[Wittrs] Re: Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 01 Jan 2010 18:03:25 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
<snip>
>
> >>this should have been obvious.
>
> >Why "obvious" since you initially presented this as von Neumann's
> >thesis which, if true, you said would mean that a mechanistic picture
> >of how consciousness works would be wrong.
>
> I undertook to show that your mechanistic, Dennett-based theory of
> consciousness can't possibly be true unless von Neumann is wrong.
>
Yes, you did. On that score I would say you haven't yet made the case.
As to the issue of von Neumann's being wrong or not, that's why I was
interested in what von Neumann had actually said (the I,II,III scenario), i.e.,
I was interested in the implications of his thesis. Since high level physics is
above my paygrade, this would be even more interesting if von Neumann's view on
the matter were also the consensus view.
However, whether it is or is not the consensus view (and it seems not to be), I
don't see the negative implications in it for Dennett's model thus far, nor do
I fnd your tweaking of von Neumann's thesis to alter his category II in terms
of what is said to be included within it implied by his thesis. By itself, von
Neumann's thesis seems to have no implications for Dennett's proposal as far as
I can see at this point while your tweaked version strikes me as an effort to
shoehorn an extra thesis into von Neumann's.
> >So why would it have been "obvious" to me that you weren't actually
> >presenting von Neumann's thesis but Joe Polanik's?
>
> >I, II and III is his.
>
> yes; and, therefore, it should have been obvious that I was presenting
> von Neumann's interpretation of QM when I was discussing his analysis of
> the measurement process; his division of the world into divisions I, II
> and III; and, his conclusion that, even after the entire physical
> universe is placed in (I + II), there is something else, the abstract I,
> that is in division III.
>
And his thesis and its implications were the crux of your claim that:
"[SWM's] mechanistic, Dennett-based theory of consciousness can't possibly be
true unless von Neumann is wrong."
Needless to say, you intrigued me with this claim and I wanted to better
understand it, i.e., what is it about von Neumann's claim that, if true,
undermines a Dennettian model of consciousness?
Apparently YOUR claim depends on a shift in the contents of von Neumann's
category II, which von Neumann does not himself make. Thus the claim is really
that Dennett's model can't be true unless Joe Polanik's version of von
Neumann's claim is wrong. And THAT is a very different issue.
It is still worth exploring, of course, but now it comes down to understanding
the Polanikian version which, as far as I can see, hinges on a move von Neumann
doesn't make and also on a presumption of "metaphenomenal" phenomena. But why
should we accept such a presumption? What would such phenomena consist of? Do
we need to invoke such a concept at all to explain the occurrence of
experiential aspects of reality?
> >1, 2 and 3 yours
>
> yes; and, therefore, it should have been obvious that I was presenting
> my own taxonomy of reality types when I spoke about numbering reality
> types 1, 2 and 3 so that these numbers may be used for subscripting
> pronouns by reality types.
>
> I've been presenting this taxonomy and using these subscripted pronouns
> for several years now,
I'm sorry but I haven't been following your presentations "for several years
now", but only briefly on Analytic when you began actively posting there and
since you came to this list. Frankly, I haven't paid very close attention to
the exchange here about your 1, 2 and 3 which you were having with others until
you made the claim that Dennett's model cannot be true unless von Neumann's
thesis about quantum theory and the collapse of the wave function is wrong.
That got my attention and I asked you to explicate von Neumann's thesis.
Subsequently it has come to light that you were explicating not his thesis but
a hybrid thesis for which you are responsible.
Well, all right, that is interesting, too, if you can make the case for your
claim that it obviates Dennett's conception of consciousness. But nothing you
have so far presented sustains that claim though, by adding your own 1, 2 and
3, you do introduce certain presumptions that are at odds with Dennett's model.
But no one, and certainly not I, will dispute a claim that Dennett's model
can't be true if you take certain assumptions to be true that are at odds with
it. But that's not an argument against the model, it's just a denial.
For Dennett's thesis to be judged mistaken, before any empirical testing of it,
it must be shown to be illogical, incoherent or incapable of accounting for the
features it claims to account for.
Your argument against Dennett, that his model 'can't be true unless von
Neumann's thesis is wrong', addresses the third possibility, that there is
something about consciousness that is not accounted for mechanistically (in the
broad sense of "mechanistically", of course).
When I have asked you what that something is you have referred back to the
argument that von Neumann's category III consists of an "abstract I" and that
it is this which is a part of any definition of consciousness and which is
extra physical because it is definitionally found outside the physical
categories of von Neumann's I and II.
I have already told you why I don't find this convincing, i.e., it is not at
all clear that such an "abstract I", as the term is used by von Neumann, must
be something which cannot be physically derived, even if it has a different
standing in the set of relations addressed. After all, its derivation from the
physical is ALL that Dennett's thesis is about.
My question boils down to this: What is the argument, either from von Neumann
or from you, that the I that is the subject in an observing relation cannot be
understood as physically derived?
> almost always in connection with Cogito like
> arguments (I experience; therefore, I am) to clarify the reality type of
> the I that demonstrates its own reality.
>
You have said you are not a Cartesian but if this is a variation of the cogito
then you are at least a variation of a Cartesian, no?
> I've been doing this on various mailing lists *including* Analytic and
> Analytic Borders while we were both there.
I don't recall you on Borders though I do recall your coming onto Analytic
where we didn't have many exchanges. We have had more here though.
> so there is really no excuse
> for you to conflate my taxonomy of reality types with von Neumann's
> division of the world.
>
I'll say it again. You said (and I'll just quote you from your own words in
this very post, above) that you:
"undertook to show that [SWM's] mechanistic, Dennett-based theory of
consciousness can't possibly be true unless von Neumann is wrong."
To which I responded by asking you what von Neumann's thesis specifically
claims. Apparently you gave me a hybrid Polanik/von Neumann thesis which is NOT
what I asked about and not what was in question, given your very specific claim
(repeated above).
Now this dispute looks to be more smokescreen than substance, at this point. My
interest, my only interest in this, has to do with whether you have found a
sound criticism of a Dennettian model of consciousness. Instead of answering
THAT question you have now sidetracked us with your indignation over whether I
should have known that you were really always hybridizing the argument from the
beginning.
So I'll tell you what, I'll stipulate to that. I shall agree that I should have
known what you had in mind from the beginning and that I am guilty of not
having read your past offerings closely enough to have been cognizant of the
actual nature of your claim, i.e., that it was less about von Neumann (despite
your repeated references to him!) than it was about Polanik's take on him. All
right? Feel better?
Now let's get to the nitty-gritty which is all that ever interested me: WHAT IS
YOUR ARGUMENT (WHETHER FROM VON NEUMANN OR YOUR OWN MUSINGS) THAT DENNETT'S
MODEL CANNOT ACCOUNT FOR ALL THE FEATURES WE EXPECT CONSCIOUSNESS TO HAVE?
So far we are here: You say that von Neumann's thesis should be reinterpreted
to replace physical instruments of measurement (his II) with phenomenal
features of reality (your 2) and that his III, the "abstract I" should then be
seen as your 3, i.e., whatever is left over when one has peeled away the
physical things observed and the phenomenal features of those observations. On
your view, we are left with something like an unperceived perceiver, a Kantian
type "transcendental I" and, since a full description of reality can only be
achieved via this 1,2,3 breakdown, if we accept 1 and 2 we must also accept 3.
Please feel free to once again correct my restatement of your argument. IS THE
ABOVE YOUR ARGUMENT FOR WHY THERE MUST BE A FEATURE IN CONSCIOUSNESS THAT IS
EXTRA PHYSICAL AND WHICH DENNETT'S MODEL HAS FAILED TO ACCOUNT FOR?
> >But this is all an assumption, i.e., there is no evidence from this
> >particular schematic of how things are that there actually IS some
> >consciousness that stands apart from the rest of the otherwise physical
> >universe in all ontological senses. Essentially you are saying THIS is
> >how von Neumann depicts the way things are and this picture means that
> >consciousness (or some essential part of it) is outside the physical.
> >But why should we accept that as evidence for, or reason to believe
> >that, that is how things are?
>
> as noted above, I undertook to show that your mechanistic, Dennett-based
> theory of consciousness can't possibly be true unless von Neumann is
> wrong. I did not claim that I could prove that von Neumann was right;
As I have noted above, I do not believe that you have made THAT case for the
reasons given.
Note that I do not argue this on whether von Neumann-on-wave-theory-collapsing
or von Neumann/Polanik on that same subject are right. I am only interested in
whether there is anything in either thesis that demonstrates the existence of
some feature of consciousness which is extra-physical and thus not accounted
for in a Dennettian physically based model of consciousness.
You DO NOT NEED TO PROVE VON NEUMANN'S CLAIMS ABOUT WAVE THEORY COLLAPSE AND
ITS CAUSES ARE TRUE OR NOT. ALL YOU HAVE TO DO IS SHOW WHY, IF THEY ARE TRUE,
THEY UNDERMINE DENNETT'S THESIS ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS AS YOU HAVE CLAIMED.
> and, while I have no objection (in principle) to discussing the evidence
> pro and con, I will defer doing so until after:
>
> [1] we've clarified the extent of the incompatibility between your
> mechanistic, Dennett-based theory of consciousness and the von Neumann
> Interpretation of QM; and,
>
It's really quite simple: Dennett's thesis (and mine) stands or falls on
whether all the features of consciousness are being adequately accounted for.
If anything is left out, then they are not and the theory is unsound.
You have asserted that something associated with consciousness, von Neumann's
"abstract I", is left out, therefore Dennett's thesis collapses (along with
those waves).
I am asking you to show why that is the case in a way that goes beyond merely
assuming that there is something that is extra-physical in the relevant sense
(because that would be circular). That is, I see no reason, in principle, why
an observer, described as an "abstract I" (since we know that "I" plays a
different role than other naming words in language) cannot be physically
derived in the way Dennett describes.
You need to show that it cannot be for your claim to work.
> [2] we clear up the confusion engendered by the discourse to this point.
>
Blow away all the smoke about 1,2 and 3 vs. I, II and III and whether I should
have read you more closely when I wasn't reading most of your posts way back
when then and focus on the issue. IF DENNETT'S THESIS (WHICH I AGREE WITH) IS
WRONG BECAUSE OF THE WAVE THEORY COLLAPSE ISSUE, SHOW US WHY.
> the principle confusion stems from the ambiguity of the word
> 'consciousness'.
>
That ambiguity cannot be helped. Like most of our words it has many uses.
(Minsky argues we should do away with it entirely and just talk about its
different features.) I have given my way of applying the term in the present
context already. Below you give us yours.
> clearing up *that* confusion is the reason I introduced my subscripted
> pronouns and the taxonomy of reality types which the subscripts encode.
>
> my point is that, when people translate 'abstract I' as 'consciousness'
> (for example, to allege that consciousness causes the collapse), they
> are not using that word the way you are using it when you advocate a
> mechanistic, Dennett-based theory of consciousness.
>
That could well be. I agree that this is about competing conceptions of mind,
of consciousness, and I have always said that it was (which you would know if
you had been following MY past posts on Analytic and Borders).
IF ONE BEGINS BY ASSUMING THAT THERE IS A TRANSCENDENTAL CORE UNDERNEATH IT
ALL, A LA KANT, THAT THERE IS AN UNPERCEIVED PERCEIVER, THEN DENNETT'S MODEL
CERTAINLY EXCLUDES THAT. BUT THEN ONE IS SAYING THAT ONE IS SIMPLY DEFINING
CONSCIOUSNESS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ASSUME THE NON-PHYSICAL AND THAT IS NOT AN
ARGUMENT AGAINST DENNETT BECAUSE IT STANDS ON ASSUMING DENNETT IS MISTAKEN!
It means that one is assuming dualism at the start and discounting any thesis
that rejects that very assumption. But what if that assumption IS mistaken?
What if there ain't no such animal as a "transcendental I", an extra physical
element underlying the physical? Suppose Dennett's approach yields a machine
that operates with all the indications of consciousness (a mental life) that we
find in creatures like ourselves. Would we then be stuck saying that such an
entity has no mind, despite all evidence to the contrary, because it lacks what
we have though we cannot show that we have it? Or would we have to say that
someone must have slipped an "abstract I" into it somehow?
> my claim i that 'consciousness' as a synonym of or translation for
> 'abstract I' refers to an (alleged or postulated) entity of reality type
> 3;
I would say that is mistaken. We do not need to assume an extra-physical core
to consciousness to speak of consciousness. It's true that some people do and
that, if you do, Dennett's thesis looks wrong. But that is the point of this,
i.e., Dennett's model explains consciousness WITHOUT ASSUMING THE PRESENCE OF
ANYTHING EXTRA-PHYSICAL YET STILL MANAGES TO ACCOUNT FOR ALL THE ACTUAL
FEATURES WE "SEE" WHEN WE CONSIDER WHAT WE MEAN BY "CONSCIOUSNESS". In fact,
positing another, invisible feature, is unnecessary precisely because, if
Dennett's model is to prove out empirically, we ought to be able to get
synthetic consciousnesses in every relevant way without the added presence of
this inexplicable, invisible extra feature.
This is why Dennett's model is consistent with a physicalist account of things
and why, if it's viable, it eliminates the need to posit anything else, e.g., a
dualist picture of things.
>whereas, 'consciousness', as you use it, refers to phenomenological
> (type 2) realities (experiences and the subject of its experiences).
>
> would you agree with that claim?
>
> Joe
I would and I'd add that if all the features of consciousness can be accounted
for in this way, including both the phenomenal elements of experience and the
experiencing function (which includes an experiencer), then there's no reason
to insist on yet one more thing, a thing we cannot see or know but must just
presume to be there. If consciousness as we recognize it can be fully accounted
for mechanistically, then there is NO reason to import a deus ex machina to
complete the picture.
Now a side note. Joe, I am willing, even pleased, to exchange posts with you
and others on issues that interest me nor do I want the exchanges to be
rancorous in any way. But I have noticed that there is something about me that
seems to bring out the worst in other posters. I have had sometimes vigorous
but, too often, angry debates on too many lists on which I have participated,
from the Critical Rationalism list to Wittgenstein-dialognet to
Analytic-Borders to Analytic and now, suprisingly, here.
I know that Sean has set out to make this list different but it seems that
there is something about list culture and certainly about me (as a catalyst or
lightning rod for personal attacks) that apparently cannot be overcome, even by
Sean. Hell, I've even had set-to's here with Sean and we are generally on the
same side!
I must assume that there is something about me that does not do well on
Internet lists. Perhaps it's my style of debate. So I am seriously thinking of
ceasing to post here. I am interested in pursuing this discussion with you
though I am not convinced we can make anymore progress than I have with Bruce
(one of the few people with whom I have had an ongoing, if somewhat testy, long
term list relationship).
If I decide to leave this list, I am extending you the invitation to exchange
remarks about this subject with me off-line. A private exchange is often less
fruitful because the interlocutors don't have the benefit of outside minds to
provide additional useful perspectives. But perhaps it has the benefit of
reduced the incentive for posturing since we would be without an audience.
In any case, I haven't made a decision about this yet and may defer it a while
longer. But I really am fed up with the attacks that I seem to draw no matter
where I post my thoughts. Maybe I'm too thin skinned but, frankly, I'm not
young anymore and don't have the energy to waste on foolish prattle when there
are real ideas that I find interesting and would like to consider.
SWM
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