Robert Paul wrote: "Phil, fastening on the notion of statements and contrasting them with sentences, believes that the Semantic Conception of Truth must be 'epistemic.' This is just a muddle." Perhaps, but the muddle belongs to Donal, not me. I only said that Donal's account must be epistemic. Whether Tarski's account is epistemic is another matter and one I certainly did not raise. Robert concludes: "Donal is right that Tarski doesn't invoke 'facts' and 'existence' in setting out his quite general criterion of truth." Huh? Donal is the one going on about 'facts' and their 'existence' while talking about T-sentences. I was the one trying to avoid such talk. Sincerely, Phil Enns Toronto, ON ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html