[lit-ideas] Re: Pirots and Squarrels: Grice on Ethology
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2013 11:13:16 +0100 (BST)
________________________________
From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
>>Philosophers of a stripe may baulk, but if someone in a play or in real-life
>>said "I knew but I was wrong" we might well understand them as saying "I
>>believed I had correct knowledge but I was wrong". Of course, if we define
>>"knowing" so that we can only "know" when we have correct knowledge (not
>>merely when we believe we have correct knowledge) then we cannot "know" and
>>yet be wrong: but this definition of "knowing" would only render the claim "I
>>knew but I was wrong" untenable as a contradiction-in-terms (of that
>>definition) - it would not render untenable the claim "I believed I had
>>correct knowledge but I was wrong". The point is: no serious epistemology can
>>be premised on merely a definition of "knowing" here: and much favours
>>adopting a view of knowledge where 'knowledge' can be false. Newton's physics
>>may be false yet an immense contribution to
human knowledge.>>
>*Hm, ... I believe that this was tackled by Wittgenstein, or maybe Ayer ?>
Wittgenstein may have suggested it is a contradiction to say, in the first
person present tense, "I know 'p' but 'p' is false" - and this may be so where
we unpack "I know 'p' but 'p' is false" to mean "I correctly believe 'p' yet
'p' is incorrect" or even "I correctly believe 'p' yet believe 'p' is
incorrect". But this kind of point does not make one much of an epistemologist
(nor do I suggest that W makes it for the purpose of 'epistemology'); nor does
it invalidate other conceptions of 'knowledge' than where to have 'knowledge'
or to 'know' is to have 'justified true belief' ['JTB']. As mentioned above -
no serious epistemology can be premised on merely a definition of
"knowing" here: and much favours adopting a view of knowledge where
'knowledge' can be false [consider Newton's contibution to human knowledge].
Indeed, Popper's theory of knowledge is antithetical to the JTB school of
thought - what constitutes knowledge in its World 3 sense need not be true,
need not be believed, and is never justified (because it cannot be 'justified')
in the key sense that it is always conjectural and fallible [evenif true].
> Anyway, we can say: "He knows it but he is wrong" just as we can say: "Tom is
> a puppy but he is not" but we cannot say it without a logical contradiction.>
This again depends on how we stipulate the meaning of "knows" - clearly it is a
contradiction to assert that he correctly believes it but his belief is
incorrect; but it is not a contradiction to assert that 'he believes what he
believes is correct but what he is believes is not correct'. No serious
epistemology can hinge on whether we stipulate "knows" one way or the other:
anyone who thinks otherwise is simply mistaking a linguistic morass for
philosophical wisdom.
And if we are to bring in Wittgenstein here, we may note that were someone to
say "He knows it but he is wrong" we could readily understand the sense of this
in a way that we cannot understand the sense of "Tom is a puppy but he is
not":- even if this sense is akin to "He 'knows' it but he is wrong" or "He
thinks he knows it but he is wrong". The correct analogy to "Tom is a puppy but
he is not" is "He knows it but he does not", but it simply begs the question
(and an uninteresting and unprofound one) to stipulate a meaning to "knows" so
that "He knows it but he is wrong" is deemed equivalent to "He knows it but he
does not". And such a restrictive stipulation does not represent the complete
meaning of "knows" as we may use and understand it.
So it begs to the underlying epistemic question to assert that
> The concept of knowing implies that a belief is true and not false. (plus,
> the fact that we hold it)>
Nor is it true: what may be true is that there a concept, or a particular
conception, of "knowing" where "knowing" implies that a belief is true. But
this particular conception is not the only one and cannot try to win the
epistemic debate by claiming it is the only one. Popper has filled a number of
books, for example Objective Knowledge, with another conception or theory of
knowledge. It is risible to think the semantics of "knowing" are adequate to
rebut Popper.
Donal
Knowing nothing
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