"Dennett is the great demystifier of consciousness. According to him there is, in the final analysis, nothing fundamentally inexplicable about the way we attribute intentions and conscious feelings to people. We often attribute feelings or intentions metaphorically to non-human things, after all. We might say our car is a bit tired today, or that our pot plant is thirsty. At the end of the day, our attitude to other human beings is just a version - a much more sophisticated version - of the same strategy. Attributing intentions to human animals makes it much easier to work out what their behaviour is likely to be. It pays us, in short, to adopt the intentional stance when trying to understand human beings." ************************************************************************\ *********************** The Dennett quoted above doesn't sound like the Dennett presented here. Dennett above starts with with the everyday notion of conscious, intentional person as an obvious given who naturally attributes the same to other being who seem the same. The Dennett presented here insists that consciousness is caused by the brain and in doing so must reconcile the language of brain mechanics with the language of purpose. And just what is he demystifing? The above paragraph doesn't say. I say he is questioning the need to view consciousness as either the manifestation of some spirit or the causal end-product of a neurological event. bruce