[lit-ideas] Re: Try a Logic Problem

  • From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sun, 2 Jul 2006 15:15:42 -0230

With reference to Donal's laments, below, I can only say that I cannot reply to
posts that I find so unintelligible that a reply would be worthless for all
concerned. Philosophical analysis is a highly distinct form of discourse; not
everything originating in one's subjectivity counts as a sensible response.
Philosophical commentary is neither political analysis, nor psychological
exhibitions of attempted individuation. See Richard Rorty on "private
individuation," 

Life is short; hence, I cannot reply to anything and everything. Moreover, I'm
in the throes of preparing for next week's match  between Italy and
Deutschland. Try to articulate your opinions in clearer, more simple terms.
Obfuscating terminology is never a sign of depth of thought or rigour in
analysis. Perhaps start with the question of how we can know anything about the
"ontic" independently of the "epistemic." Cheers,

Dr. O.



Quoting Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>:

> 
> I can't pretend to have closely followed this thread but nevertheless let me
> butt in, be ignored maybe, review the thread later to see if this is
> justified, conclude it probably is, then add 'Walter you ignored my
> beautiful
> (if simple) comments on the ontic rather than epistemic understanding of the
> 'truth/correspondence' relation, alluding to Tarski's theory of
> 'truth-as-correspendence' in its Popperian interpretation (on which Tarski
> stayed _neutral_ [naturellement]), but which takes us to the heart of many
> things - for example, why Wittgenstein's 'picture theory' fails, not
> actually
> because it blatantly confuses ontic and epistemic issues (though it might be
> suggested it does this when put in overall context) but because it offers
> fair too simplistic a model of the possible ontic relationship between
> statements and the reality to which they might correspond i.e. it suggests
> that it must come down to mere 'picturing' as in a one-to-one correspondence
> of 'pictured objects' and their real-life counterparts.
> 
> I'm getting tired. Oh yeah.
> 
> My point was that the three hats thing is not a purely logical problem at
> all
> - and quite misleading in this regard, since it is important to separate out
> the strictly logical from the other aspects if the problem. [if we assume
> that the one, who could speak out if x, cannot actually speak, then the fact
> he does not speak out - which is not one of strict logic but empirical fact
> -
> would negate inferring from the fact he does not speak (because, in fact, he
> cannot)to the conclusion that he does not speak out because his knowledge-
> situation is too weak to justify a conclusion].
> 
> Equally, and someone may have said this, can't he use the 'waiting-game'
> logic (i.e. if they don't speak out = they don't know) to reason in reverse?
> And so, after a set time, pre-empt everyone. Saying:they will be about to
> infer from my not speaking that I am uncertain that x which means they take
> it as non-x and then reason, but - assuming they are not just very slow - I
> can infer from their relative slowness that they are thinking this way,
> which
> corroborates the 'non-x' theory.
> 
> After all, as Popper said, all knowledge is guesswork of some kind.
> 
> Donal
> 
> 
> 
> 
>               
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