[quickphilosophy] Re: Fodor on Concepts IV: Circularity

  • From: wittrsl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Wed, 22 Sep 2010 00:26:53 -0000

--- In quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Ron Allen <wavelets@...> wrote:
> Hi Walter:
> No. Quine's attack on analyticity proceeds from a definition of analyticity 
> that roughly follows Frege, who held that analytic truths were those that 
> were logical truths or were reducible to logical truths through substitution 
> of synonymous terms. So, again, going back to my question about the English 
> word 'and', where is the natural language in which the meaning of this word 
> is indeterminate? Now, we have moved the argument for indeterminacy of 
> translation to the words that make up logical truths...which are just one 
> kind of analytic truth for Frege...whose definition of analyticity Quine's 
> attack bears down upon.
> In "Two Dogmas" (1951) the Frege conception of analyticity was completely 
> rejected, both logical and synonymy-derived branches. But in Word and Object 
> (1960), where the translation thesis is asserted, I believe he claims that 
> logical connectives are not subject to revision and that prelogical peoples 
> are a fiction that arises from--of all things for him to say--bad 
> translations. 
> Thanks!
> --Ron 

Hi.  I believe his view is that the logical connectives are definable via truth 
tables.  So (as he says in the Strawson review I mentioned before) he's not 
claiming to define the ordinary language "and" or "not" just the one that's 
needed for science and math.  The point, again, is to give up synonymy in favor 
of truth.


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