Eric Dean wrote: "... one might say, unequivocally, "If x was a theft, then it was wrong" and protect the accuracy of that assertion by saying that if x is not wrong, it must not have been a theft." The moral prohibition is a structural component of stealing so that it makes no sense to question whether theft is or is not wrong. To assert that x was a theft is to also assert that x was wrong. Eric continues: "However, one might also imagine that as simply a way of gerrymandering the meaning of the term 'theft' to preserve the legitimacy of the moral stricture "theft is wrong". Other ways of preserving the stricture involve exceptions -- e.g. theft is wrong unless ... (fill in the blank with your preferred exculpating circumstances)." There are no exceptions, no gerrymandering. No circumstances could remove the moral prohibition from stealing. One might suggest that there are circumstances that would justify stealing, but this merely reinforces the moral prohibition against stealing. One acknowledges that stealing is wrong by suggesting that it might be a lesser evil. To provide exculpating circumstances does not remove the moral prohibition. In order for Eric's argument to succeed, he would need to provide an example of theft that lacks any justification and is not wrong. While such acts are common with the gods, I suspect sublunary examples are impossible to provide. Sincerely, Phil Enns Yogyakarta, Indonesia ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html