[lit-ideas] Re: Univocal philosophy as the value of transcendental claims?
- From: "Phil Enns" <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 5 Jan 2009 08:06:58 +0700
Eric Dean wrote:
"Then I would say the imprecision of such judgments is that while
there are obvious examples of theft, there are also many and important
circumstances in which it is not immediately obvious whether it is or
is not a theft. Perhaps the word 'imprecise' would need to be changed
here -- maybe I would do better to say the 'uncertain application' of
such judgments, rather than their 'imprecision'. Before anyone can
know whether something is a theft, in one those circumstances, we may
have to ascertain quite a range of ancillary facts."
That there are hard cases, cases where it isn't clear whether a theft
has occurred, does not alter the moral force of the prohibition.
Here, the issue is not a matter of knowing how to apply the
prohibition since the prohibition is simple, "Don't!". Rather, the
issue lies in ascertaining whether the action in question, in all its
historical and cultural specificity, could be considered a theft.
Answering this question will require consideration of context and
application of moral judgment. In some cases, there will be no clear
answer and so the case lies in a grey area. What I don't see is how
having some cases ending up in this grey area changes the universal
moral force of the prohibition against stealing in those cases that
are clear.
:
> knowing the truth of a moral judgment depends upon our knowing how it can be
> applied to (potentially) real circumstances.
Eric D. again:
"I raise this to ask, sincerely and earnestly: what is the value of
insisting that there must be some transcendental, universal, common
meaning of moral terms? What is to be lost if we do not accept that?"
I would suggest that there is a loss in two areas. First, in the area
of human rights, reference to a transcendental, universal, common
meaning of moral terms provides a much more robust account of what is
due to every human being. If everything is only historical,
ethnically contextual, then documents like the UDHR are far less
likely to be as effective as they could be. Second, in the area of
democracy, where reference to a transcendental, universal, common
meaning of moral terms fixes the equality of all citizens. In a
liberal democracy, the equality of all citizens depends on the ability
to universalize moral terms so that any citizen, regardless of their
historically contingent identity, is to be treated as politically
equal and equal before the law. If moral judgments are only
historically and ethnically contingent, then it is much harder to
explain why all citizens should be treated equally by the state.
Finally, Eric D. wonders:
"... Walter (who I hope I've not put off with my relentlessness about this)"
Given the fact that we are both Canadian and shared a drink of Glen's
liver, I can confidently assert that Walter agrees wholeheartedly with
everything I am writing here, keeping silent only because there is
nothing else to say.
Sincerely,
except, perhaps,
that last bit,
Phil Enns
Yogyakarta, Indonesia
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