Gordon writes: > Dennett goes to great lengths to deny or obfuscate what should seem obvious: > that people really do have such things as conscious beliefs and desires in > their heads, just as normal people understand these things. But to allow for > such common sense, Dennett would need to admit that people have something > computers apparently cannot have, an idea he resists. > > For Dennett and for cognitive science in general, it's all about furthering > the research program and ideology of strong AI. Where they cannot describe > unconscious computers as conscious humans they try instead to describe > conscious humans as unconscious computers. I find it dehumanizing. > > -gts Hi Gordon, Thanks for your reply and offer about the necessary complications for your LR. I find you and Lanier today in some harmonic convergence. You'll enjoy an anecdote, then, from Jaron Lanier's Manifesto, _You are not a Gadget_: On zombies, Lanier writes: "I claim that there is one measurable difference between a zombie and a person: a zombie has a different philosophy. Therefore, zombies, can only be detected if they happen to be professional philosophers. A philosopher like Daniel Dennett is obviously a zombie. [new parag] Zombies and the rest of us do not have a symmetrical relationaship. Unfortunately, it is only possible for nonzombies to observe the telltale sign of zombiehood. To zombies, everyone looks the same. [new parag] If there are enough zombies recruited into our world, I worry about the potential for a self-fulfilling prophecy" (44). One recalls the mantra: Govt. is the problem, not the solution. Anyway.... Cheers, Budd ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/