[Wittrs] Re: Games with Logic and Bachelor
- From: "jrstern" <jrstern@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 17:09:12 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "jrstern" <jrstern@...> wrote:
>
> Gotta run.
OK I'm back, just to put some context on that last.
From a Wittgenstein perspective, I suppose that yes, pretty much
anything I write about here will be in some way related to the
Turing-Wittgenstein relationship, which in turn is about something
like the roles of reductionism, mechanism, and logic to the language
game and "semantic" issues generally.
And, much that I write, especially currently, will likely be related
to something that Fodor has written about, for at least that last
thirty years. Fodor has long tried to reconcile something like these
two sides also, though with few direct references to Wittgenstein
or Wittgensteinian thinking (since Fodor's major work is after all
"The Language of Thought", and yet, they also share interest in the
linguistic turns in philosophy of mind. Fodor refers to Turing on occassion,
often putting into Turing's mind things that I do not believe ever appear in
Turing's writing. IOW, bad references.
Anyhow, what I meant to say briefly was that my reactions to your post are just
quick reactions to the Wittgensteinianisms from the post-Wittgensteinian
perspectives, more of Quine and Sellars in this case, than of Fodor. Kripkean
talk tends to leap right over those, for better or worse. But regarding
horse-cow or even kitty-cow, Fodor calls that the disjunction problem, if you
want to follow up on it.
http://www.google.com/#hl=en&source=hp&q=fodor+disjunction+
But, well, yes, you see quickly it is a _causal_ _theory_ of _representation_,
all terms that I guess you find anti-Wittgensteinian. Yet, I think the problem
itself, if not Fodor's solutions (such as they are) to it, remain.
Josh
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