[lit-ideas] Re: Gettieriana
- From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" for DMARC)
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2015 06:49:50 -0400
In a message dated 3/13/2015 1:25:39 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx writes:
Perhaps we can try something like this: "First we take a vague or
ambiguous statement. Then we imagine a context in which it is believed to be
true
but it comes out false in the sense in which it was ostensibly intended in
that imaginary context. Next, we imagine another context which has nothing
whatsoever to do with what was ostensibly intended but in which the same
statement can be read as true. For effect, we add one or two improbable turns
to the story."
Indeed. There are three other considerations one can give some attention
to:
(I) In his essa, Gettier challenges the "justified true belief" definition
of knowledge that dates back to Plato's "Theaetetus" (He also quotes from
Ayer's Penguin book on empirical knowledge). BUT the definition is
TYPICALLY discounted at the end of that very dialogue. So we may want to
revise the
original Greek text to double-check if some justification is given to this
'discounting'.
(II) A similar argument to Gettier was found in the papers of Bertrand
Russell. Since Gettier also quotes from Ayer, a related point is whether Ayer
was aware of this Gettier-type argument in Russell, and what he thought
about it.
(III) Grice. For Gettier competes with Grice. In "An introduction to the
philosophy of language", Harrison calls Grice's definition of meaning as
second only to rule-utilitarianism as having been the target of the maximum
number of alleged counterexamples. Third must count Gettier. Grice got so
infuriated when YET another counter-example was offered to his definition, that
he decided that the best methodology for philosophy DOES NOT proceed by
offering counterexamples (he was having a refutation of Popper in mind). The
methodology should not be epagogic, but diagogic, which is surely to have
an eirenic effect, Grice adds. The keyword here would be the role of
COUNTER-EXAMPLE in CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS (especially when, as in Grice and
Gettier,
the type of conceptual analysis is 'ordinary language philosophy, Oxford
type of analysis'.
Cheers,
Speranza
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