[Wittrs] An Issue Worth Focusing On
- From: Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 09 May 2010 21:54:13 -0400
SWM wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>SWM wrote:
>>>My point is that this is a discussion and debate about what Searle
>>>was doing, ...
>>as I see it, the issue is whether the third axiom is true; and, we are
>>not limited to considering whether Searle wrote what you read him as
>>saying. any evidence/argument that the third axiom is or is not true
>>is available for consideration.
>Yes, we can consider the truth or falsity of the third premise
>independent of the CR ... But that is not the issue here ... The CR is
>the basis of the CRA. The latter is formulated entirely on claims
>derived from the former. If those claims are misguided or not
>supported, then the CRA fails.
if, for some reason that remains obscure, we limited arguments in favor
of the third axiom to those that you admit are based on the CRT; then,
even assuming that you successfully contest all those arguments you are
willing to consider, the most that you would be able to claim is that
the CRA is not supported by any of the arguments you are willing to
consider. you would not be entitled to claim that the CRA fails.
you can't have it both ways.
>Searle is giving us an argument that he says demonstrates, via logic,
>that Dennett's thesis could not succeed. Searle is arguing against the
>possibility of "strong AI" while Dennett's thesis is only an argument
>in favor of the possibility. So Dennett's is open to empirical
>consideration while Searle's is not.
given that Dennett changes the definition of 'understanding' so that he
can attribute understanding to a system that lacks subjectivity and
subjective experience, Dennett's thesis (such as it is) is utterly
irrelevant to claims that there is no understanding in the Chinese Room.
>As I have noted, the CR does not show that semantics qua understanding
>cannot be understood/explained on a system level and, if it can be so
>understood, then the third premise does not show that "syntax does not
>constitute and is not sufficient for semantics".
as I have noted, the CRT is agnostic as to theories purporting to
explain subjectivity and experience; so, until you offer a coherent
explanation for why you think otherwise, I may or may not be able to
explain why you are mistaken.
>The equivocal statement Searle formulates as his third premise serves
>to mask the problem by making a non-identity claim seem to support a
>non-causation claim.
this is a good example of the way to conduct philosophical discourse as
if it were a three-card monte scam played with words instead of cards.
the three claims (causation, constitution and identity) represent the
three cards. the target card (a.k.a. the money card) is whatever claim
is the topic of interest at the moment.
now Searle picks the claim of constitution as the topic of interest by
saying 'syntax does not constitute semantics'. consequently, we would
expect to find that the meaning of constitution would be 'under' the
card (would be the subject of the discourse); but, the dealer (you,
Stuart) moves what you call the meaning of identity so that it appears
to be the subject of discussion.
the cheating consists of linguistic sleight of hand. the meaning of
'identity' that is consistent with the is of constitution (and, often,
with claims of constitution not using 'is') is not identical to the
meaning of 'identity' that is consistent with Leibniz's Law.
>>>1) His claim that the premise is "conceptually true" (which is only
>>>the case for the denial of identity);
once the switcheroo is detected, it is clear that the first clause of
the third premise is true --- as a claim of non-constitution --- even if
it is also true when misread as a claim of non-identity.
* * *
now, Stuart, before we leave the topic of three-card monte as a model of
philosophical discourse, let me ask you one question.
you say that Searle makes a claim of non-causation in the third axiom;
and, I agree that he does; but, I take that to mean causation in the
true sense (pertaining to the notion of cause and effect that scientists
use and that descends from Aristotle's category of efficient causation).
my question is: when you say that Searle makes a claim of non-causation
do you have a different notion of causation in mind?
Joe
Note: in the unlikely event that someone doesn't know what three-card
monte is, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-card_Monte.
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
==========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
Other related posts:
