[Wittrs] Re: Dennett's vitalism
- From: "swmaerske" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2009 02:06:57 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "blroadies" <blroadies@...> wrote:
>
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "swmaerske" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> that agrees with all of the above...which I'll not copy but not with
> this
>
> "If we substitute "brain" for person, then we can avoid the dualistic
> extras."
>
> > No. Persons don't cause or produce consciousness. Brains do.
>
> Yes, C is a product of brain like blood is a product of bone marrow. But
> where's the person?
>
Depends what you mean by "person". And "where"!
> > But persons are part of what we get when we have minds
>
> So the brain produces the mind. If so, there is nothing in the mind that
> isn't in the brain. So they are identical and be treated the same, i.e.,
> causal machines. But you don't.
The mind is a function of the brain when the brain meets certain conditions (in
good working order, at a certain stage of development, functioning normally,
etc.). Where's the mind? Well where's the turning when the wheel is in motion?
Where's the smile when the mouth is upturned?
>
> > Brains don't talk, persons do.
>
> And, by implication, people are not to be understood in causal,
> mechanical terms, but purposive, telelogical ones. So minds don't stand
> in the same logical relationship to brain, as blood to bone marrow.
>
Brains don't talk, persons (and whatever might be their equivalents) do, but
not if they don't have brains (or their equivalents) meeting the necessary
conditions (i.e., a certain level of development, in good working order,
working, etc.).
> In fact, we make a distinction between behavior which is caused by a
> brain event, stroke, and an intentional event.
>
If intentional events are reflective of the intentions of persons (which
includes the intentionality -- capacity to think about things -- of persons)
then such "intentional events" are not the product of some decision of the
person to have or produce them since the person could not so decide if
he/she/it didn't already have them!
(I'm trying to behave myself here, Sean!)
> > D offers a way to understand what we mean by "mind" or "consciousness"
> > which allows us to see how brains could do it without presuming
> anything extra
>
> Until it comes to giving an intentional account. But, of course, no
> extra substance, because, in fact, none is needed.
>
To have a mind you need a brain (or its equivalent, assuming there is such a
thing) and having a mind includes having intentionality, including the capacity
to form and act on intentions, in which case we have all the account we need to
explain the basis of the occurrence of intentionality!
> When I've given the conditions for the emergence of mind in an being
> (synthetic or organic), I have exhausted what needs to be said. I have
> no need to add some "causal factor."
>
Except that if you subtract a brain or its equivalent you no longer have a
cause of the occurrence of consciousness. Here again I see the same old dispute
over the use of "cause". Fine, say produce, bring about, engender, make, etc.
(But, of course, you don't want any of those terms because you want to shut
down the possibility of any such talk about an existentially dependent of minds
on brains. But shutting the talk down is pointless because what is the case is
the case, no matter whether we want to say of it that it is "unintelligible" or
not. And if it is the case, it cannot be "unintelligible" to say of it that it
is!
> In a sense, by the ontological posit of a an essential mindless matter,
> one needs a force to bring about this new product mind.
What "new product"? Why is it any newer than any other feature of the physical
universe? That it is chronologically newer than, say, various element
formations or star and planetary systems hardly makes it especially new to us.
"New" because it is something other than other features of the physical
universe? But each and every distinctly identifiable feature of the physical
universe is different (to varying degrees) from the others. That's how we can
recognized them as distinctly identifiable. So there's no basis for supposing
that mind is a "new product" not otherwise entirely explainable in physical
terms. On the other hand, to persist in this supposition, that mind is a "new
product" is to persist in thinking about this dualistically.
> This is a brand
> of vitalism.
It's one thing to say that. Can you provide a convincing explanation though as
to why you think so? If it hinges on this notion you've advanced that mind is a
"new product" of the physical universe, then that is the wrong picture because
no one is claiming that it is. Certainly I'm not! My view is that it's a
perfectly ordinary, fully explainable feature of the physical universe, among
an array of all the other features.
> Alternatively, one can conceive of matter as neither dead
> or alive, but just stuff that, at times, appears to us as living.
As I've said numerous times, discussions of consciousness are not about the
dead and the living. It is just a matter of empirical fact that all known
instances of consciousness occur in living things and that no such instance is
known in anything that isn't alive. But it doesn't follow from THAT that this
must be so forever and everywhere.
> This
> account requires nothing extra, no special causal event.
>
> bruce
Nevertheless it is just a matter of fact that all known instances of
consciousness are also associated with instances of brains of a certain type,
functioning in a certain way, and that destruction or alteration of such brains
destroys or alters the evidence of consciousness in the organisms bearing the
said brains. That indicates a causal relation which most of us do not seriously
question given what we know of the world these days. What you can possibly have
in mind by continuing to do so remains a mystery to me almost as great as why
Cayuse persists in equating consciousness with a referentless referent.
SWM
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