[C] [Wittrs] Re: Metaphysical Versus Mystical
- From: Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2010 10:28:05 -0800 (PST)
Joe:
1. On your inability to see "the Earth is good" as relegated to the mystical in
Tractarian thought, I had based it upon the claims. First, that its current
sense is neither true nor false, but an affirmation of some sort. Like
"chocolate is the best." It's not a proposition. Secondly, 6.421, says that
aesthetics and ethics are the same. Therefore, "the Earth is good" is in the
realm of things that show it self in the form of life, but cannot be asserted
as form of science or knowledge (as a proposition). This requires silence
(presumably) because only provable can properly be said. It's not that this
means you can't say it, it means, if you do, you have not said anything that is
the case. Finally, see 6.44: "That the world is" is mystical, not "how it is,"
which suggests that science tells us how it is, but the mystical tells us what
it is. The Earth is Good is a mystical statement.
Where in the Tractatus have I gone wrong? Can you point me to something?
2. On the issue of "reality being in the head," the matter was not understood.
If there is a scientific program that languages about observables, those
utterances are propositions in Tractarian terms. But this is neither here nor
there. If I say, "the tree is in my head," and I don't mean that as a theory of
how I perceive the external world, but rather, wield it to deny the external
world, then the matter would appear to be metaphysical. This is so because it
is not a proposition (it cannot be pictured in the world), and because,
presumably, it isn't shown to us in the form of life. That is, beauty,
spirituality, love, guilt, anxiety, shame, etc. -- are all shown to us.
Whatever statements we make upon such an edifice are in the realm of religion,
aesthetics and ethics. Claims to deny the existence of an external world are
not of this sort.
Notice also the way Wittgenstein treats skepticism. He puts it in 6.51, which
is where the mystical stuff comes from. However, he dismisses skepticism for
two reasons: (a) it doubts in situations where propositions cannot be asserted
in the first place; and (b) doubting itself is a form of questioning
(asserting), which can only be done in situations where answers exist
(propositions). Hence, the skeptic is doubly confused. Not only is the object
of the doubt "false," but the doubt itself cannot be said. If you question the
unquestionable, your utterances are a form of nonsense (he uses the word
senseless). Consider again the the goal of the book:
“This book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather – not to
thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to
thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we should
therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought). ... The limit can,
therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the
limit will be simply nonsense” (27).
It is nonsense for the form of life to deny the external world. It is mystical
for the form of life to speak of something outside the world.
(If you actually have sources to authors and/or Tractatus quotes, I'd be
interested in hearing what you have to say. I think I may agree with your last
point about affect-mysticism leading to metaphysical statements. But I'm not
sure that non-affect stuff isn't treated more harshly by Tractarian thought).
Regards.
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html
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