It may do to comment on McEvoy's abstract of Putnam's contribution to the
Popper volume vis-à-vis Putnam's philosophy of mind. Described as
functionalism, it dwells on the observational-theoretical distinction McEvoy
is
referring to (Putnam, Lewis, and Grice, would refer to Ramsey's sentence). It
should be pointed out that Putnam (like indeed Grice, who dubs
'Functionalism' a monster he finds on his way to the city of eternal truth)
later found
Functionalism 'too scientific' to be true!
In a message dated 3/16/2016 4:07:13 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
"The inability to face up to mistakes (and pathological evasion of
refutation) may also be called "soft-headed". In philosophy, this tendency is
no
doubt linked to the fact that the subject lacks decisive observational tests
to resolve its disputes."
By 'subject', McEvoy means discipline, but so does maths!
McEvoy: "In this context, it is ironic that Putnam argued for a philosophy
of science where scientists were pathological evaders of refutation and
there was nothing in scientific method to stop them."
Well, at least he did not go as far as Feyerabend to allow that in
scientific method, 'anything goes'.
McEvoy:
"[Putnam's] argument is essentially simple (though not the way he presents
it) and relies on confusing a logical possibility with what
methodologically (a) is best (b) drives scientific best practice (this (a) and
(b)
dovetail). Take a refutation where an observation ['O'] appears to falsify a
theory ['T']."
The use of O and T reminds one of Ramsey's sentence used by functionalists
in philosophical psychology or philosophy of mind. The sensory input would
belong in O, as would the behavioural output. The psychological attitude
itself (that EXPLAINS the correlation between input and output) would be a
'theoretical term'.
McEvoy: "No matter how straightforward such a refutation may look, it is
the case that there is more to the picture, logically: we must also factor in
background knowledge ['BK'], for example, and in cases of deriving a
positive prediction we must also factor in 'initial conditions' ['IC']
(because
a positive prediction can only follow from T given IC). Now consider this
supposed 'refutation' in terms of a 'blame game': it is always logically
possible to evade a refutation by saying the error does not lie with T but
with O itself [e.g. the apparatus was faulty]"
I think this is Hanson's view in his dictum, very deep, that observation is
'theory-laden'.
McEvoy:
"or with some hitherto undiscovered flaw in our BK or our supposed IC. Yet
it would be a mistake to treat this logical possibility as showing that,
from the pov of sound method, we can always evade any refutation - and it
would be a gross mistake to think that the pathological evasion of refutation
is characteristic of scientific method."
It would be characteristic of an analytic conceptual philosopher, as Putnam
(and indeed Grice, or Lewis, were) to focus on issues of logical
possibility. They are not into 'sociology' of science as Kuhn was.
McEvoy:
"Yet both mistakes - and a few others like thinking IC are always necessary
for refutation (they are not, because a negative and falsifying prediction
can be deduced from T without them) - are at the heart of Putnam's paper
in Popper's Schilpp volume."
For the record, entitled, "The corroboration of theories".
McEvoy:
"In that paper will also be found several "priority claims" that though
they fit well with Putnam's "arrogant tone" (as Popper well describes it)
cannot be sustained e.g. that Putnam was among the first to realise that,
logically, a refutation can always be evaded, when Popper for one had
recognised this from the start."
On the other hand, Sarah Palin's priority claim that a refuDiation can
always be evaded cannot be evaded.
Perhaps we should also stress that Putnam's essay uses 'corroboration',
which may require a neat conceptual analysis.
McEvoy:
"Putnam suggests he is putting forward views that mark a major advance on
anything written by Popper, and as if Popper's views belong to a bygone age
of thought now surpassed, but the truth is that Putnam's paper did not
herald any ground-breaking new philosophy of science. This is unsurprising
given it rests on elevating the logical possibility of 'always evade
refutation' into some kind of methodological key-stone."
In terms of priority claims it may do to double-check WHEN Putnam was
appointed MIT's Professor of the Philosophy of Science. Must say that.
i. Always evade refutation.
sounds catchy as a slogan! Perhaps it was found appealing by Putnam's MIT
students!
McEvoy:
"It is hard to understand how there has been any kind of scientific
progress if Putnam's views were true as a characterisation of science (i.e.
that
the aim of science is to evade refutation)."
Well, apparently Putnam went on to think that Functionalism, as a method in
philosophical psychology, was 'too scientist', so one has to be careful.
He may have ended endorsing a more metaphysical view of things.
McEvoy:
"So what kind of audience would take Putnam's views seriously? One trained
in modern philosophy after the 'linguistic turn': for to allege the aim of
science is to evade refutation is precisely the kind of
paradoxical-sounding nonsense that appeals to some philosophers, many of whom
are
scientifically illiterate and also hostile to science (or what they understand
of
'science')."
One example might be Grice, who speaks of the "Devil of Scientism".
Grice:
"We must be ever watchful against the Devil of scientism, who would lead
us into myopic overconcentration on the nature and importance of knowledge,
and of scientific knowledge in particular; the Devil who is even so
audacious as to tempt us to call in question the very system of ideas require
to
make intelligible the idea of calling in question anything at all; and who
would even prompt us, in effect, to suggest that since we do not really think
but only think that we think, we had better change our minds without undue
delay."
On the other hand, post-post the linguistic turn, Chalmers entitled his,
song, er... essay, What is this thing called science. So it's only natural
that conceptual analytic philosophers may be overexacting (if that's the
word) as to the proper analysans for such an allegedly complex analysandum as
'science' is!
Cheers,
Speranza
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