[Wittrs] Re: An Issue Worth Focusing On
- From: "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 05 May 2010 00:18:44 -0000
Stuart writes:
"I have also explained, numerous times, that
Searle speaks of a constitutive claim as causal and I have said it is THAT
sense of causal that I think is at work here."
So, when in the third premise Searle states that syntax is _neither_
constitutive of _nor_ sufficient for semantics, it's as if we can read him as
merely saying the same thing (two noncausality claims for the price of one)
even though there is a "neither/nor" there?
I don't buy that. I also, a fortiori, can't buy the two-for-one sale on both
being identity claims. So, six years ago I thought you were having trouble
reading English or were flaming, i.e., it just seems obvious, contra Gordon,
that "insufficient for" is to be read as "insuff. to cause" and "doesn't
constitute" is being used as a type of nonidentity claim.
Stuart writes:
"...if semantics (here used as a proxy word for whatever we mean by
understanding of the sort we have) is a function of a system rather than any
constituent element of the system, then what syntax is not (i.e., it is not
semantics), is irrelevant to what syntax, arranged in the right way, can do.
(Causing, of course, being an instance of doing.)"
So, what do you mean by "syntax"? Computation or physics?
Hypothetical Dilemma (may be a false dilemma):
1. If syntax is conflated with physics, you and Searle win because both are
talking of systems that need not essentially be characterized as S/H systems--a
real machine uber-mensche enough to cause semantics. This is why I often
remind you that by conflating syntax with physics, you are really sharing
Searle's main position, just in a circuitous way! ;-)
2. If syntax is taken to be formal, as Searle really has it, then no amount of
arrangement of formal elements does a S/H system make to be an extra causal
factor other than the uninterpreted electricity minus the formal syntax. And
that "other than" part lands us back in 1. above.
So, win, win!
Stuart writes about his point all along:
"> My point throughout has been that, just as the aggregate of features
(including wetness, liquidity, etc.) that we call "water" are caused by the
aggregate of elements (using the ordinary English sense of "elements") called
H2O molecules, in terms of the things they do when aggregated, so semantics
(meaning whatever it is we think of as understanding) may well be caused by a
certain kind of aggregation of "syntactical" operations."
Well, are they really syntactical? And what can you mean, other than Searle's
claim that syntax is formal? That syntax is not formal and we don't have a
distinction between S/H systems and nonS/H systems? Well, then you agree with
Searle's main philosophical position because you have taken the whole meaning
of functionalism out of the equation.
The most you get to do is make a really bad case for Searle being wrong to
distinguish between S/H and nonS/H--and this is supposed to show that Searle's
position is implicitly dualist?
It's like I said all along. You fail to read the third premise as two
independent thoughts.
A larger failure is not recognizing the distinction between S/H and nonS/H.
Failure to note the distinction nets you Searle's position, actually. Failure
to note the distinction also offers a way of "showing Searle's position to be
implicitly dualist since then you have discovered a way for interpreting Searle
as denying what he claims--i.e., if he's denying computers something he doesn't
deny brains, AND, if Stuart gets us to be blind to the distinction Searle draws
between S/H and nonS/H, then....
The proof is that you consider the third premise in terms of two possibilities
other than the possibility I suggest flows from understanding simple English,
namely, two independent thoughts comprise the third premise. One is a sort of
nonidentity claim (does not constitute) and the other a noncausality claim
(insufficient for ...because not even a candidate IF one doesn't conflate
syntax with physics, yada yada, AND IF one is sensitive to Searle's distinction
between S/H and nonS/H systems.
If you would like to show Searle wrong to distinguish between S/H and nonS/H,
go ahead. I'm not disagreeing that that might be something you might try (I
wouldn't even). But even if successful, you STILL wouldn't have any good
reason to suggest that Searle's biological naturalism is a form of dualism.
If you don't agree, I'm going to refer you to my shoe. :-)
So, anticipating the broken record, Stuart writes:
"But, alas, I don't entertain any hopes you will see or acknowledge this point
now anymore than you have the thousand times in the past that I have made it.
Instead I expect you will soon come back with yet ANOTHER version of your claim
that the CRA's third premise is demonstrated by a consideration of the CR
itself. At some point, I expect, we just scrape bottom -- and since we are once
again reduced to repeating ourselves, shouldn't we assume that that is where we
have now reached in this exchange?"
I think the crux is whether we can all understand how S/H systems work and how
nonS/H systems are different even if they (along with your favorite vagina) can
be given a computational description. But I don't suppose you like that
distinction either?
Cheers,
Budd
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