I had written: "Wittgenstein wants to move us from disguised nonsense to patent nonsense. That is, there is something important that comes about because we turn from thinking to looking." to which John McCreery wrote: "Could you please elaborate a bit. Why is this patent nonsense? " Sorry, I wasn't clear. It isn't that any particular thing is patent nonsense but rather my point was that Wittgenstein is himself interested in moving people from disguised to patent nonsense. The relevant text from PI: §464. My aim is: to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense. My point was that Wittgenstein sees something important in awareness, in contrast to reflection, and wants to lead the reader towards greater awareness. John again: "Here I am truly confused. Are we implying that what psychologists do is not purposive? Different purposes, perhaps. But surely not devoid of purpose." Again, I wasn't clear enough. My point was not that other disciplines don't have purposiveness but rather that philosophy has its own kind. Wittgenstein gives examples for a purpose, a purpose that could be called philosophical. This philosophical purpose of giving examples would then be distinguished from the purpose of giving examples in psychology or anthropology. In short, this purposiveness that characterizes the giving of philosophical examples would be an important part of distinguishing the purposiveness at work in psychology or anthropology. One can, for example, imagine the different purposes for employing the example of the incest taboo depending on whether one was doing philosophy, psychology, or anthropology. Sincerely, Phil Enns Yogyakarta, Indonesia ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html