________________________________ From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Sent: Tuesday, April 30, 2013 12:13 PM Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Pirots and Squarrels: Grice on Ethology So it begs to the underlying epistemic question to assert that > The concept of knowing implies that a belief is true and not false. (plus, the fact that we hold it)> Nor is it true: what may be true is that there a concept, or a particular conception, of "knowing" where "knowing" implies that a belief is true. But this particular conception is not the only one and cannot try to win the epistemic debate by claiming it is the only one. Popper has filled a number of books, for example Objective Knowledge, with another conception or theory of knowledge. It is risible to think the semantics of "knowing" are adequate to rebut Popper. *The previous note was written in a bit of haste, and the mention of Wittgenstein or Ayer was made in passing as I don't remember the discussion well, but perhaps someone else might. Do you always get this worked up when these guys are mentioned ? The fact is that the verb 'know' is just not used in English language in the sense of false knowledge. A quick search renders this: . http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/know 1. to perceive or understand as fact or truth; to apprehend clearly and with certainty: I know the situation fully. Could you find a reliable dictionary that defines 'know' in a sense that would allow for 'false knowledge' ? Dictionaries may not be epistemic authorities but they tend to be authorities on, ehem, linguistic usage. (Btw I think that even Popper doesn't speak of 'false knowledge' but 'fallible knowledge') I am not sure that this is an attempt to 'win' the epistemological debate but rather to clarify the terms of the debate. To point out that the English usage of the verb 'know' entails correct belief does not say anything on which beliefs are to be considered correct, or on what grounds. This doesn't attempt to answer a question such as Socrates might ask: "What is knowledge ?" but rather how we use the term. O.K.