[Wittrs] Re: Dennett's vitalism
- From: "blroadies" <blroadies@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2009 21:40:23 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "swmaerske" <SWMirsky@...> wrote:
> The mind is a function of the brain when the brain meets certain
conditions...
Blood circulation is the function of the heart. I see the heart muscle
and blood move and conceive of this action as "circulation." I don't
literally see circulation. With regard to the wworking brain, on the
fMRI, I see patterns of light. I conceive them as mental activity of the
subject. I can talk to the subject and see certain brain parts light up.
Those parts are critical for hearing. But as you pointed out, the person
hears, not the brain part.
Now what is the relationship between the brain part changing color and
the person hearing? I rather like your suggested answer with the
question that follows...
> Where's the smile when the mouth is upturned?
namely, I've learned to see such changes (of light and muscle movement)
as expressions of mind. Just like the paint on the canvas doesn't cause
me to see a picture, the muscle movement doesn't cause me to see a
smile. Causation, as account, drops out. And no spirit has been added.
The above is from the point of view of the other. When we meet beings
that behave in a certain way, according to our criteria, we see them as
having minds. This we agree upon, I trust. The harder question concerns
the person himself, what is the relationship between me and my brain.
If the brain causes ones mental life, how do we make sense out of
intentions, which are not understood causally, but purposively? I think
you are trying to answer that question here.
SWM: "If intentional events are reflective of the intentions of persons
...then such "intentional events" are not the product of some decision
of the person to have or produce them since the person could not so
decide if he/she/it didn't already have them"
Are you saying that I can't decide to formulate a intentional act?
Anyway, even if I can't, and the intention is "already there", are you
saying that the brain causes my intentions creating the illusion that
I'm a purposive being?
> having a mind includes having intentionality,
but does the brain cause the intention?
> So there's no basis for supposing that mind is a "new product"
but you agree that mind requires a new language game, one of purpose,
and since the brain is not purposive, but the mind is, and since
> Nevertheless it is just a matter of fact that all known instances of
> consciousness are also associated with instances of brains
we have the problem of conceptualing the relationship between mind and
brain. Your choice is a causal relation but when I ask you to specific
the X/Y, as in scientific causes, the virus caused the illness, you
quickly say "there are many uses of 'cause' " and start talking about
functions. A functional relationship isn't causal. The wheel doesn't
cause its turning. The wheel is turning. The brain is doing what brains
do. Simultaneously, a person is doing what he is doing. If the brain
doesn't do its thing, the person can't do his. The two function
together. Looks more like a parallel relationship-- the truth of
dualism...and now we may posit some vital force or principal that links
them together.
I don't like my answer. But that's where I get to when I ask how a
mindless substance comes to birth that which is mindful.
bruce
WEB VIEW: http://tinyurl.com/ku7ga4
TODAY: http://alturl.com/whcf
3 DAYS: http://alturl.com/d9vz
1 WEEK: http://alturl.com/yeza
GOOGLE: http://groups.google.com/group/Wittrs
YAHOO: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wittrs/
FREELIST: //www.freelists.org/archive/wittrs/09-2009
Other related posts:
