--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "swmaerske" <SWMirsky@...> wrote: that agrees with all of the above...which I'll not copy but not with this "If we substitute "brain" for person, then we can avoid the dualistic extras." > No. Persons don't cause or produce consciousness. Brains do. Yes, C is a product of brain like blood is a product of bone marrow. But where's the person? > But persons are part of what we get when we have minds So the brain produces the mind. If so, there is nothing in the mind that isn't in the brain. So they are identical and be treated the same, i.e., causal machines. But you don't. > Brains don't talk, persons do. And, by implication, people are not to be understood in causal, mechanical terms, but purposive, telelogical ones. So minds don't stand in the same logical relationship to brain, as blood to bone marrow. In fact, we make a distinction between behavior which is caused by a brain event, stroke, and an intentional event. > D offers a way to understand what we mean by "mind" or "consciousness" > which allows us to see how brains could do it without presuming anything extra Until it comes to giving an intentional account. But, of course, no extra substance, because, in fact, none is needed. When I've given the conditions for the emergence of mind in an being (synthetic or organic), I have exhausted what needs to be said. I have no need to add some "causal factor." In a sense, by the ontological posit of a an essential mindless matter, one needs a force to bring about this new product mind. This is a brand of vitalism. Alternatively, one can conceive of matter as neither dead or alive, but just stuff that, at times, appears to us as living. This account requires nothing extra, no special causal event. bruce WEB VIEW: http://tinyurl.com/ku7ga4 TODAY: http://alturl.com/whcf 3 DAYS: http://alturl.com/d9vz 1 WEEK: http://alturl.com/yeza GOOGLE: http://groups.google.com/group/Wittrs YAHOO: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wittrs/ FREELIST: //www.freelists.org/archive/wittrs/09-2009