[lit-ideas] Re: Pirots and Squarrels: Grice on Ethology
- From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2013 10:24:16 -0700 (PDT)
I think that you are probably onto something that Shaw's usage of "false
knowledge" is intentionally paradoxical and/or ironic. Popper tends to use the
more palatable-sounding term "fallible knowledge" but I think that we can take
this as implying that there can be, and there is, false knowledge. This, I
believe, is motivated by Popper's wish to preserve the lofty and authoritative
status of "knowledge" for scientific, or scientifically generated claims, even
when they are found and admitted to be false. In connection to this, Popper
seems to be more concerned with how beliefs are generated than with their
actual truth. This is a reasonable-looking stance for a philosopher of science
to take but it might not be shared by most of us, and I am not sure if it is
even shared by scientists, at least in the more practical sciences. If, for
example, a doctor prescribes a medication that harms a patient, nobody is going
to be very impressed by the explanation
that he was acting on the basis of scientifically generated but false
'knowledge'. In the every day life, if I say that I know that the street is one
way, I should better be quite sure of it, or else express more cautiously with:
"I think" or even: "I don't know"
I was preparing a longer reply but the draft got lost due to my false beliefs
about email, so perhaps this will do for now.
O.K.
________________________________
From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Tuesday, April 30, 2013 4:51 PM
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Pirots and Squarrels: Grice on Ethology
________________________________
From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
>The fact is that the verb 'know' is just not used in English language in the
>sense of false knowledge.>
Even if true, this, I still suggest, is besides the epistemic point - for the
verb 'know' as used in English may here be a poor guide to the
actual epistemic status of 'knowledge'.
But I want to suggest that it is just not true that "the
verb 'know' is just not used in English language in the sense of false
knowledge" : what may be true is that the standard use of the verb 'know' is
not in connection with 'knowledge' that is simultaneously posited as untrue
(though it may be used in ways that are compatible with 'knowledge' that may be
untrue or which is possibly mistaken).
Even the first person present tense use of 'know' does not always preclude the
possibility that what I 'know' is untrue: "As far as I know..." is a standard
English phrase where 'know' is used in the first person present tense in a
sense that does not logically preclude the possibility that my first person
'knowledge' may be mistaken or untrue - all that standard usage may preclude
here is that I cannot assert that I presently 'know' x while simultaneously
believing x false. It is quite compatible with standard usage that even in the
first person present tense I can assert I 'know' x, because I believex with
adequate 'justification', even though I may admit that 'x' (contrary to my
belief and its grounds) may be false. The idea that standard English usage
operates with a foolish conceit as to the infallibility of what I 'know' is not
one derived from understanding the sense of standard English usage (or the
people who speak standard English): any
contrary suggestion is philosopher's make-believe. When I claim to 'know', I
may be claiming that my relevant belief is genuine (and that I have grounds
adequate for it to be genuine) without claiming that I 'know' with
incontrovertible certainty: in other words, my use of 'know' even in the first
person present tense may be understood in the sense of my being sincere and
rational in my belief and not in the sense that I am an idiot with no critical
sense of my own fallibility.
So if I say "I know that my car is red though it is actually blue" I may be
offending against standard usage. But there are many cases where I do not
offend against standard usage by using 'know' in relation to false belief. "Why
did Mr. Smith, now on trial for attempted murder of his wife, cut the brake
wires on his car? Because he knew that his wife would use the car to go
shopping later that afternoon. How did he know this? Because it was her usual
habit on a Saturday. But he also knew it because he checked with her and she
confirmed she was going shopping later. Of course, we now know that the police
had got wind of his plot and intervened before his wife took her
usual trip in the car. In fact, his wife knew of the plot before she confirmed
to Mr. Smith that she would be making her usual shopping trip." Here what Mr.
Smith 'knows' turns out to be false and is known to be false when we speak of
it, yet speaking of what Smith 'knows' here is neither ironic nor does it
offend against standard usage in English. In case it is not obvious, this is an
example where the use of the verb 'know' is in connection with 'knowledge' that
is simultaneously posited as untrue (albeit its untrue character is not known
to the 'knower').
No dictionary definition trumps the actual facts of usage here. While Shaw's
"false knowledge" is well researched, I am reluctant to rely on this literary
kind of use - as it has a potential paradoxical or ironic character. The
remarks above rely on standard English when it is being used in neither
an ironic nor paradoxical nor strained sense.
If we can get past the false suggestion that standard usage confines the use of
'know' and 'knowledge' in ways that preclude fallibility, we may get to the
considerations that indicate why all human knowledge is indeed fallible.
Donal
Beautiful dreamer
Abroad
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