--- On Fri, 24/6/11, Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx> wrote: >> Grice realised this much when he noted, as late as 1987: > > "We need to take into account a distinction between > solitary and concerted enterprises. It take it as being > obvious that insofar as the presence of implicature rests > on the character of one or another kind of conversational > enterprise, it will rest on the character of concerted > rather than solitary talk production. Genuine monologues > are free from speaker's implication" (Way of Words, p. > 369). Either this is merely a verbal stipulation [that nothing of "implicature" can exist in a "genuine monologue", as Grice uses these terms] or it is questionable to the point of being false: surely a "genuine monologue" can be ungrammatical or gramatical, or ambiguous _in its expression_ (whatever the speaker intended), and equally surely it can have implied meanings. "Are you going out or not?" may be a genuine monologue when uttered in the presence only of the cat (who may be deaf), and its "implicature" of exasperation may surely [definitional denial aside] exist whether anyone else is there to pick up on it? As Wittgenstein might say, even a genuine monologue does not constitute a private language, and whatever public meanings permeate language are not removed by the fact that the speech in question takes the form of a soliloquy. Nor does Grice's point properly address Popper's kind of logical point about the _systematic ambiguity_ of theories, an ambiguity that exists beyond what is intended by a speaker and that cannot be removed even by the attempt to restrict meaning by way of some concept of 'intention'. For Popper here would perhaps wish to stress the World 3 character of meaning and also its W3.3 character. Donal London