[Wittrs] Re: An Issue Worth Focusing On
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 07 May 2010 14:02:23 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
>
> Stuart,
>
> I don't have time to reply to all of the points made in this long post;
> so, for now, I'll just focus on one example of conducting philosophical
> inquiry as if it were a game of three card monte.
>
> to extend the metaphor used previously, the point to remember is that,
> while identicality is a two way street and constitution is a one way
> street, one way streets often come in pairs. a city that has a one-way
> east-bound street will often have a one-way west-bound street very close
> by.
>
> having a pair of one-way streets going in opposite directions is not the
> same as having a two way street.
>
>
> SWM wrote:
>
<snip>
>
> >My point is that "constitution" can be read as either a causal or an
> >identity claim.
>
> my point is that I'm not writing 'constitution' when I mean identity;
> so, if you are reading it that way, you are seeing the bat you put in
> the inkblot.
>
My point is that this is a discussion and debate about what Searle was doing,
not what you stipulate you mean. Thus what's at issue is what Searle means (or
seems to mean) by the statements he incorporates into his Chinese Room argument
(CRA).
> >>identicality is a two way street. the morning star is the evening star
> >>and the evening star is the morning star.
>
> >>constitution can be a one way street. electrical phenomena constitutes
> >>lightning; but, lightning does not constitute electrical phenomena.
> >>there is still a class/subclass relation there.
>
> >In your example immediately above you make an odd mistake in that you
> >confuse reference to a specific phenomenon with reference to its
> >general form (as you call it, its "class").
>
> no. I am distinguishing between the class and the subclass. try to
> remember that I'm *contesting* your claim that, when I suggested
> defining 'constitutes' as 'counts as', I was "defining it as identity".
>
We were speaking about the meaning of "does not constitute" in Searle's third
premise of the CRA which states: "Syntax does not constitute and is not
sufficient for semantics."
I noted that the text can be read in at least two ways because of certain
ambiguities including the way "constitutes" can be used. I went on to note that
the possibility of two different reasons enables a claim by Searle that THAT
premise is both "conceptually true" and supportive of a claim about causality
in the conclusion.
I further pointed out that the "conceptually true" reading is not the one that
works to support the causality claim of the conclusion.
Therefore, I suggested, an equivocation was at work which traded on the elision
of the meanings of the two readings.
Now you certainly may offer a different meaning to any of the terms but, if
they're not consistent with what Searle did in the CRA, what's the point? You
may, of course, argue that Searle was really doing what YOU did with the
meaning, i.e., denying my claim that Searle reads his premise two ways. I
believe that is Gordon's response and, as near as I can tell, Budd's as well
though both of them have different takes on this.
To such arguments, my response is that there is evidence that my reading of
Searle's usage is right:
1) His claim that the premise is "conceptually true" (which is only the case
for the denial of identity);
2) His claim that the premise supports a causal conclusion (which cannot be
inferred from a statement of non-identity alone);
3) Numerous dictionary entries that show that the various terms at issue can be
read in English in the ways I have indicated including reading "constitutes" in
both a sense suggesting identity and a sense suggesting causality;
4) Which fits well with other evidence that Searle does use a claim of
constitution elsewhere as an identity claim (his reference to water's feature's
being caused by their constituents).
> >Insofar as lightning is an example of AN electrical phenomenon, it is
> >NOT equivalent to the general class of electrical phenomena because
> >"electrical phenomena" covers many more things than just lightning.
>
> precisely, they are not identical. lightning is the subclass. electrical
> phenomena is the superclass. the two classes are not co-extensive.
>
The example you gave confused the distinction between class and representative
of the class, i.e., you said "electrical phenomena constitutes lightning". The
term "electrical phenomena" refers to a group or class of individuals or
instances and that covers far more than what constitutes lightning.
There are certainly meanings of "constitutes" that are not what we mean by
"identity" (as the dictionary search I did a while back shows) but the fact
that there are such meanings doesn't entail that Searle was using any of them.
And this is about Searle's usage not yours.
For the reasons already given, I am saying that Searle uses his terms in that
third premise (including "constitutes") in a way that slips the meaning between
a denial of identity, on the one hand, and a denial of causality, on the other.
If he does that, as I suggest, then he has made a mistake in his formulation of
his argument. Thus, this is about a problem with the CRA, not about whether you
or anyone else can restate the third premise to be more clear (I agree it can
be done).
If you want to argue that Searle didn't mean "constitutes" in the way I propose
he did, then you need to give evidence for the truth of your claim as I have
given evidence for why I believe he meant it in the way I have proposed. That
YOU don't mean "constitutes" that way or that you don't THINK he did, isn't,
itself, evidence. After all, you wouldn't take my assertion of what I think as
evidence for my claim.
So you can either explain why the four reasons I've given above aren't evidence
that Searle made the mistake I've laid on his doorstep OR provide other reasons
that are more (or at least equally) compelling that he didn't make the mistake
I've suggested he made.
> >Thus it would be correct to say that lightning is an electrical
> >phenomenon but not, as you do, that "electrical phenomena constitutes
> >lightning" since such phenomena can be any number of other things
> >including static electricity causing one's hair to frizz up, the
> >activity asscoicated with closing a closed circuit, the transfer of
> >information between individual brain cells, etc., etc.
> >Since all are "electrical phenomena" one could not say, as you do, that
> >"electrical phenomena constitute(s) lightning".
>
> using the definition of 'constitutes' as 'counts as' one could very well
> say lightning constitutes electrical phenomena;
Yes, but not that "electrical phenomena constitutes lightning" because
"electrical phenomena" is a broader concept than "lightning", i.e., they don't
operate on the same level.
> precisely because, as
> you say "lightning is an example of AN electrical phenomenon".
>
> and that refutes your claim that by defining 'constitutes' as 'counts
> as', I was "defining it as identity".
>
I don't deny you can define "constitutes" differently. If you want to say you
did not intend to count the term as an "identity" reference in your restatement
and that I misread you, I will yield that point. But if you are not using it as
an identity reference, then the issue of what Searle meant remains unaffected.
Suppose we say "electrical phenomena do not constitute and are not sufficient
for lightning". Would this be a true statement and what would the meanings of
the terms have to be to make it true?
Since "electrical phenomena" refers to a wide array of physical events and
lightning is one such event, it would be fair to say that what counts as (what
we define as, i.e., what is identical with) "electrical phenomena" cannot be
said to constitute lightning because the class of "electrical phenomena" is
more inclusive than any of its members (of which the class of lightning bolts
is one).
On the other hand, if what we mean by "electrical phenomena" are particular
phenomena that are members of the class we call "electrical phenomena" (because
they share the class membership attributes of other class members), then it
might actually make sense to say that "electrical phenomena" do constitute
lightning. This use of "constitute" would be tantamount to speaking of an
identity by the way.
> that said, I'd also point out that the other use of 'constitutes'
> employed above is also a one way street; although, it obviously goes in
> the other direction.
>
And I would reiterate that this isn't about whether we can use "constitutes" in
a non-identity way. I have already (and many times) agreed that we can. Nor is
this about how you use "constitutes". It's about how Searle does, in the CRA,
and that means we are each obliged to make our case for what we think Searle
has in mind there.
But you can't make the case just by saying "constitutes" can also be used
differently and that is how I, Joe Polanik, use it.
I've given you very specific reasons, based on Searle's actual claims, for why
I think he is using it in certain ways. What are your reasons for saying he is
doing something else?
> constitution can also mean 'composed of'. the examples you culled from
> online dictionaries includes "Copper and tin constitute bronze". that's
> a legitimate use; but, it is only a one-way relation. you can't say that
> bronze constitutes copper or tin.
>
Again, no one denies that "constitutes" has a different range of meanings from
"is identical to" or "causes". The issue is that there are overlapping
meanings. And the point is to determine what Searle means in the third premise
of his CRA.
I pulled those definitions from the Internet to show that there is a broad
enough range of meanings to allow for the usage I have argued is found in
Searle's argument. I have made the case that that usage is there by noting
other things Searle says, both about his third premise, how he uses it in his
argument, AND by pointing out other claims he has made which equate a
constitutive relationship with a causal one.
> there is a sense in which electrical phenomena constitutes lightning
> because one can say that lightning is nothing more than electrical
> phenomena. it's legitimate to say lightning is constituted by electrical
> phenomena and nothing more.
But not that "electrical phenomena constitutes lightning" though I agree that
you can say "lightning is constituted by (made up of or consists of) eletrical
phenomena" in which case one IS making an identity claim, only it is not one of
equating lightning with the class we usually designate as "electrical
phenomena" but, rather, with a sub-class of that class (because in this
instance "electrical phenomena" refers to the type of phenomena that lightning
consists of).
The point I was making was that, when you wrote "electrical phenomena
constitutes lightning" you were mixing a reference to a class of items with a
reference to a sub-class which just are what we mean by lightning. The key to
the mistake lies in your use of the "s" at the end of "constitute" since an "s"
there indicates that the subject of the sentence is singular (i.e., a class)
rather than plural as in lots of phenomena that are members of the class.
Used as a plural, "electrical phenomena" accurately (if rather generally)
describes the constituents of lightning (and thus yields an identity claim).
Used in the singular, it inaccurately refers to an abstraction (a class) that
is not logically the same as one of its members.
> indeed, that usage is precisely what is
> known as the is of constitution.
>
> Joe
I'll reiterate then. This isn't about whether "constitutes" can be used in ways
that aren't equivalent with identity claims (it can be and I have acknowledged
that from the first) but about whether Searle uses "constitutes" in the third
premise of the CRA in a way that is.
SWM
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