jrstern wrote: >Joseph Polanik wrote: >>consequently, there is no basis for claiming that Searle is an >>interactive substance dualist. Searle is only alleging that there is >>one substance or kind of object, physical objects. >He says there are at least two kinds of substance, because computers >are the wrong kind to "cause" consciousness. that would still be one kind of 'stuff'. brains and computers are made from the same chemical elements. so just one 'substance' in the traditional jargon it seems more likely that he's postulating that the brain has a set of properties that enable it to cause experience or consciousness. that might make him a property dualist; assuming, that the properties that cause consciousness are different from the properties that explain purely physical effects (measurable phenomena). this postulate is independent of any conclusion derived from the CRA as to whether computer chips could or could not implement that second set of properties. Joe -- Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@ http://what-am-i.net @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@ ========================================== Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/