (or we could say that realizing the import of the color-exclusion problem was the first domino, one which led to the rejection of the overall approach). I'm going to quote Hacker on this, because I don't have the resources available right now to assemble such a case myself and because Hacker's approach is largely consonant with my own (and influenced my own view to no small degree). The following is from "The Whistling Had to Stop", which is also a good summary of many of the particular Tractarian ideas that were rejected and the interrelationships between those ideas):

"By the time he had written the Big Typescript, however, his philosophy had become transformed
(although here and there one can still find residues of the earlier ideas sticking to the new
thoughts, like pieces of the eggshell out of which he has broken (cf. CV 23))

"To trace in detail the story of the change in Wittgenstein's views between 1929 and
1932/3 is a task for a book-length study. It would have to trace simultaneous developments
on many fronts, noting how some lagged behind when Wittgenstein initially failed to realize
the implications of some of his advances. And it would have to examine his extensive writings
on the philosophy of mathematics in this period, for that work played an important role in the
general change of his ideas."

The domino analogy is a particularly apt one because it captures what I take to be the core of our disagreement. Once the first domino falls, it is "inevitable" that the others will fall as well. That's the picture we make. But just as, when think of machines when we think of mathematical rules and neglect the fact that machine parts can bend or break, we also forget that any number of things can happen to prevent all of the dominoes from falling.

Unquestionably, Wittgenstein had important insights in 1929/1930 that would make the later work possible. But working through those ideas and their consequences would take time.

I don't have them handy nor do I recall the exact terms covered, but Moore kept some notes from 1930-1933 and they are available in a few places, including _Philosophical_Occasions_.

My best recollection of those is that in 1931 he was still ambivalent about the principle of bipolarity and about whether various sentences should be called propositions and in 1932, he was still having great difficulty articulating what was wrong with the "meaning-body" conception, sometimes suggesting that talk of meaning was itself "obsolete".

> > The phrase
> > "length of interval" has its
> > sense in virtue of the way we determine it,
> and differs
> > according to the method
> > of measurement
>
> I was thinking meaning is use, here.

Even strident verificationism could be described as approaching meaning by attending to use. But verificationism is a thesis. And one with many difficulties. The remarks on meaning and use in PI are not theses.

>
> > We cannot
> > say that two bangs two seconds apart differ only in
> degree
> > from those an hour
> > apart,
>
>
> I had understood this to say that one is a psychological
> estimate, the other isn't.

Either could be a psychological estimate and either could be measured with a stopwatch. But when I say, "They're about two seconds apart" and "They're about an hour apart", I can grasp the first interval as a whole, as when I recall a musical phrase.

Compare this with seeing 4 objects and not needing to count and seeing 17 objects and needing to count. The difference is important but it is not a difference of sense, as if when more objects are placed on a table, the numbers I use don't mean the same or as if when variations on a melody get longer (as in Brahms method of motivic variation), I'm guilty of equivocation in comparing their durations.

This is the sense of interval.
> He's taking what are thought to be analytic ideas -- length,
> interval -- and showing that they have senses which are
> conveyed only "in action."

But he's saying that there are different senses, not that symptoms and criteria we use in judging vary in different cases. Not that there is a family resemblance between the different activities we call "judging the duration", but that the sense "differs according to the method of measurement".

(Elsewhere, I've remarks on the disagreement between Bridgman and Einstein over Einstein's abandonment of operationalism in General Relativity. There, the dispute is over the "principle of equivalence" and the treatment of gravitic mass and accelerational mass as equivalent despite their being measured differently. These issues are actually closely related.)

JPDeMouy

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/