[Wittrs] Re: Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 03 Jan 2010 03:20:37 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
>
> SWM wrote:
>
> >Joseph Polanik wrote:
>
> >>I undertook to show that your mechanistic, Dennett-based theory of
> >>consciousness can't possibly be true unless von Neumann is wrong.
>
> >Yes, you did. On that score I would say you haven't yet made the case.
>
> how absurdly ironic this conversation has become!
>
Okay, Joe, I see this is as pointless with you as with some others. My mistake
to have read it otherwise!
> for years now, you have been claiming that this or that person who
> disagreed with you had latent dualistic tendencies; indeed, in another
> recent post you accuse Bruce of 'implicit dualism'.
>
I have said that holding a certain conception of consciousness implied dualism.
If you think, as you apparently do, that when we speak of consciousness we mean
phenomena plus a perceiving subject that exists apart from everything else
(including those phenomena) then that is either dualist or idealist. (It will
depend on whether you go on to think that everything else is real, in some
ontological sense of "real", or just in the mind, of course.)
Apparently a lot of folks freak out over being linked with anything dualist.
Well first, it's only a word and second it could even be true, even if I happen
to think there is no reason to suppose it is. Insofar as you are making the
case for a "cogito" like argument, which you have indicated you were before,
then that is certainly in keeping with dualism at the least, and maybe even
some form of idealism.
If people can't talk rationally and reasonably about this, I don't want to be
bothered anymore. I stayed off this list for the past 24 hours to see how this
went. Returning and reading this message of yours, I see no improvement so I
will probably just end my involvement here. Thanks for helping me with the
decision.
> nevertheless, when I presented the von Neumann Interpretation of QM
> (which is as overtly dualistic as one can get without actually
> plagiarizing from Descartes scrapbook), you resist the suggestion that
> the von Neumann Interpretation is incompatible with your mechanistic,
> Dennett-based theory of consciousness.
>
What the "f" are you talking about?
As for the theory I subscribe to, it isn't Dennett-based, it is
Dennett-consistent.
> >I don't see the negative implications in it for Dennett's model thus
> >far, nor do I fnd your tweaking of von Neumann's thesis to alter his
> >category II in terms of what is said to be included within it implied
> >by his thesis. By itself, von Neumann's thesis seems to have no
> >implications for Dennett's proposal as far as I can see at this point
> >while your tweaked version strikes me as an effort to shoehorn an extra
> >thesis into von Neumann's.
>
> how exactly did I alter the contents of von Neumann's division II?
>
> are you saying that I've included in division II something that von
> Neumann excluded? if so, what do you say I added?
>
You said von Neumann included everything physical whereas you changed that by
redefining the physical as the phenomenal. Physical and phenomenal are not
equivalents, at least not without a whole lot of work to recast the one as the
other nor is it obviously true that such a recasting must be seen to succceed.
> are you saying that I've excluded from division II something that von
> Neumann included? if so, what do you say I subtracted?
>
See above.
> >It is still worth exploring, of course, but now it comes down to
> >understanding the Polanikian version which, as far as I can see, hinges
> >on a move von Neumann doesn't make and also on a presumption of
> >"metaphenomenal" phenomena.
>
> what is the move that you think I make that von Neumann doesn't make?
>
See above. (Why the "f" did you object to my noting that your 1,2,3 differs
from von Neumann's I,II,III which you had initially cited if you now want to
say there is no difference between them?)
> I deny presuming that there are metaphenomenal phenomena. what did I
> write that made you think otherwise?
>
You said #2 contains whatever is phenomenal and that #3 is metaphenomenal.
Since the occurrence of a subject in the universe is a phenomenon in the
universe (we encounter it in the universe) it is phenomenal by dint of its
being a phenomenon. Therefore, as the content of #3 it is a metaphenomenal
phenomenon.
I don't argue for the intelligibility of the claim. I only note that that is
the proper conclusion that flows from your assertions and if they are
unintelligible, that is a problem for you, not me.
This isn't philosophy anymore because you (and some others) are not thinking
about the issues in any serious way or considering what others are saying. You
are out to see who can prolong this through insult and nitpicking crap in an
extremely juvenile manner and I decline to participate further. You can go
back and play with Walter since I see he finds you amusing in his fashion.
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