Given McEvoy's offering of his 'witch' example, it may do to revise some of
Putnam's views on theory-laden observation. In his essay in the Popper
volume, Putnam urged that some scientific theories cannot be overthrown by
experiments and obsevrations alone, but only by alternative theories.
McEvoy was referring to a link that speaks of Cruyff as 'revolutionary',
and that perhaps is the key. For Putnam, even a theory which is paradigmatic
is NOT given up because of observational and experimental results by
themselves, but because and when a better theory is available.
Data, in the usual sense, cannot establish the superiority of one paradigm
over another because data themselves are perceived through the spectacles
of one paradigm or another.
Putnam argues that because observations are always theory laden they
"constitute" what is observed.
There are concepts applying to or being thought to apply to both
macroscopic and submicroscopic particles. A case in point are spatial and
temporal
relations and the color concepts that play an important role in Newton's
corpuscle theory of light. Hence, there are clear-cut instances of observation
concepts that apply to unobservable entities, which does not seem
acceptable (cf. Putnam 1962).
An explanation of theoreticity may be felt unsatisfactory as it determines
the property of being theoretical only via negation of the property of
being observable (Putnam 1962).
Theory-ladeness in Putnam's view relates to our very definition of
theoretical terms in a causal framework. A purely causal or causal-historical
account of reference may seem a viable option for theoretical terms. Putnam
suggests a hybrid account that combine descriptivist intuitions with causal
elements.
1. A term t refers to an entity x if and only if x satisfies the core
causal description associated with t.
2. Two terms t′ and t denote the same entity if and only if (a) their
putative referents play the same causal role with respect to a network of
phenomena; and (b) the core causal description of t′ takes up the
kind-constitutive properties of the core causal description associated with t.
And so on.
Cheers,
Speranza
Alspector-Kelly, M. ‘Seeing the Unobservable: Van Fraassen and the Limits
of Experience’, Synthese, 140
Basu, P. K. ‘Theory-ladenness of Evidence: A Case Study from History of
Chemistry’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 34.
Brewer, W.F. and B.L. Lambert ‘The Theory-Ladenness of Observation andthe
Theory-Ladenness of the Rest of the Scientific Process’, Philosophy of
Science, 68.
Brown, H.I. ‘A Theory-Laden Observation Can Test the Theory’, British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 44.
Chalmers, A. ‘The Theory-dependence of the Use of Instruments in Science’,
Philosophy of Science, 70.
Churchland, P.M. ‘The Ontological Status of the Observables: In Praise of
the Superempirical Virtues’, Image of Science: Essays on Realism and
Empiricism,
with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen, P. M. Churchland and C. A. Hooker
(eds.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Franklin, A. et. al. ‘Can a Theory-Laden Observation Test the Theory?’,
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 40.
Franklin, A. ‘Calibration’, Perspectives on Science, 5.
Fodor, J. ‘Observation Reconsidered’, Philosophy of Science, 51
Hacking, I. ‘Do We See Through A Microscope?’, Images of Science, P.M.
Churchland and C.A. Hooks (eds.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hardcastle, V.G. ‘The Image of Observables’, British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 45
Heidelberger, M. ‘Theory-Ladenness and Scientific Instruments in
Experimentation’, The Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation, Hans Radder
(ed.),
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Hunt, S. D. ‘A Realist Theory of Empirical Testing: “Resolving the
TheoryLadenness/Objectivity Debate’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, vol.
24.
Linden, T. ‘Shapere on Observation - Discussion’, Philosophy of Science,
vol. 59(2): 293-299.
Putnam, H., What Theories are not?, in Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy
of Science, E. Nagel, P. Suppes and A. Tarski (eds.), Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
Putnam, H., The meaning of ‘Meaning’”, in Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science VII, K. Gunderson (ed.), Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Putnam, H., Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 45.
Raftopoulos, A. ‘Reentrant Neural Pathways and the Theory-Ladenness of
Perception’, Philosophy of Science, 68
Rasmussen, N. 'Facts, Artifacts, and Mesosomes: Practicing Epistemology
with the Electron Microscope", Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
24
Shapere, D. ‘The Concept of Observation in Science and Philosophy’,
Philosophy of Science, 49.
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
