Robert Paul wrote: "Surely, though, the earlier suggestion that there was an air of circularity about the claim that theft was always (morally) 'wrong' because the very term picks out something that is understood to be wrong, isn't entirely mistaken. Take adultery. Is 'adultery' one of those 'purely descriptive' terms (like 'first cousin'), or does it, like 'theft' (as it is claimed) carry with it a sense of opprobrium? Answers may vary; but in any case, the possibility of adultery is contingent upon there being something like the institution of marriage, the relation 'is married to,' and so on." What I have tried to suggest is that using the word 'theft' is to not only pick out an act but at the same time assert the moral prohibition. The use of the word does not pick out a moral quality but rather asserts it. I would argue that 'adultery' is not a purely descriptive term but rather is partially descriptive (i.e. it locates a betrayed relationship and in this sense is contingent) and partially normative (i.e. it asserts a moral prohibition regarding betrayed intimate relationships). It seems to me that this is the nature of moral claims, which are always grounded in particular, contingent cases but aim to express something universal about such cases. The word 'adultery' may not be applicable everywhere, since it is dependent on a variety of institutions and practices, but I am not sure how that lessens the moral prohibition against betraying intimate relationships where such relationships are found. Sincerely, Phil Enns Yogyakarta, Indonesia ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html