[Wittrs] Re: An Issue Worth Focusing On
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 06 May 2010 13:48:09 -0000
Still having trouble with my pc. I replied to this one but it didn't seem to go
through. Here it is again then:
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
<snip>
>
> indeed, I am expressing myself in ordinary english; but, that doesn't
> mean that I'm using my language as imprecisely as it might be used by
> someone slobbering out an opinion as Ludwig's Ordinary Language Sport
> Utility Bar.
>
A stupid remark, unworthy of serious attention.
> so, unless you are claiming that sloppy language is mandatory for anyone
> using ordinary english words to express a thought,
A false distinction, either intended to mislead or reflecting your own
confusion.
> listen carefully
> because I'm telling you once again: identity, constitution and causality
> are three distinct concepts.
This just reflects a failure to understand Wittgenstein's point about the
organic and flexible nature of language, i.e., that words mean what they mean
based on how they are used. The idea that there are fixed concepts to which
word are indelibly attached is a view that is certainly held by some but it's
out of accord with Wittgenstein's insights as to language and its relation to
our thinking. You, Joe, are free to think about this as you do but simply
making such a claim doesn't mean you are right (anymore than my claiming a
different position means I am). What it shows is where we stand on this sort of
thing.
So you can declare that, when you use these terms, you have in mind three
separate concepts whereas I am telling you that, on my view, an examination of
these words shows their uses (and hence their meanings) "bleed" into one
another. What matters at this point, then, is whose explanation of how words
work makes more sense -- an entirely different argument.
I don't see a need to defend what I take to be a fundamentally Wittgensteinian
insight against a claim like yours which strikes me as simply wrongheaded. One
doesn't argue such things. One sees them or one doesn't.
> Furthermore,
>
> I use 'identity' to make an identity claim.
>
> I use 'constitution' to make a constitution claim.
>
> I use 'causality' to make a causality claim.
>
There aren't the clear distinctions you imagine. These words are rooted in
language, ordinary language, and the effort to turn them into strictly distinct
and entirely separable concepts is simply a reflection of an older (and less
subtle) understanding of language, the sort Wittgenstein pointed out Augustine
and other philosophers who think in such terms were guilty of. Coming from
someone like you, who is still stuck in Aristotelian and Cartesian modes of
thinking, I am not surprised that the best you can do when it comes to
Wittgenstein is make sophomoric jokes about "sports bars".
> >As you know (or should know) I have said numerous times that
> >"constitution" can be read as asserting identity or causality (and have
> >given dictionary definitions showing both uses).
>
> and I'm telling you yet again: I'm not doing that.
>
It doesn't matter what you're doing. It matters how the words are used and, in
the present case, what Searle was doing. As I noted, Searle says of the third
premise that it is "conceptually true". He says it of the entire third premise
(both sides). At the same time he applies THAT premise to support a claim of
causality.
The only "conceptually true" reading is the denial of identity which, indeed,
the words can be read as, using ordinary English (the terms in which the
statement is expressed).
The same words can be used to make a causality claim, which is NOT
"conceptually true".
The reason we can slip between the two uses is that "constitutes" (the claim of
constitution) can be used in BOTH ways (as expressing a type of identity or a
type of causality).
It doesn't matter how YOU are using the terms. This is about how Searle does
and the evidence for his usage lies in his dual claim that:
1) The third premise is "conceptually true"; and
2) The third premise has a causality implication (supports a conclusion of
non-causality).
> you may crank out verbiage like someone who took linguistic philosophy
> lessons from a street hustler running a game of three card monte; but, I
> do not.
>
You don't understand the Wittgensteinian notion of language and its
implications for philosophy and so resort to name-calling (e.g., "a street
hustler") as a way of covering up your failure of insight.
> I use 'constitution' to make a constitution claim.
>
This is about what Searle uses since we are considering HIS argument and
whether my critique of it is on target and appropriate. You can't resolve that
by resorting to name-calling (though nothing can prevent you from doing so, I
suppose).
> >>so, let's just informally define 'constitutes' as 'counts as'.
>
> >Then you are defining it as identity rather than as causal.
>
> well, thank you for admitting that I'm not defining 'constitution' as
> 'causation' (in the narrow sense); but, you are still conflating
> constitution and identity.
>
My point is that "constitution" can be read as either a causal or an identity
claim. You can deny it if you like (but the evidence is in the dictionary uses
and in Searle's own usage) and you can insist that that isn't what YOU are
doing, but then that's irrelevant since this is about what Searle does, not
what you stipulate about your own usage.
> identicality is a two way street. the morning star is the evening star
> and the evening star is the morning star.
>
There are many uses of "identity", of course, and people who don't recognize
that often make mistakes by slipping and sliding between them.
> consitution can be a one way street. electrical phenomena constitutes
> lightning; but, lightning does not constitute electrical phenomena.
> there is still a class/subclass relation there.
>
In your example immediately above you make an odd mistake in that you confuse
reference to a specific phenomenon with reference to its general form (as you
call it, its "class").
Insofar as lightning is an example of AN electrical phenomenon, it is NOT
equivalent to the general class of electrical phenomena because "electrical
phenomena" covers many more things than just lightning. Thus it would be
correct to say that lightning is an electrical phenomenon but not, as you do,
that "electrical phenomena constitutes lightning" since such phenomena can be
any number of other things including static electricity causing one's hair to
frizz up, the activity asscoicated with closing a closed circuit, the transfer
of information between individual brain cells, etc., etc.
Since all are "electrical phenomena" one could not say, as you do, that
"electrical phenomena constitute(s) lightning".
We could, of course, say that lightning constitutes (as in 'consists of' or
'represents' or 'is seen to be' or 'is best explained as') an electrical
phenomenon. But note that this equates instances of lightning with instances of
a certain class of phenomena. Again, one could never say, as you just did, that
"electrical phenomena constitutes(sic) lightning".
Yours is a remarkably unsubtle and wrongheaded reading of the use of these
particular terms, not even in accord with ordinary language, let alone the
scientific sort. (Such a misreading problem isn't solved by stipulation,
either.)
> listen carefully, Stuart. to avoid assigning the meaning of one word to
> the other word; and, to avoid conflating their meanings,
>
> I use 'identity' to make an identity claim.
>
You misuse "constitutes" above, for starters.
However, let me reiterate the more important issue, Joe: THIS IS NOT ABOUT HOW
YOU USE (OR IMAGINE YOU USE) THESE TERMS. IT'S ABOUT HOW SEARLE DOES.
Since we are arguing about Searle's CRA, your usages (whether they are right or
wrong) are irrelevant here.
> I use 'constitution' to make a constitution claim.
>
And get it wrong right out of the gate when applying it to the phenomenon of
lightning. If you can't even get that right, how can you expect anyone here to
take you seriously on your other points?
> now, Stuart, having clarified what is meant by what is said, let's try
> this again.
>
I admire the way you always seem to imagine yourself in some pedagogical role
with regard to others you are conversing with. It reveals a serious lack of
self-awareness (for one whose abiding slogan speaks of that condition), and yet
you persist in it, even after making freshman error after freshman error. At
least you get credit for tenacity.
> defining 'constitutes' informally as 'counts as' and avoiding any
> conflation of constitution with either identity or causation, do you
> admit or deny that the hypothesis [2] is refuted?
>
> Joe
What you have offered above, Joe, is rife with so many errors that I cannot
imagine responding to such a question. It's a little like my being asked to
answer the question: "Have you stopped beating your wife?" Saying either yes or
no allows the erroneous assumption embedded in the question to stand.
Since your question is built on a series of mistakes, including an insufficient
understanding of how language works, a failure to grasp that this is about
Searle's argument, not your stipulations, and, your inaccurate use of a word
that you have made critical to your own claims ("constitutes"), any reply risks
inadvertently sustaining these errors.
I will therefore say again, what I have previously said here many times:
The third premise in Searle's CRA can be read in at least two ways, as a claim
of non-identity and as a claim of non-causality.
Only the claim of non-identity is "conceptually true" while it is the claim of
non-causality (which is not established by the CR thought experiment) that is
required to sustain the conclusion of the CRA.
This ambiguity of meaning in the third premise is made possible by the use of
the word "constitutes" which can be read in different ways (including as both
an identity and causal claim).
The ambiguity CAN be eliminated by simply recasting the third premise as either
one or the other:
1) Syntax is not the same as semantics and is not sufficient for allowing us to
claim an instance of semantics is present when an instance of syntax is; or
2) Syntax cannot cause semantics.
Had Searle used either formulation (or an equivalent) he'd have avoided the
charge of linguistic double dipping.
But then the first version would not have sustained his conclusion (that what
is syntax cannot cause what has semantics) because non-identity does not imply
non-causality,
while the second version requires an added assumption about "semantics", i.e.,
that it cannot be caused by anything that isn't, itself, already semantical in
its nature.
Making THAT added assumption opens one up to the charge of dualism (because it
hinges on the claim that mind, or whatever constitutes it, is irreducible).
SWM
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