I'm in general aggreement with SC below though I would specify "scientism" to refer to the eroneous application of scientific methods and procedures to domains of meaning and truth that are not "get-at-able" via such methods and procedures. Moral judgement being one of them. But I quickly add that I do not view philosophy or any other form of inquiry or practice as being "primary ..." Such a claim sounds religious to me. Walter O. MUN Quoting cblists@xxxxxxxx: > > On 21-Sep-08, at 8:51 PM, wokshevs@xxxxxx wrote: > > > Scientists seduced by the allure of brain science ... > > To say nothing of philosophers seduced by same: > > ... philosophical scientism fails to see the role that > science and technology play in the alienation of > human beings from the world through the latter's > objectification into a causally determined realm of > nature or, more aggregiously, into a reified realm of > commodities manipulated by an instrumental rationality. > .... [S]cientism rests on the false assumption that the > scientific or theoretical way of viewing things ... provides > the primary and most significant access to ourselves and > the world. ... [T]he scientific view of the world is derivative > and parasitic upon a prior practical view of the world as > [in Heideggerian terms] ready-to-hand, that is, the environing > world that is closest, most familiar, and most meaningful > to us, the world that is always colored by our cognitive, > ethical and aesthetic values. That is to say, scientism ... > overlooks the phenomenon of the *life-world* which is > the enabling condition for scientific practice. Although > such an anti-scientism *can* lead to obscurantism ... it > *need* not do so. The critique of scientism ... does not > seek to refute or negate the results of scientific research in > the name of some mystical apprehension of the unity of > man and nature ...; it rather simply insists that science does > not provide the primary and most significant access to a > sense of ourselves and the world.... [T]he practices of the > natural sciences arise out of life-world practices, and ... > the latter are not simply reducible to the former. > > [from Simon Critchley, "Introduction: what is Continental > philosophy?", in Simon Critchley and William R Schroeder, eds. _A > Companion to Continental Philosophy_, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, > 1998; p. 13] > > Of course, one does not have to side with Heidegger in order to be > critical of 'scientism' - Adorno & Horkheimer (with all of their > antipathies to Heidegger) immediately come to (well, at least, *my*) > mind. (I think it is the 'commodities manipulated by an instrumental > rationality' which triggers that.) > > Indeed I think that in Kant's 'Copernican revolution' in philosophy a > critique of theoretical science providing 'the primary and most > significant access to ourselves and the world' can be founded. > (Tentative explication of this view will be made available upon > request.) > > One must be fair to the scientists themselves. Not all are (or were) > 'realists' when it comes to philosophising about their endeavours; > indeed some regard(ed) realism as an impediment to scientific progress > (the parenthetical past tenses - 'were' and 'regarded' are prompted by > thoughts of the debate between the early developers of quantum theory > and Einstein: the former thought that Einstein's commitment to realism > a serious hindrance). 'Anti-scientism' (i.e., rejection of the view > that science 'provides the primary and most significant access to > ourselves and the world') is most definitely not automatically 'anti- > science'. > > - Chris Bruce > Kiel, Germany > -- > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, > digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html > ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html