[C] [Wittrs] !!!Re: Re: Metaphysical Versus Mystical
- From: "J D" <ubersicht@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2010 23:41:30 -0000
SW,
> .. here's the way I understand this.
> I think this is right. (Tell me, J, if you agree):
>
> 1. "The unicorn is in the barn," is NOT nonsense, it
> is FALSE. And it is therefore a proposition.
Assuming that Wittgenstein would have accepted something like Russell's Theory
of Descriptions as part of the process of analysis, that seems plausible.
However, I don't think the Tractatus itself takes such a stand. The correct
analysis of sentences is undecided. Only that such an analysis should yield
elementary propositions is decided.
I am agreeing so far but with reservations.
>
> 2. "The unicorn has two purple souls" is nonsense, but not
> because of arguments about mixing grammars (mixing color
> words with spirit words, which is a red herring here). It is
> nonsense because of the simple fact that: (a) the matter
> cannot be pictured in the world;
What are your criteria for whether it can be pictured?
Be careful equating the picture theory with the idea that we must be able to
imagine, visualize, or make a drawing or sculpture, or whatever, of a state of
affairs that a proposition purports to describe.
I wouldn't prejudge the analysis of the second sentence. Could a "purple soul"
be a regal soul? Or a poetic soul? Could its " two souls" indicate something
like a dual character? I don't know how these things are to be analyzed. It
may be nonsense or not.
Because the Tractatus doesn't spell out the methods of analysis, I don't know
that we can say.
(b) it is not an analytic
> statement in service of something picturable; and (c) does
> not, therefore, SAY anything. Furthermore (more
> controversial): (d) it is not a matter that purports to
> reside in the "netherworld" because the idea doesn't show
> or reveal itself to the form of life [see below].
hmmm. I am very suspicious of reading into the early philosophy anything like
a later Wittgenstein's emphasis on the role religious beliefs play in a
person's life. Also, I'd be careful about the role a belief plays in an
individual's life being equated with the idea of the human form of life.
>
> 3. "God has unicorns in heaven." This is seemingly NOT
> nonsense. It is simply unspeakable. This is because
> it comes from another realm (mystical).
Why should this be distinguished from the unicorns' dual purple souls?
I would emphasize again that you seem to be making a distinction other than a
logical one and trying to soften the logical distinction to accommodate it.
Mystical talk is also nonsense. Full stop.
And Wittgenstein even says that those who engage in it are "gassing". He also
sees value in what he supposes must motivate them but that's a separate matter
from whether it's nonsense.
The same is true
> of the statement, "Dance is beautiful," or "The good is
> being happy."
If the 1929 Lecture on Ethics is any indication (big "if") then statements
about the good or the beautiful might be analyzable into other terms or they
might not be. It depends whether "good" or "beautiful" (or "should", et al)
are being used in an "absolute sense".
And these examples do describe activities or conditions of people in the world,
so they don't illustrate your point very well.
Yes, their absolute value must reside outside the world on the Tractarian view
but this brings us the question: why should we any less suppose that the twin
purple souls of unicorns must reside in the world?
Furthermore, how do you know that (returning to your anachronistic point) the
twin purple hearts of unicorns don't play a serious role in the life of someone
who says such things?
>
> However, note that the statement "God has unicorns in
> heaven" may not be given the status of unspeakable merely
> because God as a subject matter is referring to an
> extra-worldly place. It's not grammar that does it (the
> grammar of "God."). What he means by the transcendental
> "showing" itself, I think, is something that is deeply
> felt. And so if I say in despair, "I feel God" -- and if I
> am devout about it -- I am saying something that has ground
> in my feeling. This is important because feelings of this
> sort periodically show itself in the form of life. But it
> does not ever render itself capable of being true or false.
> (The feeling might be true or false,
Feelings aren't true or false. Avowals may be sincere or insincere and
ascriptions may be true or false, but feelings, per se, are not.
but not the statement
> it births. For example, "I feel God" would be false where
> the person is lying and feels no sensations. Maybe he is
> just play-acting. But where the person feels sensations and
> attributes the affect to "God," whether God had been "it"
> would not be something true or false).
Be careful. A believer says something and I refuse either to agree or to
contradict him. That needn't mean that I would say, "It's neither true nor
false". There are just some things I'm not inclined to say.
>
> Hence, this is how the transcendental shows itself, but
> cannot be the subject of propositions. So if you say
> anything metaphysical from a sense of AFFECT -- "dance is
> wonderful" -- you have not stated a proposition, but have
> talked about something that shows itself in the form of
> life.
That's a form on non-cognitivism, a thesis (!) often ascribed to the later (!)
Wittgenstein
The only confusing part about this is why it requires
> silence ??!!! I guess because Wittgenstein is trying to
> formulate a theory that says what proper speaking/thinking
> is. And proper thinking is only yes/no stuff. And if you
> have feeling-affect metaphysics -- the mystical -- you
> have something that simply cannot be asserted.
>
> The only other thing that I note with interest: under this
> view, it seems that certain kinds of continental philosophy
> are put wholesale in the toilet, but other kinds -- say,
> Kiekegaard -- are put in the closet. Do you agree, J? Plato
> & Co get shown the trash can (regarding metaphysics),
> but Kiekegaard gets put under the bed? (Of course, the
> bizarre thing is that Kierkegaard can't write anything and
> you can't read it, at least not if either is doing
> philosophy properly, which is the equivalent of thinking
> properly).
Again, the logical status of a sentence and its psychological significance are
separate questions. "Nonsense" needn't be a rebuke.
And do not suppose that Wittgenstein would rebuke what Plato has to say while
accepting Kierkegaard. Recall the significance of Plato to Augustine!
JPDeMouy
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