[C] [Wittrs] !!!Re: Re: Metaphysical Versus Mystical
- From: "J D" <ubersicht@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2010 02:27:02 -0000
JRS,
> > The scope of "logic" in TLP may not be clear on this point. If he is
> > describing the propositional calculus, then what Godel and Turing have to
> > say about second and higher orders of the predicate calculus would be
> > irrelevant.
>
> Sure, but by what principle would one separate out only first-order
> statements? But I don't think that's quite the direction that Wittgenstein
> would (did) take.
Three of the principles used in the Tractatus (all of which would be rejected
by the later Wittgenstein) are:
1. the treatment of universal quantification as an abbreviation for a
conjunction and existential quantification as an abbreviation for a disjunction;
2. the replacement of identity statements (which standardly involve
quantification over classes) with the requirement that in a logically perfect
language, each symbol corresponds to one and only one object; and
3. the assumption that a complete analysis of a proposition will yield
elementary propositions, each of whose truth-value is independent of the
truth-value of every other elementary proposition.
All of these are problematic, as every Wittgenstein scholar should know, but if
one were to suppose them true, the idea an analysis requiring only first-order
predicate logic becomes more plausible.
I agree with you that he was wrong on this but I am more interested in why he's
wrong and why he might have made such a supposition (aside from the face that
insights such as Turing's and Godel's came later).
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