David Chalmers: The Problem of ConsciousnessHe is one of today's leading figures in the quest for a comprehensive theory of consciousness.The second part of the audio is a conversation between WIE editor Craig Hamilton and Dr. Chalmers, in which they discuss the hard problem of consciousness, free will, and the materialist view of reality.It may be the largest outstanding obstacle in our quest for a scientific understanding of the universe....We have good reason to believe that consciousness arises from physical systems such as brains, but we have little idea how it arises, or why it exists at all.www.wie.org /unbound/media.asp?id=77 (378 words) Message Forum: Re: The Hard Problem of ConsciousnessThe far more difficult problem lies in fully describing states of *subjective experience*: this is known as the"hard problem".By locating the neurons in the cerebral cortex that correlate best with consciousness, and figuring out how they link to neurons elsewhere in the brain, we may come across key insights into what David J. Chalmers calls the hard problem: a full accounting of the manner in which subjective experience arises from these cerebral processes.We commend Chalmers for boldly recognizing and focusing on the hard problem at this early stage, although we are not as enthusiastic about some of his thought experiments.www.rinkworks.com /rinkforum/view.cgi?post=26772 (2196 words) sekhar --- On Thu, 6/5/10, Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: From: Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx> Subject: [Wittrs] An Issue Worth Focusing On To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Date: Thursday, 6 May, 2010, 4:18 PM SWM wrote: >Joseph Polanik wrote: >>SWM wrote: >>>Joseph Polanik wrote: >>let's see if you've made relevant points, shall we? >>>>[1] the hypothesis that syntactic operations are identical to >>>>understanding is refuted by the absence of understanding in the CR >>>>despite the presence of syntactic operations in the CR. >I admit that the hypothesis you state above, that "'syntactical >operations are identical to understanding' is refuted by the absence of >understanding in the CR" is true. okay, then. let's move on. >>>>[2] the hypothesis that syntactic operations constitute >>>>understanding is refuted by the absence of understanding in the CR >>>>despite the presence of syntactic operations in the CR. >>>This hinges on the use of "constitutes" which can be taken in a >>>causal sense or in an identity sense. >>focus, Stuart. we're not writing a dissertation on the conflationary >>possibilities of ordinary english; >"We" are expressing a claim in ordinary English above. indeed, I am expressing myself in ordinary english; but, that doesn't mean that I'm using my language as imprecisely as it might be used by someone slobbering out an opinion as Ludwig's Ordinary Language Sport Utility Bar. so, unless you are claiming that sloppy language is mandatory for anyone using ordinary english words to express a thought, listen carefully because I'm telling you once again: identity, constitution and causality are three distinct concepts. Furthermore, I use 'identity' to make an identity claim. I use 'constitution' to make a constitution claim. I use 'causality' to make a causality claim. >As you know (or should know) I have said numerous times that >"constitution" can be read as asserting identity or causality (and have >given dictionary definitions showing both uses). and I'm telling you yet again: I'm not doing that. you may crank out verbiage like someone who took linguistic philosophy lessons from a street hustler running a game of three card monte; but, I do not. I use 'constitution' to make a constitution claim. >>so, let's just informally define 'constitutes' as 'counts as'. >Then you are defining it as identity rather than as causal. well, thank you for admitting that I'm not defining 'constitution' as 'causation' (in the narrow sense); but, you are still conflating constitution and identity. identicality is a two way street. the morning star is the evening star and the evening star is the morning star. consitution can be a one way street. electrical phenomena constitutes lightning; but, lightning does not constitute electrical phenomena. there is still a class/subclass relation there. listen carefully, Stuart. to avoid assigning the meaning of one word to the other word; and, to avoid conflating their meanings, I use 'identity' to make an identity claim. I use 'constitution' to make a constitution claim. now, Stuart, having clarified what is meant by what is said, let's try this again. defining 'constitutes' informally as 'counts as' and avoiding any conflation of constitution with either identity or causation, do you admit or deny that the hypothesis [2] is refuted? Joe -- Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@ http://what-am-i.net @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@ ========================================== Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/