--- On Sun, 21/9/08, Eric Yost <mr.eric.yost@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > These dilemmas always seem to presuppose facts not in > evidence for persons living outside of thought > experiments. (This is one. The Baby or the Botticelli > is another.) Might it be fair to say that far-fetched thought experiments may be useful and interesting in many fields (e.g. quantum physics) but they are rarely this in the field of ethics? They seem almost non-ethical in that they remove ethics from its roots in practical problems and dilemmas and try to transport it, unconvincingly to some, into the soil of supposed logical analysis of different dreamt-up situations and our 'intuitions' about them. As iff. Ethics is not a field for idle speculation but for understanding the complexities of practical moral problems, which a little thought often shows raise complex dilemmas - what 'ethics' can teach is to be better attuned to these difficulties and not ride on our moral high horse roughshod over them. As to issues about the role of 'emotion' of 'reason' in having moral intuitions, is it not that both are necessary but neither are sufficient conditions of having moral sense? And is it not that they are inextricably linked in most human thinking, particularly moral thinking? And that talking as if the answer to these questions is 'no' is unreal? Donal High-balling on crack Govan ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html