--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Gordon Swobe <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > Dennett denies the reality of mental states as normal people think of them. He denies that you have direct knowledge of your own experience (qualia) and denies that you have such things in your head as thoughts, beliefs and desires. Does he denial the reality? Stuart says "No." It seems to me that your next paragraph is on the mark. > He denies these common sense ideas because, according to the behaviorist tradition from which he hails, mental states do not lend themselves to scientific (third-person) observation and so ought to be disregarded as something less than real... for the purposes study, of acquiring knowledge. What I find intriguing is D's notion of "intentional stance." He obviously HAS ONE. He isn't merely attributing it to himself But when he comes to me, he only allows for attribution. But he does not actually attribute a intentional stance to me. He only allows "as if" because, in the end, for him, I'm no different from a robot that appears intentional. bruce ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/