John Wager wrote: "I've always thought that what Kant had in mind was the motivation for an activity or action, not the action itself. One can do the right thing for "heteronomous" reasons, or for "autonomous" reasons. What makes this "public" in the sense you use the word above is that it's based on the form of reason itself, which is indeed "public" to everyone. It would be impossible easily to tell from the outside whether a person was acting from a morally relevant rule, or acting out of some other motivation. Some people just habitually "tell the truth" without thinking about it at all. Others see that this is a "rule" that one should give one's self and see why; this is an "autonomous" individual." This is all pretty slippery. For example, if as John suggests the emphasis is on motivation, then we would expect the autonomous individual to be one whose motivations are largely based on the form of reason. But how much of an individual's life is comprised of motivations that could be based on the form of reason? I like to think of myself as relatively sensitive to ethical issues but a very, very small part of my day is taken with authentic ethical encounters. Most of my day is taken up with work obligations, family obligations and personal pursuits. In other words, the vast majority of my life is not public, but private. Occasionally I am faced with an ethical dilemma and then I like to think I act autonomously. I just don't see that as being sufficient grounds for calling myself an autonomous individual. And I find it impossible to imagine a socialized adult whose motivations are largely based on the form of reason. It gets more messy if we try and figure exactly how to distinguish between motivation and act. After all, a motivation is always a motivation to do something in particular. In the Third Critique, Kant suggests that a way of evaluating the universal character of our own judgment is to adopt the standpoint of others. If we are to do this, it seems that the very idea of motivation collapses into the act since when we take up the standpoint of an other, we take up their standpoint vis a vis a particular act. It seems to me to make more sense to distinguish between autonomous and heteronomous acts since motivation and act can be structurally distinguished but not isolated. As I said motivation is always motivation to do something. And acts have attendant motivations so that when someone acts we can usually ascribe motivation. We can therefore identify actions as ethical as opposed to private because we usually have a pretty good idea of the motives attending those actions. What counts as ethical is never certain and always open to debate, but enough agreement exists to make judgments regarding human activity. I just don't think it make sense to apply this judgment to people. Sincerely, Phil Enns ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html