SWM wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>I claim that von Neumann did not use my taxonomy of reality types in
>>his analysis of the measurement problem. he did not convert the
>>formula expressed in his notation, (I + II) | III, into a formula
>>that, when expressed in the notation I use for reality types, includes
>>reality type

>We know you say he didn't and I don't claim that you did!

>>I don't make that conversion either. Indeed, I specifically told you
>>"reality type 2 does not appear in von Neumann's formula". [my post of
>>2009-12-31 - 01:47 PM, msg #3686 in the Yahoo group arkive]

>I am well aware you are saying that your 1,2,3 is different from his
>I,II,III. But the fact remains that you derive yours from his (that's
>why you referenced his first as a source and justification for yours).
>You then pin your claim on your version.

I do not derive my set of subscripted pronouns (or the taxonomy of
reality types which they encode) from von Neumann.

>But this is still just smoke, diverting us from the main point which
>is ...

there is a lot of worthless smoke in the cloud of verbiage you crank
out; but, you are the source of it. if you actually want the smoke to
dissipate so that you might focus on a more productive issue (see
below); then, simply stop cranking out these absurd allegations --- that
I converted von Neumann's notation into my own, that I derived my
notation from his, that I redefined his division II to include
phenomenological reality types, and so on.

>Your entire argument appears to hinge on your claim that
>"consciousness" means an "abstract I" (von Neumann's term)

my argument includes the claim that advocates of the von Neumann
Interpretation translate 'abstract I' as 'consciousness'; and, the claim
that, when so used, 'consciousness' means something different from
what you or I or Dennett might mean by 'the subject of experience' or
'the experiencing I' or 'the experiencer'.

>that you tell us has the nature of something like Kant's
>"transcendental I", an unperceived perceiver, and that this is implied
>in von Neumann's formulation.

this is more smoke and nonsense, Stuart. I have never claimed that the
abstract I is "something like Kant's 'transcendental I', an unperceived
perceiver, and that this is implied in von Neumann's formulation" and I
challenge you to identify the post in which you claim I did so.

>My point is that you are saying it is appropriate to use your
>approach, ... presumably because yours adds something (leads to a
>certain conclusion? makes something clearer?).

if by 'my approach' you mean my use of subscripted pronouns; then, yes,
I used them in the attempt to clarify the difference(s) between the two
uses of 'consciousness' mentioned above.

at one point, your post of 2010-01-01 (msg #3708 at yahoo), it seemed
that you understood that.

>>my claim is that 'consciousness' as a synonym of or translation for
>>'abstract I' refers to an (alleged or postulated) entity of reality
>>type 3; whereas, 'consciousness', as you use it, refers to
>>phenomenological (type 2) realities (experiences and the subject of
>>its experiences).

>>would you agree with that claim?

>I would ...

what is your position, now? do you agree or disagree with that claim?

Joe

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SWM wrote:

>What is there about the von Neumann claim concerning the I,II,III
>categorization, relative to the matter of observers collapsing the wave
>function (by observing phenomena on a quantum level), that you think
>undermines a Dennettian like description of consciousness?

I've already answered this question. to repeat, the incompatibilities
between a von Neumann-consistent philosophy of consciousness and a
Dennett-consistent philosophy of consciousness include these:

[using 'PoC' for 'philosophy of consciousness']

1. a von Neumann-consistent PoC is dualistic. a Dennett-conistent PoC is
monistic.

2. in a Dennett-consistent PoC, consciousness (as defined therein) is
epiphenomenal --- causally ineffective and certainly not the source of a
free will (if there is one at all in such a PoC). in a von
Neumann-consistent PoC consciousness (as defined therein) is causally
effective and is the source of a free will.

I see that you've been posting your thoughts about dualism and I will
review them further before posting an opinion as to whether you've
really addressed the first point.

meanwhile, you may address the second point. would you kindly explain
just how a consciousness (depicted as a narrative center of gravity or
as being like a government press secretary out of the decision making
loop) can be the source of a free will and causally effective at
collapsing a wave function.

Joe

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "J" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
<snip>
>
> "...basically it is the supposition that one can produce consciousness on a computer by running certain kinds of programs."
>
> "Strong AI" is not the "supposition" that one "can" produce intentionality (to use Searle's terminology, owing to Brentano - a term I personally would avoid, but we're stuck with it for purposes of this discussion), thought, intelligence, consciousness (all of which Searle unfortunately runs together, though this running together is based on separate arguments, the debating of which would take us too far afield). It is the assertion that running the right kind of program is constitutive of those things.
>

"Strong AI" is the assertion that brains produce consciousness in a way that is equivalent to how computers operate. What is at issue here is not whether brains work just like computers but whether they produce consciousness in a way that is like the things computers do (even if the underlying mechanisms may differ) in which case there would be no reason to think a computer can't also achieve consciousness.

It's a "supposition" because, in the end, it's a working hypothesis for a particular research program. Note that Searle sets himself, via the CRA, to assert that we cannot achieve consciousness in this way.

Those who think otherwise think we can, that is, they are pursuing a "supposition".

That some may feel more strongly about it than others (i.e., some may believe it HAS to be right) isn't the point. Searle's argument is that it CAN'T be right. If his argument fails, then he hasn't shown that it can't be, even if it remains to be shown that it IS right (which is, finally, an empirical question).

> "Note that I see no difference in this formulation with your 'assertion of an equivalence', i.e., that consciousness is just the running of certain kinds of programming on computers."
>
> What do you mean, you "see no difference"?
>

The thesis is that consciousness in ourselves is the performance of certain tasks or functions by an organic machine (the brain) in the way programs in operation on computers perform functions and that, if one can perform the same functions brains perform via a computer (even if, at the mechanical level, computers operate differently than brains to perform those functions), then the same results ought to be obtainable, i.e., consciousness.

The platform doesn't matter as long as the same operations can be performed. Consciousness is seen to be the operations performed (as in the particular process-based system), not the underlying machinery, i.e., interchangeability.

> "I suppose we could argue over the nuances here but it seems to me to be a not especially useful area of debate."
>
> The only thing I've been willing to debate with you is your understanding of the Chinese Room Argument and of the position Searle describes as "Strong AI". And I've only been willing to discuss that because you've demanded I justify a remark I made about your lack of understanding. And that remark was foolishly made precisely because I had no interest in that topic though you kept bringing it up when I (again foolishly) attempted to offer assistance in other matters.
>

Whether foolishly made or not, if you claim it you should back it up or else it is just so much verbal ballast.

> If you're going to dismiss as "nuances" the real logical distinctions I've tried to bring to your attention and regard such things as "not especially useful", then there is really no reason to have this discussion at all.
>

Oy, which "nuances" do you think ought not to be "dismissed"?

You claim I don't understand Searle's argument. So far it seems to me you are the one who does not since you have persisted in asserting that Searle would consider a more robust system, constructed of the same elements as the CR, as not relevant to his CRA. But that can hardly be true because 1) he does not accept arguments for machine consciousness based on a more robustly specked AI because of his CRA (Dennett's, the Churchlands' Reply); and 2) if his CRA only applied to the limited type system represented by his CR it would not be very important since it only tells us what we already know, that a rote system with limited functions isn't conscious.

While Searle has offered many variations of what he means by "Strong AI", in the end what he means is best seen by observing what he actually says in defense of it, how he uses it, and by its actual implications.

> "The bottom line boils down to this: If consciousness is like programs running on a computer..."
>
> That's called a simile.
>

So?

> "...(as Dennett describes it) then that in essence IS an assertion of equivalence."
>
> No, it's not. Saying one thing is like something else is not the same as saying that the two things are identical nor yet is it the same as saying that the first thing could possibly produce the second thing.
>

The issue is not whether they are identical as in being precisely the same (A=A) but whether they can achieve the same kind of results. No one says that a computer is built like or performs its operations like a brain or that a machine consciousness would have to be precisely like ours. For instance, relying on different sensory apparatus, a machine of this type may have different perceptions. What is at issue, rather, is: 1) whether all that our consciousness is is such machine-like operations; and 2) whether, because of this, some machines can be made to have a kind of functionality that includes the features we recognize as consciousness in ourselves (e.g., intentionality, understanding, etc.).

Searle argues, via the CRA, that we cannot achieve such consciousness in machines.

> But I suppose such distinctions are just more "nuance".
>

Wasn't what I meant by "nuance", however, here is an important nuance for you. The fact that a phrase or term may have the form of a simile doesn't necessarily exhaust its meaning. For instance, noting that, "if consciousness is like programs running on a computer then we ought to be able to do the same thing (produce consciousness by running programs on a computer)" is not to say that "the runner leaped over the barrier in his race like a lion pursuing its prey". The use I offered does not depend on a poetic _expression_ of similarity (whether that can be read into my statement or not). My point was that the Dennettian model is about functionality.

If brains do what they do in a way that is replicable in computers (despite brains and computers being manifestly different kinds of platforms), then the outcomes should be replicable too. But, again, it's an empirical question in the end, whereas Searle's argument is a logical one designed to shut the door on the empirical research.

If Searle's argument succeeds, then AI is a false trail and that, of course, is precisely what Searle claims. Now AI may, indeed, prove to be a false trail but Searle has not shown that logically via the CRA. All he has shown is that the configuration of processes he has specked into his CR would not be judged conscious by us. His effort to draw a broader conclusion from the CR is unsound for the reasons I've previously given (including, among other things, that a system that isn't specked to be conscious cannot be expected to be).

> I'm going to resist replying to the rest of this, though I've been sorely tempted. Having read through twice, I am afraid that when I again reach the line where you tell me that a direct quotation from Searle is a "misreading of Searle", I won't be able to maintain my civility.
>
> JPDeMouy
>
> =========================================

My reference was to your statement ABOVE that direct quotation and not to the quotation, of course. I was saying you were misreading that quote.

Anyway, I can see you'd rather not pursue this since you fail to address the substantive points I made and, instead grab onto tangential points like similes. I have found that there is a great resistance on the part of many to the implications of a Dennettian type model of consciousness and a great desire to agree with Searle's conclusion about its impossibility, whether one embraces the specifics of his claims or not (which you appear to claim you don't).

But, for the record, and to repeat what I've said before and which you failed to address, Searle's CRA is pointless unless it applies to all computationally based systems, even if more robust than the CR.

If building a system of multiple processing capacity, doing many more things (functions) than the CR does, can produce consciousness, then the CRA is wrong. But if the CRA is deemed not to be addressing such systems because they are "too robust" for it, then, as an argument, it is pointless because the argument over whether computationally based consciousness is possible is not about whether limited systems like the CR are conscious. (See the real work of AI people like Minsky, e.g., The Emotion Machine.)

SWM

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SWM,

For the record, since you seem to take an interest in such matters (though I'm sure you'll now say that you don't really care, even though you keep alluding to it), I do not cleave to Searle's views. Nor yet to Dennett's. If I were to be identified with any other philosopher's positions in matters even tangentially related to this, they would be those of Peter Hacker (best known as a Wittgenstein exegete), in the book he co-authored with neurophysiologist, Maxwell Bennett, _Philosophical_Foundations_of_Neuroscience_ , and in _Neuroscience_and_Philosophy:_Brain,_Mind,_and_Language_, in which Bennett and Hacker debate Searle and Dennett. Based on that, one might say that my own views are orthogonal to the debate between Searle and Dennett. There are fundamental difference between Hacker on the one side and Searle and Dennett on the other that make the differences between Searle and Dennett... I want to say "negligible", but that's not quite right. Suffice it to say, Searle and Dennett are on one side, Hacker and Bennett are on the other, and I am a lot closer to Hacker. And the disputes concern fundamental issues about the nature of philosophy as well as (what Hacker and Bennett take to be) conceptual confusions and misunderstandings common to many in this "field", including Dennett and Searle. I cannot imagine being persuaded to discuss these topics with you further (though obviously I've done equally foolish things already) fo a variety of reasons, though it should suffice to say that it would complicate matters to no real benefit. And saying this much should suffice to address suggestions that I am somehow indignant that you would dare criticize Searle or somehow just uncomfortable with Dennett, suggestions that are simply irrelevant anyway.

Now, I am going to take a different approach here.

In Searle's paper, "Minds, Brains, and Programs", in which the Chinese Room Argument makes its first appearance, we find the following passage, reminiscent of a press conference by former US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, in which Searle poses and answers a series of questions. My own remarks will be in parentheses.


"'Could a machine think?' The answer is, obviously, yes. We are precisely such machines."

(Here, I agree. For what that's worth. So, to read him as denying that a machine can think, be conscious, and so forth, is simply to misread him.)

"'Yes, but could an artifact, a man-made machine, think?'

"Assuming it is possible to produce artificially a machine with a nervous system, neurons with axons and dendrites, and all the rest of it, sufficiently like ours, again the answer to the question seems to be obviously, yes. If you can exactly duplicate the causes, you could duplicate the effects. And indeed it might be possible to produce consciousness, intentionality, and all the rest of it using some other sorts of chemical principles than those that human beings use. It is, as I said, an empirical question."

(Note how much he grants here. My own answer would be somewhat different, but that needn't concern us here. The fact is that he does grant the possibility that an artifact, a man-made machine, can think, be conscious, and so forth. He doesn't even limit this possibility to an artificial brain that operated on the same chemical basis. So, to read him as denying the possibility that a man-made machine can think, be conscious, and so forth, is again, a misreading.)

"'OK, but could a digital computer think?'

"If by 'digital computer' we mean anything at all that has a level of description where it can correctly be described as the instantiation of a computer program, then again the answer is, of course, yes, since we are the instantiations of any number of computer programs, and we can think."

(I think this is a muddle, but again, that needn't concern us here. He doesn't deny that something that can be correctly described as the instantiaton of a computer program can also be correctly described as thinking.)

"'But could something think, understand, and so on solely in virtue of being a computer with the right sort of program? Could instantiating a program, the right program of course, by itself be a sufficient condition of understanding?'"

(Note well: "solely in virtue" and "sufficient condition".)

"This I think is the right question to ask, though it is usually confused with one or more of the earlier questions, and the answer to it is no.

"'Why not?'

"Because the formal symbol manipulations by themselves don't have any intentionality; they are quite meaningless; they aren't even symbol manipulations, since the symbols don't symbolize anything. In the linguistic jargon, they have only a syntax but no semantics. Such intentionality as computers appear to have is solely in the minds of those who program them and those who use them, those who send in the input and those who interpret the output."

(I consider this also to be a muddle. But that's not the point here. The point is that this answer is addressed to the preceding two questions and not to the three questions prior to them.)

"The aim of the Chinese room example was to try to show this by showing that as soon as we put something into the system that really does have intentionality (a man), and we program him with the formal program, you can see that the formal program carries no additional intentionality. It adds nothing, for example, to a man's ability to understand Chinese."

Now, continuing in a Rumsfeldian vein, I offer some questions and answers of my own:

Is every position that Searle ever criticized therefore an example of the position he calls "Strong AI"?

No. He even explicitly points this out in the original essay. Regarding the "Brain Simulator Reply", he wrote:

"Before countering this reply I want to digress to note that it is an odd reply for any partisan of artificial intelligence (or functionalism, etc.) to make: I thought the whole idea of strong AI is that we don't need to know how the brain works to know how the mind works. The basic hypothesis, or so I had supposed, was that there is a level of mental operations consisting of computational processes over formal elements that constitute the essence of the mental and can be realized in all sorts of different brain processes, in the same way that any computer program can be realized in different computer hardwares: On the assumptions of strong AI, the mind is to the brain as the program is to the hardware, and thus we can understand the mind without doing neurophysiology. If we had to know how the brain worked to do AI, we wouldn't bother with AI."

He then goes on to construct a scenario resembling the Chinese room in some respects, but whatever the merits of this argument, it is no longer the CRA and it is no longer addressed to Strong AI as he defines it.

Does he sometimes criticize positions that do not fit his definition of Strong AI without taking the time to explicitly point that out?

Yes, he does. Again, in the original essay, regarding the "Robot Reply", he doesn't explicitly spell out that this reply is no longer what he has defined as "Strong AI". He does point out the difference though and if you've followed closely, you'll see that the position does involve a departure from the position he's called "Strong AI".

"The first thing to notice about the robot reply is that it tacitly concedes that cognition is not solely a matter of formal symbol manipulation, since this reply adds a set of causal relations with the outside world (cf. Fodor 1980)."

In proceeding to reply to this, he calls his response "the same thought experiment", though in fact it is a variant. But let us grant that it is "the same". (And again, I am setting aside what I may think of the merits of the argument.) That would demonstrate that he regards the Chinese Room Argument (including this variant) as being able to address some cases that do not strictly count as "Strong AI".

But whether he thinks that the Chinese Room Argument applies to cases that do not count as "Strong AI", it does not follow that he expects it to apply to every position he might oppose. Nor does offering some other position that is not addressed by the Chinese Room Argument but is also not a case of Strong AI count as a refutation of the Chinese Room Argument.

The fact that Searle opposes a view is not evidence that he thinks that the Chinese Room Argument refutes it nor is it evidence that the view he opposes counts as "Strong AI" merely because it is something he opposes!

Do philosophers whose positions do not qualify as "Strong AI" as Searle defines it still criticize the Chinese Room Argument?

Yes. The examples above demonstrate this. And undoubtedly, there are other examples of positions that depart from "Strong AI" as Searle defines whose advocates would still take issue with the Chinese Room Argument. For example, I take issue with the Chinese Room Argument and I don't advocate a position even remotely resembling "Strong AI"! But leaving that aside, I am sure there are many people who think it's just a bad argument. That doesn't prove that their positions count as "Strong AI" nor does it mean that they hold positions to which the Chinese Room Argument is even relevant!

Another example, from the original essay, would be what he calls the "Combination Reply". He acknowledges that the case described would be persuasive unless we looked "under the hood" (and again, I am not addressing the merit of this argument), but he says:

"I really don't see that this is any help to the claims of strong AI, and here's why: According to strong AI, instatitiating a formal program with the right input and output is a sufficient condition of, indeed is constitutive of, intentionality."

Again, the fact that a philosopher presents a counter-argument to the Chinese Room Argument and the fact that Searle rejects that counter-argument do not demonstrate that the position they're debating qualifies as "Strong AI".

Isn't "Strong AI" then a straw man, if it's defined so narrowly that most people who argue with Searle don't count as "Strong AI"?

First, suppose that it is. Searle would not be the first to offer a straw man and he would not be the last. That in itself is no reason to disregard the textual evidence that he did define the position he called "Strong AI" quite narrowly.

Second, we should consider the historical context. People have offered various responses that seek to distinguish to evade the Chinese Room Argument and in so doing, their positions sometimes no longer qualify as Strong AI. Would that be a demonstration that Strong AI was a strawman? Or could it be evidence that in raising the issue, he has forced others to reconsider their positions and to reject the position he's set out to criticize, whether they acknowledge it or not?

Third, the literature of the Turing test and on machine functionalism written prior to the publication of "Minds, Brains, and Programs" does show positions that could at least be mistaken for what he describes as "Strong AI". If his work has forced the authors of those works to clarify their positions, to make explicit that they are not advocating Strong AI but had merely been mistaken for such, then he has done a service.

Now, Mr. Mirsky. I have patiently and carefully elaborated my reading of Searle's usage of "Strong AI" and its relationship to the Chinese Room Argument, I have considered various counter-arguments, and I have shown complete civility in doing so. I consider any obligation to you fully discharged. If you do not, I can only wonder what would satisfy you, short of my dishonestly saying that I'm somehow persuaded that you're right and I'm mistaken. The alternative is for me to engage in endless exchanges with you, addressing each and every point you might raise. I don't think my obligation extends that far.

JPDeMouy

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JP,

Just want to again simply endorse your post.

I don't have a single quibble about your representations here regarding Searle.

It's quite rare that I see anyone discuss Searle for two paragraphs without thinking that they have blown it. FWIW.

Defending Stuart a little (without his permission) I don't anticipate that he will disagree with a thing you said, either. And maybe I'll let Stuart speak for himself after that.

Just as a final reaction to your post, it is remarkable that you did manage to discuss Searle at length - without giving an explicit *hint* as to what your own position is on the issues (other than the reference to Hacker and Bennett). I know you said you meant not to, but it's often quite difficult for people to hide their own viewpoints - or to even desire to do so! Just sayin'.

If you say your position is closer to Hacker than Bennett as presented in their book, then I have to presume your position is on the order of the Wittgensteinian notions that Hacker both explains and applies. I have trouble imagining any such that differs greatly from Dennett's "stance" descriptions, if that's what you mean by Dennett - since Dennett's later works do seem to be to drift away from a pure stancial view towards a more substantial one - which drift I approve of, btw, and wish he would drift much faster and farther in exactly that direction. Though I'm going to guess you as more of a Hackerite and less of a Bennettian would disapprove of exactly such notions.

OK, Hacker might say that Dennett still reifies intentionality even by attribution as I gather he would not approve of, intentionality becoming its own (and invalid) grammar or game separately from whatever the content of an intentional thought might otherwise be.

But I wonder if you'd be as pure in your own theory.

So, if you would like to present a few indications of what your position is, on the matter of - well, whatever it is on the matter of, mind, intentionality, language, brains? I at least would be curious, and perhaps other lurkers here would, too.

Thanks.

Josh

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On Tue, Jan 5, 2010 at 8:45 PM, CJ <castalia@optonline.net> wrote:
>
> Sean, J,
>
> when too much philosophizing can be just plain too much

<< snip >>

Hey Sean, good work catching this. Walter Kaufmann did some bold
moves when translating Goethe, Nietzsche and Buber, as you probably
know. Part of the work is matching with contemporary meanings, for
the benefit of readers today, which does involve making lots of
aesthetic judgments, why it's good to have more than one translation
available. Not every philosophical literature is so lucky.

Kaufmann took time in his lectures to address issues of translation,
to speak about them extensively. With Nietzsche's 'Gay Science', he
took the time to talk about this trajectory around 'gay, i.e. at the
time Nietzsche wrote it, he wasn't specifically meaning what some
might presume he meant, if looking through today's lenses. Buber's "I
and Thou" became "I and You" precisely because there's been a reversal
in English to where "thou" is considered the more formal and
distancing whereas "you" has that mutuality, that sense of relating to
a peer. With Nietzsche, he needed to reconsider the "superman" meme,
which only leads to comic book imagery (not such a bad outcome, given
'Thus Spake Zarathustra' has a Narnia-like flavor -- lots of talking
animals etc.). He came up with 'overman' and made it clear this had
nothing to do with Aryans or any of that nonsense (Nietzsche was
Austrian, like LW, wasn't proto-Nazi in any way -- would be Kaufmann's
brief on the guy).

Anyway, the long and short of it is it's very apropos to have this
discussions alongside whatever translations are going on. There's no
requirement to let things "pass silently" as it were, even
(especially) where a thinker as subtle as Wittgenstein is concerned.
I regard your starting this thread as a real public service (simply
for getting the ball rolling) and have cited your post appreciatively
in my journal, providing some of my own local context (naturally).

http://controlroom.blogspot.com/2010/01/another-debate.html (last paragraph)

Keep up the great work.

Kirby

--
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http://www.wikieducator.org/Digital_Math
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... much thanks, Kirby.

SW

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Kirby,

Thanks for the very interesting information regarding Kaufmann's translations and explanations of same.

One quibble:

(Nietzsche was
> Austrian, like LW, wasn't proto-Nazi in any way -- would be Kaufmann's
> brief on the guy).

Surely not. Surely, Kaufmann would know that Nietzsche was born and died in Saxony, Prussia, that he studied at Bonn, that he taught in Switzerland, that after that he summered in Switzerland, but spent his winters in Italy and France on different occasions, but on no account was Austrian. He would know that Nietzsche had been a citizen of Prussia, a part of the German Confederation, but had that annulled to teach at Basel and was thenceforth officially stateless. He'd also know that Nietzsche insisted on his descent from Polish noblemen.

Moreover, he'd know that Hitler himself was Austrian, so being Austrian would not preclude being a Nazi, proto- or otherwise.

That Nietzsche ended his friendship (and his hero-worship) of Wagner on learning of the latter's anti-Semitism, considering such bigotry to be contrary to his overman ideal would be far more relevant as a brief way of dispensing with the "proto-Nazi" charge. (Similarly, his break with friend and editor, Ernst Schmeitzner, for similar reasons.)

(And the history of his sister's selection and redaction of her brother's work on the basis of her own Nazi sympathies would serve in part to address why people might have taken him as such.)

JPDeMouy

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On Wed, Jan 6, 2010 at 11:12 AM, J <ubersicht@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Kirby,
>
> Thanks for the very interesting information regarding Kaufmann's translations and explanations of same.
>
> One quibble:
>
>  (Nietzsche was
> > Austrian, like LW, wasn't proto-Nazi in any way -- would be Kaufmann's
> > brief on the guy).
>
> Surely not.  Surely, Kaufmann would know that Nietzsche was born and died in Saxony, Prussia, that he studied at Bonn, that he taught in Switzerland, that after that he summered in Switzerland, but spent his winters in Italy and France on different occasions, but on no account was Austrian.  He would know that Nietzsche had been a citizen of Prussia, a part of the German Confederation, but had that annulled to teach at Basel and was thenceforth officially stateless.  He'd also know that Nietzsche insisted on his descent from Polish noblemen.
>

Yes, thank you. Kaufmann would have known all this yes.

I notice in the Wikipedia bio of Nietzsche the following interesting sentence:

"Before moving to Basel, Nietzsche renounced his Prussian citizenship:
for the rest of his life he remained officially stateless.[9]"

Here's a Nietzsche quote from my blog, which I have just updated (and
changed the time stamp) to address the error of my ways (I'd called
him Austrian there too).

From Twilight of the Idols:

"""
One pays heavily for coming to power: power makes stupid. The Germans
-- once they were called the people of thinkers: do they think at all
today? The Germans are now bored with the spirit, the Germans now
mistrust the spirit; politics swallows up all serious concern for
really spiritual matters. Deutschland, Deutschland uber alles -- I
fear that was the end of German philosophy. [1]
"""

http://mybizmo.blogspot.com/2008/02/philosophy-101.html

> Moreover, he'd know that Hitler himself was Austrian, so being Austrian would not preclude being a Nazi, proto- or otherwise.
>

Wittgenstein gets to be Austrian right?

Yes, good point. There's that book putting Hitler and Wittgenstein
together and suggesting a rivalry. I'm not sure to what extent anyone
believes this story.

Wikipedia again:

"""
Until 1903, Ludwig was educated by private tutors at home; after that,
he began three years of schooling at the Realschule in Linz, a school
emphasizing technical topics. For one school year, Adolf Hitler, who
was born a mere six days before Wittgenstein, was a student there, but
two grades below Wittgenstein, when both boys were 14 or 15 years
old.[15] It is unknown whether Hitler and Wittgenstein even knew of
each other, and, if so, whether either had any memory of the other.
"""

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Jew_of_Linz (upon re-reading this
entry, I see scholars are pretty much universally highly skeptical,
consider this historical fiction (ala Neal Stephenson's novels I might
suggest)).

> That Nietzsche ended his friendship (and his hero-worship) of Wagner on learning of the latter's anti-Semitism, considering such bigotry to be contrary to his overman ideal would be far more relevant as a brief way of dispensing with the "proto-Nazi" charge.  (Similarly, his break with friend and editor, Ernst Schmeitzner, for similar reasons.)
>
> (And the history of his sister's selection and redaction of her brother's work on the basis of her own Nazi sympathies would serve in part to address why people might have taken him as such.)
>

Yes, this matches Kaufmann's account pretty well, to the best of my
recollection.

I accept responsibility for the errors above and thank you for correcting me.

Kirby

> JPDeMouy
>
>
> Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
>
>

--
>>> from mars import math
http://www.wikieducator.org/Digital_Math
=========================================
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KU,

I actually had not known that he'd been officially without a state until I checked that Wikipedia article to confirm the things I did recall. Hence the paraphrase.

> Wittgenstein gets to be Austrian right?

Wittgenstein was an Austrian who became a British subject.

There are certain ugly views that make that a murky question - ugly views that had serious practical consequences for Wittgenstein's family - but I don't think such views have a place in what we call him, except to the extent that we are acknowledging the role those ugly views played in his life and the life of his kin.

>
> Yes, good point. There's that book putting Hitler and Wittgenstein
> together and suggesting a rivalry. I'm not sure to what extent anyone
> believes this story.

My take is that Cornish was hoping to push his own philosophical positions and his readings of Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein on the sensationalism of a ridiculous narrative rather than on the merits of those views.

Did Hitler and Wittgenstein attend the same school at the same time? I think so. That seems pretty well confirmed.

Did they meet? We can only speculate.

Was Wittgenstein the first Jew Hitler ever insulted? Could be, I suppose. No reason to think that but it's not that implausible.

Was there a lifelong rivalry? No.

Why not? Hitler himself had to authorize the granting of mischlinge status to Wittgenstein's sisters. If so much of his life had been driven by such a rivalry, it's just implausible he'd have agreed to that.

That and... well... the fact that there's not a gods damn shred of frakkin' evidence for such a rivalry!

> Yes, this matches Kaufmann's account pretty well, to the best of my
> recollection.
>

My remarks were based on my own recollection of Kaufmann, so our recollections at least agree.

> I accept responsibility for the errors above and thank you for correcting me.

You're most welcome. And your attitude is thoroughly refreshing.

(Some recent discussions with others had me prepared for the possibility of a claim that, since Nietzsche claimed Polish ancestry and part of Poland was at the time part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, that somehow a case could be made that that made him Austrian. Crazier arguments have been made!)

JPDeMouy

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